In re G.G., 92 A.3d 648

Background

DCYF sought to admit a videotaped Child Advocacy Center interview of G.G., an 11‑year‑old alleged abuse victim, in an adjudicatory hearing under RSA chapter 169‑C.
Respondent (father) objected, asserting an absolute statutory right to subpoena and cross‑examine G.G. at the hearing (citing RSA 169‑C:18, III and RSA 169‑C:11).
State opposed compelling G.G., citing child‑protection purposes and a therapist’s concerns; noted G.G. was expected to testify later in a related criminal trial.
Trial court reviewed the video, admitted it without calling G.G., and denied respondent’s subpoena request, reasoning the child’s presence was not necessary, testimony would be cumulative, and compelling her would harm the child.
Superior court upheld the trial court’s abuse/neglect finding after de novo review; respondent appealed only the denial of his right to subpoena/cross‑examine G.G.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Respondent)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether RSA 169‑C gives an accused parent an absolute right to subpoena and cross‑examine the child victim	Statutes grant an absolute right to present witnesses and cross‑examine adverse witnesses; child’s in‑court testimony is necessary because she has unique, direct knowledge	Child’s testimony can be excluded to protect the child; hearsay (reliable out‑of‑court statements) may be admitted; court should exercise discretion	No absolute right. Court has discretion to decide whether to compel the child to testify, subject to statutory text and inherent authority
Whether relevance/materiality alone compels child testimony	Relevance and materiality under RSA 169‑C:12 mean child must be called if she has direct knowledge	Relevance is not the only limit; RSA 169‑C:11 and court’s control allow balancing child’s welfare	Relevance/materiality insufficient alone; courts may consider other statutory provisions and inherent authority
What factors should guide courts when deciding to compel a child to testify	(argued implicitly) that defendant must be allowed to test child credibility	State emphasizes child’s protection and potential harm from testifying	Court (supervisory) lists non‑exclusive factors for courts to consider (age, harm, reliability of statements, corroborating evidence, incremental probative value, alternatives)
Whether trial court made adequate findings in this case when denying subpoena	Respondent argues court failed to permit cross‑examination and subpoena without adequate balancing	State relied on cumulative nature of evidence and potential harm to child	Court vacated in part and remanded for express findings applying enumerated factors; affirmed discretion but required clearer factfinding

Key Cases Cited

In re Cierra L., 161 N.H. 185 (discussing de novo review in statutory interpretation)
Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719 (statutory interpretation principles)
State v. Fecteau, 140 N.H. 498 (trial court’s inherent authority to control proceedings)
In re Shelby R., 148 N.H. 237 (Child Protection Act’s primary interest in protecting children)
In re C.M., 163 N.H. 768 (limitations and scope of Child Protection Act)
In the Matter of Jeffrey G. & Janette P., 153 N.H. 200 (welfare of child paramount under chapter 169‑C)
In the Matter of Rupa & Rupa, 161 N.H. 311 (need for express findings to facilitate appellate review)
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (permitting special procedures for child testimony in abuse cases)
State v. Chick, 141 N.H. 503 (declining to address undeveloped constitutional arguments)
In re Tayler F., 995 A.2d 611 (standard for finding child unavailable and harm analysis)
In re Quinn, 763 N.E.2d 573 (consideration of related proceedings and timing of child protection actions)