In re Jackson, 585 B.R. 410

Debtor Melindia Gail Jackson filed Chapter 7 in Sept. 2013; stay was lifted and her home was foreclosed in 2014; discharge entered Feb. 23, 2015.
In Dec. 2016 Jackson sent four letters to the bankruptcy court seeking various ministerial acts and reconsideration (change of creditor account number; unwind foreclosure; signed order reflecting amended schedules; transfer of venue).
The bankruptcy court issued a Memorandum Decision & Order on Jan. 26, 2017 denying all relief except acknowledging the changed account number, and directed the Clerk to enter a final decree "promptly but not earlier than twenty eight days" after entry.
Jackson filed a notice of appeal on Feb. 23, 2017—28 days after the Jan. 26 order (but before the Clerk’s docketed Text Order of Final Decree on Feb. 24, 2017).
Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a)(1) requires notice of appeal within 14 days; 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) incorporates that time limit for appeals to district courts/BAPs.
The Panel sua sponte addressed whether the late notice deprived it of jurisdiction and concluded the appeal was untimely and jurisdictionally barred.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 14-day appeal deadline in Rule 8002, as incorporated by 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2), is jurisdictional	Jackson implicitly contended appeal was timely or that administrative closing did not start the appeal clock	Appellees argued the § 158(c)(2)/Rule 8002 deadline is jurisdictional and non-waivable	Held: The § 158(c)(2) time limit is jurisdictional; late appeal dismissed
Whether the time limit is statutory (vs. purely procedural rule)	Jackson relied on Rule 8002 as procedural rule of the courts	Appellees argued § 158(c)(2) expressly incorporates Rule 8002 and thus creates a statutory time limit	Held: The deadline is set by statute (§ 158(c)(2) incorporates Rule 8002’s time and thus is statutory)
Whether Hamer and recent Supreme Court precedents require treating § 158(c)(2) as non-jurisdictional	Jackson relied on Hamer/Kontrick-type reasoning to treat deadlines as claim-processing rules	Appellees pointed to Bowles/Henderson and post-Kontrick circuit authority treating § 158(c)(2) as jurisdictional	Held: Applying Hamer and the clear-statement rule, the Panel concluded Congress clearly intended § 158(c)(2) to be jurisdictional
Effect of late filing on this appeal	Jackson argued the administrative Text Order and timing created ambiguity	Appellees argued filing after the 14-day period deprives the BAP of jurisdiction	Held: Notice filed 28 days after entry was untimely under § 158(c)(2); appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017) (clarifies test for when time prescriptions are jurisdictional vs. claim-processing)
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (appeal-timing statute is jurisdictional where statute governs transfer of adjudicatory authority)
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (procedural time bars in rules do not create or withdraw subject-matter jurisdiction)
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (similar statutory language treated as jurisdictional; discusses clear-statement rule)
United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015) (most statutory time bars are claim-processing absent clear congressional intent)