In Re: Frank James Welch, Jr., 884 F.3d 1319

In 1995 Welch participated in a carjacking in which he shot the victim, took the victim’s two-year-old son, and later admitted the shooting; police recovered stolen firearms and jewelry linked to other robberies.
Welch had three prior Alabama violent-felony convictions used to trigger a 15-year ACCA enhancement for his § 922(g) felon‑in‑possession sentence: one first‑degree robbery and two first‑degree assaults (each involving a gun and serious injury).
Welch pleaded guilty in federal court to carjacking, § 924(c), § 922(g) (felon‑in‑possession), and related counts; the PSR and Welch at sentencing accepted the ACCA enhancement and the facts supporting it.
The district court imposed an upward departure and ultimately a life sentence on the ACCA‑enhanced felon‑in‑possession count; the sentence was affirmed on direct appeal and earlier § 2255 petitions were denied.
After Johnson invalidated the ACCA residual clause and Welch (Supreme Court) made Johnson retroactive, Welch sought authorization under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A) and 2255(h) to file a second or successive § 2255 asserting Johnson relief, arguing two assault priors no longer qualify as violent felonies.
The Eleventh Circuit examined whether Welch made a prima facie showing that he was sentenced, at least in part, under the residual clause and whether his prior convictions nonetheless qualify under the ACCA elements clause.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Welch may obtain authorization to file a second/successive §2255 under Johnson (i.e., whether he was sentenced in part under the residual clause)	Welch: Two Alabama first‑degree assault convictions no longer qualify as "violent felonies" post‑Johnson, so his ACCA enhancement relied on the residual clause	Respondent/Court: Welch’s three priors (one robbery, two assaults) qualify under the ACCA elements clause independent of the residual clause	Denied — Welch failed to make a prima facie showing because his priors qualify under the elements clause, so Johnson relief is not available
Whether Alabama first‑degree assault convictions here can be treated under the modified categorical approach to show they meet the ACCA elements clause	Welch: Statute is divisible but record does not identify which subsection, so cannot show conviction required use of force	Court: Indictments, plea colloquy, and PSR show convictions under §13A‑6‑20(a)(1) (intent to cause serious injury by means of a deadly weapon), which requires physical force	Held — Modified categorical approach applies; records show convictions under (a)(1), and the least conduct criminalized by that subsection involves violent physical force, qualifying as violent felonies

In re Hires, 825 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2016) (standard for prima facie showing to file second or successive §2255 based on Johnson)
In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2003) ("reasonable likelihood" standard to show benefit from new rule)
United States v. Davis, 875 F.3d 592 (11th Cir. 2017) (modified categorical approach and divisibility analysis)
United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2016) (state armed‑robbery statute satisfies ACCA elements clause)
United States v. McCloud, 818 F.3d 591 (11th Cir. 2016) (permissible records for modified categorical approach)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits on the modified categorical approach applied only to divisible statutes)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (definition of "physical force")
United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2010) (conviction predicated on recklessness does not satisfy use‑of‑force requirement)