In re H.C.
D072368
| Cal. Ct. App. | Dec 4, 2017Background
- H.C. was declared a dependent in 2013, placed in long-term foster care, and continued as a nonminor dependent after turning 18.
- By Nov. 2016 she was in an approved supervised independent living placement, enrolled in college, job-seeking, and had an agreed transitional independent living case plan.
- The county agency later learned H.C. had married Alonzo and moved in with him; the Agency sought termination of her nonminor dependency, relying on a DSS All-County Letter that excludes married nonminors.
- The juvenile court adopted the Agency's position, found marriage rendered H.C. ineligible for extended foster care, and terminated dependency jurisdiction.
- H.C. appealed, arguing the statutory scheme governing nonminor dependency (state and federal) does not mention marriage and does not bar married nonminors from participation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether marriage renders a nonminor dependent ineligible for extended foster care | Marriage removes the court's role; All-County Letter excludes married nonminors so termination proper | Statutes defining nonminor dependency (age, placement/care responsibility, case plan) do not mention marriage; marriage does not affect eligibility | Court reversed: marriage alone does not make a nonminor ineligible |
| Deference to DSS All-County Letter excluding married nonminors | Agency relies on the All-County Letter and administrative interpretation | The Letter is interpretive, informal, lacks regulatory force; courts apply independent judgment under California law | Court gives little deference to the All-County Letter and rejects its exclusion of married nonminors |
| Applicability of federal guidance (title IV-E) permitting married youths | Agency argued federal funding context supports exclusion | Federal Child Welfare Policy Manual states married or military youths may be eligible for title IV-E if otherwise eligible | Federal guidance supports that marriage does not bar eligibility; Court relies on it |
| Alternative ground that H.C. left approved placement without approval | Agency now argues H.C. moved in with husband and might have been unapproved | H.C. notes Agency did not rely on that ground in court; termination was expressly for marriage | Court declines to affirm on this alternative ground and remands so compliance can be assessed under proper standards |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Aaron S., 235 Cal.App.4th 507 (2015) (discusses court discretion to continue jurisdiction over nonminor dependents)
- In re R.G., 240 Cal.App.4th 1090 (2015) (addresses state adoption of extended foster care to secure federal funding)
- In re A.A., 243 Cal.App.4th 765 (2016) (interprets transitional independent living case plan and placements)
- In re Shannon M., 221 Cal.App.4th 282 (2013) (discusses court authority to extend dependency jurisdiction outside current statutory federal-funded framework)
- Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Board of Equalization, 19 Cal.4th 1 (1998) (framework for judicial deference to agency interpretations)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (federal administrative deference doctrine referenced and distinguished)
Disposition: The juvenile court order terminating H.C.'s dependency for the sole reason of marriage is reversed; H.C. may demonstrate continued compliance with program requirements under the correct legal standards.