In re Kirchner
216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876
Cal.2017Background
- Kristopher Kirchner committed murder at age 16 (1993), was tried as an adult, convicted of first‑degree murder with special‑circumstance findings, and sentenced to life without parole (LWOP).
- Pre‑sentencing juvenile referral recommended treatment and noted rehabilitative potential; the trial court nevertheless imposed LWOP.
- Kirchner’s direct appeal was dismissed for failure to file an opening brief; he filed a habeas petition in 2014 asserting Miller error (sentencing without proper consideration of youth factors).
- The superior court granted habeas relief and ordered resentencing; the Court of Appeal reversed, ruling Penal Code §1170(d)(2) provided an adequate statutory remedy that displaced habeas corpus.
- The California Supreme Court granted review and held §1170(d)(2) is not an adequate or exclusive remedy for Miller error and that Kirchner may obtain Miller resentencing via habeas corpus.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability/retroactivity of Miller to Kirchner | Miller (and Montgomery) apply retroactively; Kirchner’s LWOP is presumptively unlawful because trial court did not consider youth factors | Initially contested retroactivity, later conceded trial court failed to consider Miller factors but relied on §1170(d)(2) as remedy | Miller/Montgomery apply; habeas relief available because sentencing did not comply with Miller and Montgomery requires remedying that error |
| Whether §1170(d)(2) is an adequate legal remedy that precludes habeas | §1170(d)(2) is not tailored to cure Miller error and thus cannot displace habeas | §1170(d)(2) offers recall and resentencing to parole‑eligible terms and therefore remedies Miller concerns | §1170(d)(2) is not an adequate or exclusive remedy for Miller error and does not bar habeas relief |
| Whether petitioner must exhaust §1170(d)(2) before seeking habeas | Petitioner need not exhaust §1170(d)(2); habeas may directly obtain Miller resentencing | Court of Appeal: petitioners should use §1170(d)(2) (or at least it must be exhausted) | Court rejects exhaustion requirement; §1170(d)(2) need not be pursued exclusively or first |
| Burden and scope of resentencing inquiry under §1170(d)(2) vs. Miller | Miller requires mandatory consideration of youth factors and, where appropriate, parole opportunity; §1170(d)(2) inquiry may not ensure that | §1170(d)(2) permits consideration of relevant factors and could be read to impose Miller‑like burdens | §1170(d)(2) does not guarantee Miller’s required inquiry or burden; the statute cannot be judicially rewritten to supply those guarantees |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (juvenile death penalty unconstitutional; juveniles have diminished culpability)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violates Eighth Amendment; mandates meaningful parole opportunity)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth’s distinctive attributes)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (U.S. 2016) (Miller announced substantive rule and is retroactive)
- People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (Cal. 2014) (interpreting Miller factors and rejecting reliance on future recall as cure for initial Miller defects)
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (Cal. 2016) (distinguishing sentences that functionally afford parole hearings from LWOP implicating Miller)
- In re Gandolfo, 36 Cal.3d 889 (Cal. 1984) (habeas disfavored where statutory remedy is well suited to vindicate the right)