In Re: Garcia
2025 V.I. 8
Supreme Court of The Virgin Is...2025Background
- Felipe Garcia died in April 2020, leaving a will executed the day before his death that named his sister, Julia Sergent, as executrix and principal beneficiary.
- Sergent petitioned to probate the will, and retained attorney Mark Milligan to represent her and the estate in the proceedings.
- Garcia’s daughter, Felipa Biamonte, contested the will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.
- Biamonte moved to disqualify Milligan as counsel, arguing he would be a necessary witness regarding the will’s preparation and Garcia’s capacity.
- The Magistrate Division disqualified Milligan without an evidentiary hearing, relying on rules prohibiting lawyers from acting as both counsel and witness, and denied Sergent’s request for a hearing.
- Sergent’s interlocutory appeal to the Superior Court’s Appellate Division was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the final judgment rule; Sergent appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff’s Argument | Defendant’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the dismissal of the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction was proper | Sergent argued the collateral order doctrine should allow immediate appeal of Milligan’s disqualification | Biamonte relied on the final judgment rule—no interlocutory appeals are permitted | Dismissal reversed; the order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine in the probate context |
| Whether Milligan’s disqualification required an evidentiary hearing | Sergent requested an evidentiary hearing on factual issues related to necessity of disqualification | Biamonte argued sufficient evidence existed via disclosures and billing records, and an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary | The court held an evidentiary hearing is required due to the importance of the right to counsel |
| Application of the final judgment rule in probate proceedings | Sergent argued exceptions apply, especially in probate which often involves piecemeal, final-like orders | Biamonte argued strictly for the rule, barring appeal of interim decisions | Exception applies in probate; piecemeal appeals are sometimes appropriate |
| Proper application of attorney-witness disqualification rule (Rule 211.3.7) | Milligan need not be disqualified unless a hearing establishes he’s a necessary witness; harm to client’s choice of counsel is substantial | Biamonte contended Milligan’s role and expected testimony require disqualification to avoid trial taint | Disqualification decided only after evidentiary hearing; summary disqualification was error |
Key Cases Cited
- Mohansingh v. Hess Corp., 2022 WL 558092 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2022) (explains interlocutory appeal requirements)
- In re Holcombe, 63 V.I. 800 (V.I. 2015) (collateral order doctrine requirements in Virgin Islands law)
- Sekou v. Moorhead, 72 V.I. 1048 (V.I. 2020) (standard for evidentiary hearings in attorney disqualification)
- Enrietto v. Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC, 49 V.I. 311 (V.I. 2007) (final judgment rule and its exceptions)
- Gardiner v. Diaz, 58 V.I. 199 (V.I. 2013) (reviewing magistrate vs. appellate division decisions)
--- Conclusion: The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Sergent’s appeal and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether Milligan should be disqualified from representing Sergent and the estate.