In re Lee
411 S.W.3d 445
| Tex. | 2013Background
- Parents Stephanie Lee and Benjamin Redus, joint managing conservators, mediated a modification to a 2007 parentage order giving Benjamin exclusive right to designate primary residence; the parties signed a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) meeting §153.0071(d) formalities (bold irrevocability language, signatures of parties and attorneys).
- The MSA included a protective provision enjoining Stephanie’s husband Scott (a registered sex offender) from being within five miles of the child and requiring notice of his whereabouts; Scott was a nonparty.
- At a prove-up before an associate judge Benjamin testified to allegations about Scott’s conduct; the associate judge refused to enter judgment. Benjamin then withdrew consent and the district court conducted a de novo hearing and denied entry of judgment, finding the MSA was "not in the child’s best interest," and set the case for trial.
- Stephanie petitioned for mandamus arguing that §153.0071(e) entitles a party to judgment on a statutorily compliant MSA and a court may decline entry on best-interest grounds only if the family-violence exception in §153.0071(e-1) applies.
- The Texas Supreme Court held the trial court abused its discretion: when an MSA complies with §153.0071(d) and no family-violence exception applies, a court may not refuse to enter judgment based on a broad best-interest inquiry; mandamus conditionally granted.
- The Court emphasized alternative protective mechanisms (DFPS reporting, temporary orders, appointment of representatives, continuances, arbitration/mediation safeguards) remain available and that §153.0071(e) limits judicial reexamination of MSAs to the narrow family-violence circumstance in (e-1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lee) | Defendant's Argument (Redus / State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may refuse to enter judgment on a statutorily compliant MSA based on a best-interest inquiry | Lee: §153.0071(e) makes a party "entitled to judgment" on a compliant MSA; best-interest review is displaced except where §153.0071(e-1) family-violence exception applies | Redus/State: Family Code’s overarching best-interest mandate allows courts to refuse enforcement of an MSA that is not in the child’s best interest; public policy requires judicial oversight | Court: A trial court may not deny entry of judgment on a properly executed MSA based on a broad best-interest inquiry; only the narrow (e-1) family-violence exception permits refusal |
| Scope of the phrase "notwithstanding Rule 11 ... or another rule of law" in §153.0071(e) | Lee: Means §153.0071 controls and displaces other enforcement doctrines that would allow unilateral withdrawal or revocation of MSAs | Redus: Should not be read to override the Family Code’s best-interest protections | Court: "Notwithstanding" shows the Legislature intended §153.0071 to control; specific MSA rule prevails over more general best-interest provisions absent the (e-1) exception |
| Whether courts must be powerless to protect a child endangered by an MSA | Lee: Courts retain other statutory protective tools (DFPS reporting, temporary orders, continuances, appointment of representatives) to address endangerment without invalidating §153.0071(e) | Redus/Dissent: If an MSA places a child at risk (endangerment), the court must be able to decline entry as part of its best-interest duty | Court: Agrees courts are not powerless — they must use other statutory protections and may continue hearings or invoke DFPS — but may not perform a broad best-interest reweighing to refuse entry absent (e-1) family-violence findings |
| Remedy and procedural posture: mandamus availability to compel entry of judgment on MSA | Lee: Mandamus appropriate because appellate remedy is inadequate and mediation’s benefits would be nullified by post-hoc best-interest rejections | Redus: Disagreed that mandamus was appropriate if court properly exercised discretion to protect the child | Court: Mandamus conditionally granted because the trial court abused discretion in denying entry on best-interest grounds not authorized by §153.0071 |
Key Cases Cited
- Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. 2011) (statutory construction: review de novo; "notwithstanding" language evidences controlling legislative intent)
- Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Samudio, 370 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. 2012) (statutory interpretation objective: give effect to Legislature’s intent and plain text)
- Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. 2012) (plain statutory text is primary guide to legislative intent)
- In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. 2008) (courts must avoid rendering statutory language surplusage)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (recognition of presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests)
- Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976) (Holley factors govern best-interest analysis)
- Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. 2003) (parental presumption regarding child-rearing decisions)
- Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. 2012) (MSA enforcement and mediator/arbitrator role under MSA procedures)