195 A.3d 364
Vt.2018Background
- Four defendants (Barber, Smith, Rousseau, Burke) pled guilty between 2005–2013 and later filed post-conviction relief (PCR) petitions asserting their plea colloquies failed to satisfy V.R.Cr.P. 11(f) (factual-basis requirement).
- While these PCR appeals were pending, this Court decided In re Bridger, 2017 VT 79, holding Rule 11(f) requires a defendant’s personal oral admission of the facts, that stipulations/waivers cannot substitute, and that substantial compliance does not apply.
- The State argued Bridger announced a new rule that should not be applied retroactively to convictions final on direct review; the Court adopted Teague’s framework for retroactivity in the PCR context.
- The Court analyzed whether Bridger announced a new rule and, if so, whether Teague’s exceptions (substantive rule or watershed procedural rule) compelled retroactive application.
- The Court held Bridger’s personal-admission requirement was consistent with prior Vermont precedent (not a new rule), but its holdings that stipulations/waivers cannot substitute and that substantial compliance is inapplicable were new rules; neither Teague exception applied.
- Applying pre-Bridger law, the Court affirmed denial of PCR for Barber, Smith, and Burke, and reversed/remanded for Rousseau (whose colloquy lacked a personal admission of factual basis).
Issues
| Issue | Petitioner’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bridger applies retroactively to PCR cases pending when decided | Bridger should apply to the pending PCRs | Bridger announced a new procedural rule that should not apply retroactively | Bridger announced new rules; retroactivity is governed by Teague; Bridger’s new rules do not apply retroactively |
| Whether Bridger announced a new rule about Rule 11(f) | Bridger merely clarified existing law; not a new rule | Bridger created new obligations by disallowing stipulations and rejecting substantial compliance | Personal-admission rule not new; prohibition on stipulations and rejection of substantial-compliance are new rules |
| Whether any Teague exceptions save retroactive application (substantive or watershed) | Bridger is necessary for voluntary pleas and accuracy; thus watershed | Bridger is procedural, not substantive, and not a watershed rule | Neither exception applies; Bridger’s new rules are nonretroactive |
| Application of pre-Bridger standard to each petitioner (Barber, Smith, Rousseau, Burke) | Each petitioner urges Bridger standard to invalidate colloquies | State argues pre-Bridger standards control for these PCRs | Under pre-Bridger law: Barber affirmed, Smith affirmed, Burke affirmed, Rousseau reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (established framework limiting retroactive application of new criminal-procedure rules)
- Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (explained Teague exceptions and narrowness of watershed rule)
- Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (states may adopt different retroactivity rules; clarifies scope of retroactivity inquiry)
- State v. Yates, 169 Vt. 20, 726 A.2d 483 (Vt. rule requiring defendant’s admission of facts in plea colloquy)
- State v. Cleary, 175 Vt. 142, 824 A.2d 509 (permitted counsel’s stipulation to supply factual basis under pre-Bridger precedent)
- State v. White, 182 Vt. 510, 944 A.2d 203 (Vermont alignment with federal retroactivity principles)
- State v. Shattuck, 141 Vt. 523, 450 A.2d 1122 (earlier Vermont rule applying law change to cases on direct review)
- McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (Rule 11 procedures are safeguards, not constitutionally mandated exacting requirements)