323 Conn. 690
Conn.2016Background
- Mother (respondent) had her parental rights to a prior child voluntarily terminated as a minor; later had a second child, Jayce, removed by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) after concerns about substance use, unstable housing and inappropriate caregivers.
- DCF filed coterminous petitions (neglect and termination) for Jayce on Sept. 16, 2014; Jayce was adjudicated neglected Jan. 23, 2015; trial on termination was delayed to allow additional time for rehabilitation.
- Court-ordered specific steps and numerous services (therapy, parent coaching, substance‑abuse treatment, medication management, Birth-to-Three) were provided; mother attended services but repeatedly denied marijuana was problematic and intermittently refused medication and full engagement in therapy.
- Court-appointed psychological evaluator concluded mother related well to Jayce but had ongoing PTSD/borderline/dysthymic issues, poor engagement, and recommended 8–12 additional months before reunification could be recommended; evaluator favored permanency via termination over further delay.
- Trial court found DCF made reasonable efforts, later clarified it found mother was unwilling/unable to benefit from those efforts, and concluded mother failed to rehabilitate; parental rights were terminated. Mother appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Petitioner's Argument | Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether relying on mother’s prior voluntary termination (when she was a minor) under Conn. Gen. Stat. §17a-112(j)(3)(E) violated procedural due process | Reliance on prior termination is permissible where statutory elements are otherwise proved; mother received procedural protections (notice, counsel, specific steps, extra time) so no risk of erroneous deprivation | Mother lacked notice that consenting as a minor could permit later coterminous petitions; consensual prior termination and passage of time make prior termination an unreliable indicator of current fitness | Court held no due process violation: mother received same or greater procedural protections she would have under alternative statutory subsection; consideration of prior termination did not create risk of erroneous deprivation |
| Whether the court erred in finding DCF made reasonable efforts and/or failed to find mother unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts | DCF contended it provided extensive, targeted services and gave extra time; court could find efforts reasonable and that mother was unable/unwilling to benefit | Mother argued services, progress, additional visitation, and provider optimism showed adequate rehabilitation and that DCF’s efforts were insufficient or mischaracterized | Court affirmed: DCF made reasonable efforts; court’s articulation confirmed it found mother unwilling/unable to benefit from efforts, supported by the record |
| Whether there was insufficient evidence to support finding mother failed to rehabilitate | DCF argued record (relapse, denial of marijuana problem, refusal of meds, poor engagement in therapy, evaluator’s opinion) supported failure-to-rehabilitate finding | Mother pointed to compliance with some steps, progress in visitation, and providers’ statements that with supports/medication she could improve | Court affirmed: substantial evidence and reasonable inferences support finding mother failed to achieve rehabilitation within a reasonable time; contrary evidence did not make the finding unreasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (framework for balancing procedural due‑process protections)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (parental rights as fundamental liberty interest)
- In re Tayler F., 296 Conn. 524 (due process review in termination cases)
- In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557 (importance of parental liberty interest in termination context)
- In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539 (petitioner need prove reasonable efforts or parent’s inability/unwillingness to benefit)
- In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485 (interpretation of statutory termination grounds)
- In re Gabriella A., 319 Conn. 775 (review standard for finding inability/unwillingness to benefit from services)
- In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569 (standard of review for failure-to-rehabilitate findings)
- Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433 (appellate review principles; construing evidence in light most favorable to sustaining judgment)