in Re Jamarion Lakwa Lawhorn
330655
| Mich. Ct. App. | May 18, 2017Background
- On Aug. 4, 2014, 12-year-old Jamarion Lawhorn carried a concealed knife, met and played with the 9-year-old victim and others, retrieved a hidden knife from sand, and repeatedly stabbed the victim, who later died.
- Lawhorn called 9-1-1 and told the operator he had just killed someone; he also told a detective at the hospital he wanted to die and to be executed.
- Lawhorn presented an insanity defense at trial and alternatively sought a guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict; the jury was instructed on first- and second-degree murder and guilty-but-mentally-ill options.
- The jury rejected insanity and guilty-but-mentally-ill verdicts and convicted Lawhorn of first-degree premeditated murder.
- On appeal Lawhorn challenged (1) refusal to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, (2) admission of an autopsy photograph, (3) failure to suppress his hospital statement (sua sponte), (4) trial counsel ineffectiveness for not moving to suppress or objecting, and (5) that guilty (not guilty-but-mentally-ill) verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter | Prosecution: any instructional error harmless because jury convicted of 1st-degree and rejected 2nd-degree | Lawhorn: trial court should have given voluntary manslaughter instruction as lesser included offense | Harmless error: conviction of 1st-degree and rejection of 2nd-degree shows jury unwilling to convict on lesser; manslaughter instruction not required |
| Admission of autopsy photo | Prosecution: photo corroborates pathologist and supports intent element; not unduly prejudicial | Lawhorn: photo was inflammatory and should have been excluded under MRE 403 | No abuse of discretion: photo relevant to force/intent and not excluded for gruesomeness alone |
| Failure to suppress hospital statement (sua sponte) | Prosecution: statement admissible; defendant voluntarily spoke after Miranda warning | Lawhorn: as a 12-year-old he could not validly waive Miranda; court should have suppressed statement | No relief: Lawhorn effectively waived challenge by relying on statement at trial; assuming error or counsel deficiency, no prejudice shown |
| Verdict was against great weight; should be guilty-but-mentally-ill | Lawhorn: experts agreed he had mental illness, so jury should have returned guilty-but-mentally-ill | Prosecution: jury assesses credibility and could reject defense experts based on facts and witness testimony | No miscarriage of justice: evidence did not preponderate so heavily against verdict to warrant reversal; jury reasonably could reject expert opinions |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Zak, 184 Mich. App. 1 (1990) (failure to give manslaughter instruction is harmless where jury convicts of greater offense after rejecting intermediate lesser offense)
- People v Beach, 429 Mich. 450 (1988) (harmless-error framework for lesser-included-offense instructions)
- People v Cornell, 466 Mich. 335 (2002) (heat-of-passion provocation standard for voluntary manslaughter)
- People v Roper, 286 Mich. App. 77 (2009) (provocation and manslaughter analysis)
- People v Gayheart, 285 Mich. App. 202 (2009) (admissibility of photographs: relevance vs. undue prejudice)
- People v Mesik (On Reconsideration), 285 Mich. App. 535 (2009) (photographs may prove elements like intent)
- People v Riley, 465 Mich. 442 (2001) (party cannot harbor error on appeal after relying on evidence at trial)
- People v Carter, 462 Mich. 206 (2000) (waiver principles and appellate review limits)
- People v Carbin, 463 Mich. 590 (2001) (ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance plus prejudice)
- People v Carines, 460 Mich. 750 (1999) (plain-error standard for unpreserved constitutional claims)
- People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich. App. 467 (2009) (standard for new trial on great-weight-of-evidence and definition of mental illness)
- People v Drossart, 99 Mich. App. 66 (1980) (jury may reject expert psychiatric testimony and weigh lay evidence)
- People v Lemmon, 456 Mich. 625 (1998) (criteria for overturning verdict as against great weight of evidence)
- Vial v Vial, 369 Mich. 534 (1963) (trier of fact not required to accept expert opinion over lay testimony)