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470 B.R. 109
Bankr. D.P.R.
2012
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Background

  • Debtor filed Chapter 13 petition on August 2, 2011 and claimed a $20,791.78 homestead exemption on a real property where a house is under construction.
  • Trustee objected that the property is not a residence and thus not exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
  • Court granted Trustee’s objection; Debtor moved for reconsideration alleging excusable neglect and ongoing construction funded by personal loans.
  • Debtor asserts the property and surrounding lands are part of the residence and that her family uses them as part of their living space.
  • Trustee argues Debtor does not live in the Real Property and the structure is not a residence; Debtor’s delay in answering was excusable neglect but merits review on reconsideration.
  • Court grants reconsideration to the extent of excusable neglect but denies merits; it holds the Real Property is not Debtor’s residence and denies the homestead exemption.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether Debtor's motion for reconsideration is proper under Rule 60(b). Lyamour contends excusable neglect justifies relief. Trustee argues reconsideration is extraordinary and merits review under narrow standards. Motion reviewed under Rule 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect; granted for excusable neglect.
Whether the Real Property qualifies as a 'residence' under § 522(d)(1). Debtor asserts the property and adjacent lands used with residence can be exempted. Trustee contends Debtor does not reside there; primary residence is at Debtor's mother's house. Real Property not Debtor's residence; cannot claim homestead exemption.
Whether the Trustee met burden to show exemption not properly claimed under 4003(c). Trustee must prove the exemption is not properly claimed. Debtor argues trustee failed to establish lack of occupancy and ownership. Trustee satisfied burden; Debtor cannot claim exemption.
Whether Debtor's principal dwelling is the mother's house, affecting eligibility for exemptions on adjacent property. Debtor claims use of adjacent lot constitutes part of residence. Debtor does not own the Real Property or occupy it as principal dwelling. Debtor's principal dwelling is the mother's house; contiguous property not exempt.

Key Cases Cited

  • Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993) (excusable neglect test for Rule 60(b) relief; equitable factors)
  • Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1991) (timeliness of motions; excusable neglect standards)
  • Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (Rule 60(b)(6) exclusivity; exceptions to first five subsections)
  • Ungar v. PLO, 599 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010) (Rule 60(b) framework; excusable neglect considerations)
  • In re Edwards, 281 B.R. 439 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (burden of proof under 4003(c) for exemptions; bankruptcy context)
  • In re Marcus, N/A (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (cases cited by debtor on homestead interpretation)
  • Fiffy v. Nickless (In re Fiffy), 293 B.R. 550 (1st Cir. BAP 2003) (broad interpretations of homestead; distinguishable factuals)
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Case Details

Case Name: In Re Lozada Rivera
Court Name: United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
Date Published: May 3, 2012
Citations: 470 B.R. 109; 2012 WL 1560387; 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1962; 19-00523
Docket Number: 19-00523
Court Abbreviation: Bankr. D.P.R.
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