In re: Jones
847 F.3d 1293
10th Cir.2017Background
- Julius Darius Jones, convicted of felony murder in Oklahoma (2002) and sentenced to death; direct appeal and state post-conviction relief denied; initial federal habeas denied and affirmed; certiorari denied (2016).
- Jones seeks authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) to file a second or successive § 2254 petition asserting a Hurst-based claim that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravators outweigh mitigators before imposing death.
- To obtain authorization Jones must make a prima facie showing that his claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to collateral cases by the Supreme Court (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)).
- Jones argues Hurst announced a new substantive (or watershed procedural) rule entitled to retroactive effect under Teague principles; he relies in part on Seventh Circuit authority (Price).
- The Tenth Circuit declined to decide whether Hurst announced a new substantive rule and instead held the Supreme Court has not made Hurst retroactive; under Tenth Circuit precedent the court cannot declare a new rule retroactive for § 2244(b)(2)(A) purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Jones's Argument | Government/Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Hurst announce a new rule of constitutional law relevant to his sentencing claim? | Hurst announced that the weighing decision must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. | Implicitly disputes application here and emphasizes procedural posture. | Court assumed arguendo that Hurst announced a new rule but did not decide it definitively. |
| If Hurst is a new rule, is it retroactive to cases on collateral review? | Hurst is substantive (or watershed procedural) and thus retroactive under Teague/Welch. | The Supreme Court has not held Hurst retroactive; only the Supreme Court can make a rule retroactive for § 2244(b)(2)(A). | Not retroactive as a matter of § 2244(b)(2)(A); Jones cannot rely on circuit-level retroactivity analysis. |
| May the Tenth Circuit independently declare a Supreme Court rule retroactive for authorization purposes? | Jones urges the court to apply general Teague principles and hold Hurst retroactive. | Court cites Tyler, Cannon, and Gieswein: only the Supreme Court can ‘make’ a rule retroactive for § 2244(b)(2)(A). | Tenth Circuit will not declare retroactivity; it must rely on Supreme Court holdings. |
| Does Jones meet gatekeeping requirements of § 2244(b) to obtain authorization? | He has a Hurst-based claim and seeks authorization to proceed. | Government argues the claim may have been raised via ineffective-assistance theory earlier, but court need not decide that because the retroactivity failure is dispositive. | Denied: Jones failed to make the prima facie showing required under § 2244(b)(2)(A). |
Key Cases Cited
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016) (Supreme Court decision on jury findings and capital sentencing)
- Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (U.S. 2001) (only Supreme Court can make a new rule retroactive for collateral review)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (framework for retroactivity of new rules)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (U.S. 2016) (new substantive rules generally apply retroactively)
- In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2015) (circuit may not itself declare Supreme Court rule retroactive for § 2244(b)(2)(A))
- Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2002) (same point on retroactivity authority)
- Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (Seventh Circuit decision treating Hurst-like rule as substantive and retroactive; rejected by Tenth Circuit)
- Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2013) (cited for § 2244(b) gatekeeping standards)