In re Johnson
246 Cal. App. 4th 1396
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Ezekiel Johnson was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy for the 2005 beating and killing of Salvador Espinoza; jury was instructed on three theories: (1) Johnson as the actual perpetrator (premeditated murder), (2) direct aiding and abetting, and (3) aiding and abetting/ conspiracy with murder as a natural and probable consequence of an assault.
- Facts supporting guilt included Johnson’s statements he wanted to kill the victim, his participation in further blows, placing a milk crate over the victim’s neck and jumping on it, and stabbing the victim’s neck. Forensic testimony could not determine whether the initial or subsequent beatings caused death, nor that the stab wounds were fatal.
- At trial the jury found Johnson guilty of first degree murder and conspiracy to assault; it rejected allegations that he personally used a deadly weapon (knife and milk crate). The verdict form did not indicate which theory the jury relied upon.
- After conviction became final, People v. Chiu changed the law: an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; first-degree liability for an aider requires direct aiding-and-abetting proof.
- Johnson filed a habeas petition arguing Chiu requires reversal because the jury could have relied on the now-invalid natural and probable consequences theory; the Court of Appeal exercised original jurisdiction and reviewed prejudice under Chapman.
Issues
| Issue | Johnson's Argument | Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chiu’s abolition of the natural-and-probable-consequences (NPC) basis for first-degree murder requires reversal of Johnson’s conviction | Chiu applies retroactively; because jury was instructed on and prosecutor argued NPC theory, court cannot say verdict was based solely on valid direct-aid theory | Chiu narrowed liability but did not change the statute; habeas relief requires showing as a matter of law that conduct is no longer criminal (Mutch/Earley standard) | Granted habeas: court found error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and vacated the first-degree conviction; People may retry on direct aiding theory or accept reduction to second-degree murder |
| Standard for prejudice when a new rule (Chiu) invalidates a theory used at trial | Chapman beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies (as in Lucero/Hansen) | Older habeas cases (Mutch/Earley) require showing conduct no longer criminal as matter of law | Court applied Chapman (following Lucero/Hansen) and concluded it could not find beyond a reasonable doubt the jury relied only on a valid theory |
| Significance of jury’s rejection of deadly-weapon enhancements | Supports inference jury did not find Johnson was the actual premeditated killer and may have relied on NPC theory | Jury could have rejected enhancements for other reasons (e.g., crate not a deadly weapon) | The rejection of weapon allegations reinforces but does not conclusively determine that the NPC theory influenced the verdict; contributes to finding lack of harmlessness |
| Remedy after finding non-harmless instructional error under Chiu | Vacate first-degree conviction; allow People to retry on direct aiding theory or accept reduction to second-degree murder | — | Court ordered judgment vacated and remanded; People may retry or the court shall enter conviction for second-degree murder if People decline prosecution |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (abolished NPC basis for convicting an aider of first-degree premeditated murder)
- People v. Guiton, 4 Cal.4th 1116 (1993) (when jury is instructed on alternate valid and invalid theories, reversal required unless verdict is based on valid theory)
- In re Lucero, 200 Cal.App.4th 38 (2011) (applies Chapman review where a change in law like Chun affects final convictions)
- In re Hansen, 227 Cal.App.4th 906 (2014) (followed Lucero applying Chapman to post-conviction claims after a substantive change in law)
- People v. Chun, 45 Cal.4th 1172 (2009) (reinterpreted felony-murder rule; used as a comparative change-of-law example)
- People v. Mutch, 4 Cal.3d 389 (1971) (older habeas precedent requiring showing as a matter of law that conduct is no longer criminal)
- In re Earley, 14 Cal.3d 122 (1975) (similar to Mutch; addresses relief where a statutory interpretation change negates the underlying offense)