In re G.A.T.
76 N.E.3d 51
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Minor respondent G.A.T. was charged in Grundy County with multiple sex-related delinquency counts arising from offenses against A.N., who was four at the time and nine at the hearing.
- Relevant counts included two aggravated criminal sexual abuse counts (oral sex and digital anal penetration), two sexual exploitation counts (coercion to remove clothes; exposure/fondling), and two battery counts (offensive contact for the oral and digital acts).
- A.N. testified to three separate occasions where respondent forced him to perform oral sex and one occasion where respondent spread A.N.’s buttocks and inserted a finger into A.N.’s anus; the trial court found A.N. credible and convicted on all counts.
- The court adjudicated respondent a ward of the court, committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), and imposed 30 days in DJJ on two battery counts (with credit for time served).
- On appeal, respondent argued (1) multiple convictions should be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine and (2) remand for resentencing was required because the court did not expressly find DJJ was the least restrictive alternative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether multiple adjudications based on the same conduct violate the one-act, one-crime rule | State: separate counts reflect distinct legal elements or distinct acts; prosecutions were properly apportioned | G.A.T.: several counts (batteries and sexual-exploitation counts) duplicate the same physical acts underlying aggravated criminal sexual abuse and must be vacated | Vacated one battery adjudication (Count VIII) that duplicated the aggravated criminal sexual abuse count; other adjudications upheld because they involved separate acts or distinct statutory elements |
| Whether aggravated criminal sexual abuse and sexual exploitation counts premised on the same episode are a single act | State: coercion to remove clothes and sexual conduct are distinct acts/elements | G.A.T.: the acts were part of the same occurrence and should merge | Court held coercion to remove clothes and the sexual touching were separate physical acts and not lesser-included offenses of one another; both adjudications stand |
| Whether multiple oral-sex counts (three occurrences) were improperly multiplicitous without apportionment | State: charged three separate occasions and argued as such | G.A.T.: trial court didn’t specify which occasion supported which count — could have convicted multiple times for the same occasion | Court found the record supports three distinct occasions over time and the State did apportion; upheld all three oral-sex-related adjudications |
| Whether remand for resentencing is required due to lack of explicit least-restrictive-alternative finding | G.A.T.: sentencing to DJJ required an express finding that DJJ was the least restrictive alternative | State: (not reached) | Court remanded for resentencing because vacating Count VIII altered the sentencing baseline; did not decide the least-restrictive-alternative argument on the merits due to remand necessity |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d 161 (analysis framework for one-act, one-crime doctrine)
- People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218 (lesser/less-serious offense is vacated when merger required)
- People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (apportionment requirement where closely related acts presented as one attack)
- People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598 (plain-error review framework)
- People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551 (defining second prong of plain-error test)
- People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 (definition of "act" and guidance on multiple convictions for separate acts)
- People v. Depner, 89 Ill. App. 3d 689 (discussion of lesser-included offenses in multi-act context)
- People v. Almond, 2015 IL 113817 (one-act, one-crime analysis and multiple-act guidance)