50 Cal.App.5th 833
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- J.M. (born Jan. 2017) was removed in March 2017; the juvenile court sustained jurisdiction solely on domestic-violence-related allegations involving Mother and Father. Child was placed with long‑term foster caregivers.
- Mother received reunification services, attended regular visits, completed many services (parenting, domestic‑violence programs, therapy), secured DCFS‑approved housing, and obtained steady work; she nonetheless lost reunification in Sept. 2018 after violating a no‑contact order with Father and because statutory reunification time had expired.
- After reunification termination, J.M. was diagnosed with autism and other developmental delays and began receiving intensive services while remaining in caregivers’ home; visits with Mother continued and reportedly improved.
- Mother filed a § 388 petition (Jan. 14, 2019) seeking placement with her or additional reunification services; DCFS joined a later petition and opposed return of the child.
- The juvenile court denied the Jan. 2019 § 388 petition (May 15, 2019), citing concerns that Mother lacked concrete evidence of being trained to care for J.M.’s special needs and had credibility issues; a subsequent § 388 petition and a § 366.26 order terminating parental rights were also entered (Sept. 30, 2019).
- The Court of Appeal reversed: it held Mother showed a substantial change in circumstances and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding placement with Mother not in the child’s best interests; the May and Sept. 2019 orders (including termination) were reversed and the court was instructed to place J.M. with Mother.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mother established a substantial change in circumstances under § 388 | Mother had not resolved core problems; outstanding mental‑health and compliance issues persisted | Mother had remedied the domestic violence basis for jurisdiction and completed required services and stabilized housing/employment | Mother established a substantial change: domestic‑violence issues resolved and other court‑identified concerns addressed; trial court abused discretion in finding otherwise |
| Whether returning J.M. to Mother (or granting further reunification) would be in child’s best interests overcoming post‑reunification presumption favoring foster care | Continued foster care is presumed best; caregiver bond and child’s special needs support keeping stability with caregivers | Benefits of preserving bond with biological mother who reformed, plus family connections and Mother’s compliance, outweigh presumption | Court misapplied best‑interests analysis by speculating about needed “training”; appellate court reversed and found placement with Mother could be in child’s best interests |
| Whether the juvenile court’s citation of Mother’s lack of specific "training" for child’s developmental needs was a proper reason to deny § 388 | Lack of documented training and unreliable testimony supported denial | No evidence showed Mother incapable of caring for J.M.; caregivers also had no special training; speculation was arbitrary | Reliance on speculation about training—without record evidence—was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion |
| Effect of reversing the Jan. 2019 § 388 denial on subsequent orders (Aug./Sept. 2019 § 388 denial and termination) | Subsequent orders should stand independently if supported by record | Reversal of the initial erroneous denial requires reversal of downstream orders and termination | Reversal of May 2019 order required reversal of the Sept. 2019 § 388 denial and termination; court instructed to place J.M. with Mother |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Kimberly F., 56 Cal.App.4th 519 (1997) (describing § 388 as an "escape mechanism" allowing post‑reunification relief)
- In re Marilyn H., 5 Cal.4th 295 (1993) (section 388 essential for due‑process protections at § 366.26 stage)
- In re Stephanie M., 7 Cal.4th 295 (1994) (limits on granting relief where extreme facts of parental misconduct exist)
- In re Aaliyah R., 136 Cal.App.4th 437 (2006) (post‑reunification presumption that continued foster care is in child’s best interests)
- In re Mickel O., 197 Cal.App.4th 586 (2011) (burden on petitioner to show change in circumstances and best interests)
- In re Sean E., 3 Cal.App.4th 1594 (1992) (reversal of a § 388 denial can require reversal of subsequent § 366.26 orders)
- In re G.S.R., 159 Cal.App.4th 1202 (2008) (poverty alone does not support juvenile court jurisdiction)
- In re Paul E., 39 Cal.App.4th 996 (1995) (household defects do not automatically justify removal)