In Re Cierra L.
The respondent, Cara L., appeals an order of the Superior Court {Brown, J.) denying her motion to dismiss the abuse and neglect findings against her. We affirm.
The record supports the following facts. On November 10, 2008, the Franklin Family Division {Gordon, J.) entered a finding of abuse and neglect against the respondent with respect to her child and two stepchildren. It issued a final dispositional order after a hearing on November 21, 2008. The respondent requested an appeal de novo in superior court pursuant to RSA 169-C:28. See RSA 169-C:28,1 (2002).
On April 8, 2009, the superior court scheduled a status conference for April 20. The respondent moved to reschedule the status conference and the superior court granted the motion, setting the new date for June 5, 2009. Thereafter, the respondent filed an assented-to motion to continue the June 5 status conference. The superior court granted the respondent’s motion and rescheduled the status conference for June 29.
A de novo adjudicatory hearing was held from September 1 to September 3,2009. On September 28, the superior court issued an order affirming the family division’s finding of abuse and neglect and subsequently scheduled a dispositional hearing for November 17, 2009. On October 30, 2009, the respondent moved to dismiss both the superior court and the family division findings against her on the grounds that the superior court failed to schedule the matter as a priority under RSA 169-C:28,1, and that it failed to schedule the dispositional hearing within thirty days of its finding of abuse and neglect pursuant to RSA 169-C:18, VII (Supp. 2009).
The superior court denied the respondent’s motion. With respect to RSA 169-C:28,1, the court found “that any delay in scheduling the hearing on the petition was principally due to the respondent’s own motion practice.” Regarding RSA 169-C:18, VII, the court ruled that “[b]ased on the facts of this case alone, the Court declines to accept that the minimal delay beyond the thirty days warrants the extraordinary remedy of dismissal.” This appeal followed.
The respondent argues that the superior court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because it failed to give her de novo appeal priority on its calendar in accordance with RSA 169-C:28,1, and it failed to conduct a final dispositional hearing within thirty days of its findings of abuse and neglect pursuant to RSA 169~C:18, VII. We will address each argument in turn.
The respondent first argues that the superior court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because it did not give her
de novo
adjudicatory hearing priority
RSA 169-C:28,1, states, in relevant part:
An appeal under this chapter may be taken to the superior court by the child or the child’s authorized representative or any party having an interest, including the state, or any person subject to any administrative decision pursuant to this chapter, within 30 days of the final dispositional order; but an appeal shall not suspend the order or decision of the court unless the court so orders. The superior court shall hear the matter de novo, and shall give an appeal under this chapter priority on the court calendar.
(Emphasis added.)
We first must determine whether the prescription under RSA 169-C:28,1, that the superior court give priority to an appeal is mandatory or discretionary.
See In re Christopher K.,
Even assuming, without deciding, that the language imposed a time limit on the superior court, the statute does not provide a remedy for its enforcement. “Where the legislature has not provided how its mandatory time limits are to be enforced, we must determine the appropriate mode of enforcement.”
Fournier,
“When interpreting the goals of a statute, we have distinguished between two types of time limits: those involving a liberty interest and those involving a general interest in hastening adjudicative dispositions.”
Id.
at 446-47 (quotation omitted). “Where the legislature, out of liberty concerns, has mandated time limits for holding hearings, we have held that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is lost, absent waiver, if the case is not heard within the statutory period.”
Id.
at 447 (quotation omitted). “Where the legislature has prescribed time limits out of a general interest in hastening adjudicative dispositions for the benefit of all parties involved, however,
The purpose of RSA chapter 169-C is “through the mandatory reporting of suspected instances of child abuse or neglect, to provide
protection to children whose life, health or welfare is endangered and to establish a judicial framework to protect the rights of all parties involved in the adjudication of child abuse or neglect cases.” RSA 169-C:2,1 (2002). It bears emphasizing that RSA 169-C:28, I, delineates no particular time frame for conducting an adjudicatory hearing in a
de novo
appeal under the chapter. Additionally, our review of the legislative history of the statute reveals nothing to indicate that RSA 169-C:28,1, was enacted to protect the liberty interest of those involved in the adjudication of child abuse and neglect eases.
Cf. In re Russell C.,
Finally, we note that the respondent has not raised any prejudice argument. Accordingly, we conclude that the superior court did not err in denying her motion to dismiss based on RSA 169-C:28.
Turning to the respondent’s second argument, she contends that the superior court failed to schedule the dispositional hearing within thirty days of the adjudicatory hearing, as mandated by RSA 169-C:18, VII, and this failure also deprived the court of jurisdiction. The State concedes that the time limit prescribed in RSA 169-C:18, VII is mandatory. However, it argues that the time limit does not apply to de novo appeal proceedings in superior court. The State further contends that, even if the time limit does apply to the superior court, dismissal is not warranted.
RSA 169-C:18, VII provides that “[t]he court shall hold a hearing on final disposition within 30 days after a finding of neglect or abuse.” RSA 169-C:3, IX (Supp. 2009) defines “court” as “the district court, unless otherwise indicated.” Neither party disputes that the term “district court” as used in the statute includes proceedings in the family division.
See
RSA 490-D:14 (2010); RSA 169-C:28, II (2002). The time limit in RSA 169-C:18, VII speaks only of “court” without giving any indication that the term includes the superior court. In contrast, RSA 169-C:28, I, expressly requires the “superior court” to “give an appeal under this chapter priority on the court calendar.” We regard it as incongruous that the legislature would require the superior court to give
de novo
appeals priority on its calendar in one
section of the statute and then assign it a specific time period, jurisdictional in nature, to conduct a final dispositional hearing in another section of the statute.
See Appeal of Thermo-Fisher Scientific,
Moreover, viewing the entire statutory framework, we conclude that the legislature intended ESA 169-C:18, VII to apply
Following the adjudicatory hearing, “[t]he court shall hold a hearing on final disposition within 30 days after a finding of neglect or abuse.” RSA 169-C:18, VII. The district court then may determine the appropriate final disposition, including placement and legal custody of the child.
See
RSA 169-C:19 I, III (Supp. 2009). The court also may issue an “order of protection setting forth conditions of behavior by a parent, relative, sibling, guardian, custodian or a household member,” RSA 169-C.-19, II, and “order any parent, guardian, relative, custodian, household member, or child to undergo individual or family therapy, or medical treatment.” RSA 169-C:19, IV (Supp. 2009). Thereafter, an appeal may be taken to the superior court “within 30 days of the final dispositional order; but an appeal shall not suspend the order or decision of the court unless the court so orders.” RSA 169-C:28, I;
In re Thomas M.,
Given that the purpose of RSA chapter 169-C is “to provide protection to children whose life, health or welfare is endangered and to establish a judicial framework to protect the rights of all parties involved in the adjudication of child abuse or neglect cases,” RSA 169-C:2,1 (2002), and that it is the district court’s final disposition that resolves such significant issues as the placement and legal custody of the child in the first instance,
RSA 169-C:19, it is understandable that the legislature intended for the district court to provide a speedy disposition of such cases once it renders a finding of abuse or neglect.
Cf. In re Melissa M.,
The respondent contends that our decision in
In re Juvenile 2002-511-A,
Having previously determined that the de novo review provided in RSA 169-C:28 required the superior court to hear both the adjudicatory and dispositional proceedings of an abuse and neglect case de novo, we declined to limit the scope of de novo hearings in superior court to less than that provided by the legislature at the district court level. Id. As such, we concluded that RSA 169-C:28 provides clear indication that the term “court” in RSA 169-C:21 applies to the superior court in a de novo appeal. Id. This interpretation comports with the mandate of providing de novo review in superior court commensurate with the scope of the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings afforded at the district court. In contrast, RSA 169-C:18, VII governs the time frame for conducting a final dispositional hearing. As discussed earlier, it is reasonable to conclude the legislature did not intend for this time frame to apply to the superior court. In view of this holding, we need not consider the respondent’s jurisdictional argument regarding RSA 169-C:18, VII.
Affirmed.