in Re Lorin A. Strickland, 358 S.W.3d 818

Relator Mother and Father were divorced on January 29, 2010, with joint managing conservators and Mother given exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence; no geographic limit in the decree.
In November 2011 Father moved to modify and sought a temporary restraining order, alleging Mother planned to move to Florida with the children to live with her boyfriend.
The trial court granted a TRO restricting the children’s residence to Denton and nearby Texas counties and set a hearing for December 5, 2011.
At the December hearing, the court ordered a social study and stated the parties should remain in the area until it was completed.
Mother filed a petition for mandamus; this court granted emergency relief and stayed the December 5 order on December 12, 2011.
The issue is whether the temporary order that restricted residence changed who has the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence in violation of Tex. Fam. Code § 156.006(b).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the temporary order violate 156.006(b) by changing designation of primary residence?	Strickland: order changes who designates residence without qualifying exception.	Father: order is a permissible temporary measure under the statute.	Yes; order effected a change in designation in violation of 156.006(b).
Do any statutory exceptions to 156.006(b)(1)–(3) apply to this case?	Strickland contends no applicable exception.	Father argues temporary need to protect child health if relocation occurs.	No, none of the exceptions apply here.
Was there sufficient evidence to support an exception based on the child’s health or development under 156.006(b)(1)?	Strickland asserts no demonstrated significant impairment.	Father asserts potential harm from relocation to emotional development.	Evidence did not prove significant impairment of emotional development; exception not satisfied.

In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. 2007) (mandamus review of temporary orders in family cases)
In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2010) (mandamus relief for temporary orders; standard of review)
In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2009) (deference to trial court factual findings; de novo review of legal determinations)
In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard for trial court decisions in mandamus)
In re Rather, 2011 WL 6141677 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) (evidence required for impairment of emotional development; WL cited but not official reporter)