In Re Grand Jury, 640 F.3d 385

Doe, a state prisoner, refused to testify before a federal grand jury after immunity; was held in civil contempt under 28 U.S.C. §1826(a) for up to 18 months or until the grand jury ends.
District court amended the contempt order to interrupt Doe's state sentence, so the state term would not run during civil confinement and would resume when contempt ends.
Doe appealed contending §1826 does not authorize interrupting a separate state sentence to toll its running during federal contempt.
The government argues §1826 authorizes interruption and that multiple circuits have upheld interrupting preexisting sentences for civil contempt.
Court analyzes statutory text, history, and federal–state balance, noting no explicit Congressional authorization and applying background principles; ultimately affirms the district court’s order.
Affirmed the district court, recognizing potential state concerns but deeming the order valid and enforceable as a practical means to secure testimony.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §1826 authorizes tolling a state sentence during civil contempt.	Doe argues no explicit grant to toll state sentences.	Government argues practice aligns with §1826 purpose to secure testimony.	Affirmed; §1826 authority supports interrupting the state sentence.
Court’s approach to federalism balance in §1826 interpretation.	Doe relies on limits to federal intrusion on states.	Government relies on background principles and historical practice.	Court favors federal approach supporting interruption as consistent with §1826 aims.
Impact of Liberatore and Dien on authority.	Liberatore suggests no interruptibility; Dien questions aspects.	Dien undercuts Liberatore's rigidity; authority exists.	Court acknowledges divergence but sustains district court order.
Whether interruption is permissible given lack of explicit statutory language.	No explicit language permitting tolling state sentence.	Practical enforcement and prior circuit practice support it.	Allowed by practical necessity and prior practice; no explicit prohibition.
Availability of state objection or conflict later if state seeks relief.	State could object if its sentence is diluted.	Any state concerns can be addressed later; not raised here.	Not decided here; not necessary to resolve at this stage.

United States v. Chacon, 663 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1981) (early per curiam upholding contempt authority)
In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1978) (interruption of a preexisting federal sentence discussed (pattern))
United States v. Dien, 598 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1979) (followed Liberatore; questioned sole rule against interruptibility)
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 534 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1976) (contempt authority context for grand jury witnesses)
Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1975) (contempt and related procedures reference)
Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1974) (contempt procedures and enforcement context)
Liddy v. United States, 510 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc or major discussion of contempt power)
Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (U.S. 2002) (plain-statement rule for preemption)
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1991) (federalism and state sovereignty considerations)
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (U.S. 1971) (federal balance and sovereignty considerations)
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429 (U.S. 2005) (state sovereignty and preemption considerations)