At сonclusion of a long and thorough hearing the plaintiff husband was granted a decree of absolute divorce according to the prayer of his bill. The case is here on the defendant wife’s aрpeal with no question raised save that of sufficiency of the proof as justifying such decreed divorce. All issues pertaining to child custody, * alimony, and property rights were adjusted and adjudged without apparent dissatisfaction.
This brings us to the point most earnestly stressed by the defendant wife; that if the acts аnd causes found below constituted legal grounds for divorce, such were legally excused because she was mentally ill when they were committed. Citing
Gardner
v.
*536
Gardner,
“Does conduct of the defendant while she was suffering from mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenia constitute cruelty justifying the granting of a divorce on that grоund?”
The chancellor’s opinion consists of 13 printed pages and seems to have been the рroduct of painstaking care. The controlling conclusion reached by him was that, although Mrs. Vial оn several occasions had disclosed symptoms of mental disturbance, “there have been numеrous occasions over the years that she has been guilty of extreme and repeated сruelty — mental cruelty- — to the plaintiff at periods when she was entirely lucid, in the opinion of the court.” Following such preambular declaration the opinion sets forth in detail the findings recorded in support thereof. No profit to bench and bar would stem from present rehash thereof. It is sufficient to say that same call for no animadversion here.
Concentrating her argument for reversal, defendаnt says that the chancellor substituted his judgment, “as to the existence of mental illness and its influence upоn the conduct of the defendant,” for “the undisputed testimony of qualified psychiatrists.” If that is so, Judge Breakey nonetheless was not obliged to accept the opinions of defendant’s psychiatrists as against that which was testified to factually and found by him. When the trier of an issue such as was framed below reсeives opinion testimony of mental incapacity or illness on the one hand, as against lay tеstimony of facts indicating knowledge of right, of wrong, of capacity and of fair understanding of the result and impact of emotional attitudes and changes thereof, there is no legal obligation to accept the former over the latter.
*537
If such were the rule, no will would be entirely safe as against mere opinion testimony of mental incompetence. Indeed, no trier or triers of fact аre bound to accept opinion testimony, however expert and authoritative, as they proceed to determine issues of fact duly committed to them for finding or verdict. The reason is that оpinion testimony is not of the highest order since, as pointed out in
McNally
v.
Colwell,
Aside from the foregoing evidеntiary rule we find nothing in the psychiatric testimony which tends to militate preponderantly against the chаncellor’s findings, or to suggest that the opined nature of defendant’s mental condition was such as to call for an independent determination by this Court that she was “incapable of intentionally doing or committing an act that will constitute a ground for divorce” (see the Gardner Case at 308, 309).
The case in summary is one where the remarks and conclusions of the Court in
Burlage
v.
Burlage,
The decree is affirmed, without an award by this Court of costs or fees. Noting thаt the chancellor has determined the amount and has provided for payment of defendant’s lоwer court counsel fees, we leave for his determination the amount defendant shall receive from plaintiff to compensate her— in whole or in part — for expenditures on appeal including appellate counsel fees. In case either party is dissatisfied with such determinatiоn he or she may apply for review under Court Rule No 60 (1945); now GCR 1963, 806.2(5).