In re J.W., 2018 Ohio 2475

Background

In 2014 Geauga County Department of Job and Family Services (GCDJFS) removed four children from Alison Ward's home after she was intoxicated and threatened the children; children adjudicated dependent (and one abused).\
Children placed in foster care and later with paternal aunt and uncle (the Mannings); father largely absent and did not participate in later proceedings.\
Appellant convicted of attempted child endangering, completed alcohol treatment; she had volatile text exchanges with children in 2017 leading the court to suspend visitation.\
The Mannings were awarded legal custody by a December 2016 order, but after interventions by the children’s GAL and counsel the Mannings later declined custody and the trial court vacated the December 2016 order.\
GCDJFS moved for permanent custody in 2017; after a hearing the court granted permanent custody to GCDJFS and terminated appellant’s parental rights (Sept. 19, 2017).\
Appellant appealed, raising (1) expiration of statutory temporary-custody time limits, (2) court proceeding after vacating the Mannings’ custody order, (3) alleged agency failure in case planning due to a rogue GAL, and (4) alleged conflict because an attorney had briefly been appointed for appellant then later represented GCDJFS. The Eleventh District affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Ward's Argument	GCDJFS / Court's Argument	Held
1. Did the court lose jurisdiction to enter a dispositional order because temporary custody exceeded statutory "sunset" limits?	The trial court exceeded its authority by continuing temporary custody past statutory time limits (R.C. 2151.353/2151.415).	Young Children and later authority permit the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction and enter orders to protect the child when underlying problems remain.	Court retained jurisdiction; no plain-error warranting reversal.
2. Did the court err in proceeding after vacating the Mannings’ legal-custody order instead of returning children to mother or Mannings?	After vacating the Mannings’ order the court lacked authority to address custody changes and should have returned children.	Vacatur did not preclude further proceedings; court may act in children's best interests given unresolved issues.	No error; court could proceed and decide permanency.
3. Did GCDJFS fail reasonable-case-planning/diligent-efforts because a GAL "subverted" reunification?	The GAL’s conduct undermined agency efforts; GCDJFS therefore failed to show reasonable efforts to reunify.	GCDJFS made reasonable efforts (assessments, counseling, supervised visits); R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) permanent-custody motion here did not require R.C. 2151.419 review.	Court found sufficient reasonable efforts; appellant’s challenge rejected.
4. Did appointing an attorney who later represented GCDJFS create a conflict requiring reversal?	Donovan DeLuca had been appointed to represent Ward and later prosecuted custody for GCDJFS; possible conflict deprived Ward of conflict-free counsel.	DeLuca’s appointment was limited, he did no work for Ward, and Ward never met him; no actual conflict.	No actual conflict found on remand; no new custody hearing required.

Key Cases Cited

In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46 (Ohio 1997) (parental-rights termination requires full procedural protections).\
In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92 (Ohio 2002) (termination of parental rights equated to a severe sanction).\
In re Omosun Children, 106 Ohio App.3d 813 (11th Dist. 1995) (held dispositional time limit issues could divest jurisdiction; later limited by higher authority).\
In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d 520 (Ohio 1999) (treated certain timing requirements as directory rather than jurisdictional).\
In re Young Children, 76 Ohio St.3d 632 (Ohio 1996) (juvenile court retains jurisdiction after sunset date and may enter dispositional orders to protect children).\
State v. Gillard, 64 Ohio St.3d 304 (Ohio 1992) (trial court must inquire into possible counsel conflicts; prejudice may be presumed if inquiry is lacking).