In Re Levin
289 Ga. 170
Ga.2011Background
- Levin began practicing law in 1996 and repeatedly visited sexually oriented chat rooms, exposing himself via webcam.
- In 2007 he contacted a 16-year-old girl with the mother’s permission; he communicated via Facebook and was later deceived by an officer posing as the girl.
- Levin revealed a webcam image of himself touching his penis and arranged to meet the girl; he was arrested at the meeting location.
- Following arrest, Levin halted practice for six months (Oct 2007–Apr 2008) and sought treatment; he underwent 54 weeks of group therapy and ongoing maintenance therapy with positive rehabilitation indicators.
- He received criminal penalties (jail time, probation, community service, fines) and probation terms restricting his online activity, contact with the victim’s family, court access, and requiring counseling; he apologized publicly and in writing.
- The Special Master recommended a six-month suspension with reinstatement contingent on continued therapy; the State Bar urged a longer suspension; the Supreme Court ultimately imposed a 24-month suspension with conditions for reinstatement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sanction appropriate for moral turpitude conduct | State Bar: 12–24 months appropriate; conduct involves moral turpitude. | Levin: six months sufficient; delay and voluntary cessation should be mitigating. | 24-month suspension with conditions for reinstatement. |
| Whether delay/cessation should mitigate discipline | Delay attributable to the disciplinary process warrants mitigation. | Delay not attributable to State Bar; mitigation improper. | Delay and voluntary cessation not mitigating. |
| Was the misconduct a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(3) (moral turpitude affecting fitness to practice)? | Conduct involved dishonesty and breach of trust in attempting to entrap a minor. | Disciplinary rule requires direct connection to the practice; no violence or explicit professional targeting. | Yes; constitutes moral turpitude affecting fitness. |
| Nunc pro tunc suspension allowed? | Retroactive suspension acceptable under precedent. | Six-month voluntary cessation should satisfy reinstatement. | Not nunc pro tunc; enforce 24-month suspension with conditions. |
Key Cases Cited
- In the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156 (Ga. 2010) (mitigation considerations; schedule balancing in discipline)
- In the Matter of Ortman, 289 Ga. 130 (Ga. 2011) (considers criminal penalty as non-mitigating factor)
- In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488 (Ga. 1981) (penalty deterrence and fitness to practice guidance)
- In the Matter of Williams, 266 Ga. 132 (Ga. 1996) (discusses connection between conduct and fitness; dissent cited by Levin)
- In the Matter of Jackel, 275 Ga. 568 (Ga. 2002) (disbarment after misdemeanors related to sexual misconduct)
- In the Matter of Stewart, 275 Ga. 199 (Ga. 2002) (18-month suspension for solicitation related to sexual favors)
- In the Matter of Threlkeld, 273 Ga. 331 (Ga. 2001) (disbarment after public indecency involving a juvenile client)
- In the Matter of Holloway, 266 Ga. 599 (Ga. 1996) (three-year suspension for unlawful invasion of privacy)
- In the Matter of Yarbrough, 264 Ga. 720 (Ga. 1994) (eighteen-month suspension for misdemeanor sexual battery)
- In the Matter of Brooks, 264 Ga. 583 (Ga. 1994) (three-year suspension for multiple misdemeanor sexual battery offenses)
- In the Matter of Suttle, 288 Ga. 14 (Ga. 2010) (delay not attributable to State Bar; mitigation)