330 Conn. 744
Conn.2019Background
- Father (Daniel W.) is imprisoned (effective 29-year sentence) and accused of sexual and domestic misconduct; three minor children live with their maternal grandmother (petitioner).
- Petitioner (grandmother) filed amended petitions to terminate father's parental rights under § 45a‑717(g)(2)(C) (no ongoing parent‑child relationship).
- Trial court found petitioner failed to prove (by clear and convincing evidence) both: (1) there was no ongoing parent‑child relationship; and (2) allowing further time to establish/reestablish a relationship would be detrimental to the children’s best interests; it also found termination not in children’s best interests.
- Appellate Court reversed, holding the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard and made inconsistent factual findings regarding the ‘‘no ongoing parent‑child relationship’’ prong, and ordered a new trial.
- Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification limited to whether the Appellate Court correctly reversed based on the trial court being legally/logically inconsistent; Justice D’Auria (dissent joined by two justices) would instead affirm because the trial court’s independent ‘‘further time would be detrimental’’ finding supports denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred in finding there was an ongoing parent‑child relationship (§45a‑717(g)(2)(C) first prong) | Petitioner: Trial court misapplied the legal test and ignored children’s negative feelings, lack of contact, and recommendations to terminate; clear and convincing proof of no ongoing relationship existed | Respondent: Trial court permissibly weighed evidence and found insufficient proof of no ongoing relationship given prison, protective order, and potential for future reestablishment | Appellate Court found trial court applied wrong legal test and made inconsistent findings; Supreme Court majority addressed errors on the first prong (dissent would not reach this because of second prong) |
| Whether allowing further time to establish/reestablish the relationship would be detrimental to the children (second prong) | Petitioner: Further time would be detrimental given children’s aversion, low likelihood of productive contact, and recommendations for termination | Respondent: Trial court reasonably concluded evidence did not clearly and convincingly show further time would be detrimental; lack of productivity ≠ detriment and possibility of future contact/modification existed | Trial court found petitioner failed to prove detriment; dissent defends this independent basis to deny petitions; majority found aspects of trial court’s subordinate statement clearly erroneous, prompting remand for new trial |
| Whether termination is in the children’s best interest (ultimate dispositional inquiry) | Petitioner: Given father’s incarceration and recommendations, termination is in children’s best interest | Respondent: Trial court found termination not in children’s best interest; children thriving with grandparents | Trial court found termination not in children’s best interest; appellate reversal leads to new trial where this will be reassessed |
| Proper standard and sequencing for analyzing the two prongs of §45a‑717(g)(2)(C) | Petitioner: Courts must apply correct test to first prong before considering second; errors on first prong require reversal | Respondent/Dissent: Trial court may consider second prong independently; even if first prong analysis imperfect, second prong can independently support denial | Majority treats first‑prong errors seriously and orders new trial; dissent argues trial courts may resolve cases on second prong and appellate reversal was unwarranted |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485 (discussing that incarceration alone cannot be sole basis for termination)
- In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 (parental rights termination implicates fundamental constitutional interests)
- In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483 (children’s need for continuity and stability in custody determinations)
- In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516 (statutory interpretation that both prongs of §45a‑717(g)(2)(C) must be proved)
- In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263 (clear and convincing proof required for termination; amended/new petitions permissible)
- In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431 (incarceration alone insufficient for termination)
- In re Jason R., 306 Conn. 438 (read memorandum of decision as a whole; appellate deference to trial court articulation)
- Lewis v. Commissioner of Correction, 117 Conn. App. 120 (presumption that trial court considered the evidence)
- State v. Henderson, 312 Conn. 585 (presumption that trial court applied law and considered facts)
- Walton v. New Hartford, 223 Conn. 155 (similar presumption regarding trial court consideration of evidence)
- In re Juvenile Appeal (83‑DE), 190 Conn. 310 (status of conditions at time of trial controls termination inquiry)
- Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709 (trial courts should address merits of all litigated theories when feasible)
- In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648 (discussion of sequencing best‑interest analysis relative to prongs of termination statute)