In re J.M.P., 2017 Ohio 8126

Background

Father (B.L.G./appellant) filed pro se objection after stepfather S.C.P. petitioned to adopt child, alleging father failed to provide more than de minimis contact for at least one year.
Father requested appointment of counsel claiming indigence and that counsel was necessary to protect his constitutional parent-child rights; trial court denied the request.
Father appealed the denial, raising equal protection and due process claims and arguing Ohio probate courts may appoint counsel for indigent parents in adoption proceedings.
Appellate court noted procedural defects in how assignments of error were framed and that many constitutional arguments were not fully presented below, so review is largely for plain error.
On the merits, the court applied federal precedent (Lassiter/Eldridge) and Ohio authority, concluding current law does not clearly require appointed counsel for indigent parents in private adoption cases and affirmed the denial.
Dissent would have reached the merits under less restrictive review and remanded for an Eldridge balancing by the trial court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether appellant had a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this private adoption	Father: due process and equal protection require counsel because adoption terminates parental rights	Probate court/appellee: no statutory or established constitutional rule entitles indigent parents to counsel in private adoptions	Court: No plain-error; under current law Lassiter/Eldridge balancing does not establish a per se right and trial court did not obviously err in denying counsel
Whether differing treatment between juvenile termination proceedings and private adoptions violates equal protection	Father: R.C. 2151.352 provides counsel in juvenile terminations but not in private adoptions—similarly situated parents treated differently	Appellee: State not required to provide counsel in private adoption; no controlling precedent finds an equal protection violation	Court: No controlling precedent; not a plain or obvious equal protection violation under current law
Whether due process required trial court to perform Eldridge balancing and appoint counsel	Father: court should have balanced private interest, risk of error, and state interest and appointed counsel	Appellee: trial court not shown to have plainly erred; father didn’t ask for Eldridge analysis below	Court: Father forfeited detailed Eldridge arguments below; plain-error review does not show obvious error—trial court could decide on case-by-case basis and may revisit if circumstances change
Whether probate courts have statutory authority to appoint counsel for indigent parents in adoptions	Father: probate courts may appoint; legislative gap arguable; policy favors counsel	Appellee: no Ohio statute or rule mandating appointment in private adoptions; R.C. 2151.352 applies to juvenile court, not probate	Court: No statute or binding precedent requires appointment; policy-making belongs to legislature; judgment affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (recognition of parental rights as fundamental and need for due process in termination)
Lassiter v. Durham County Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (no automatic right to counsel in parental termination; apply Eldridge balancing)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (three-factor test for what procedural due process requires)
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (parental-rights termination cases demand close consideration; due process concerns)
In re Adoption of Zschach, 75 Ohio St.3d 648 (Ohio adoption procedures satisfy due process; did not require appointed counsel in private adoptions)
State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 (state-initiated termination proceedings require appointed counsel for indigent parents)
In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163 (recognizing parental custody rights as fundamental)
Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (plain-error doctrine in civil cases requires utmost caution)