In re Estate of Stewart
2016 IL App (2d) 151117
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- In Feb 2008, 18‑year‑old Jeffrey Stewart collapsed in an Oswego high‑school classroom and later died; autopsy listed cause of death as bronchial asthma. Teacher Stacy Harper ran to Stewart, sent two students to fetch the nurse (on foot), but did not call 911 for approximately 7–20 minutes. School nurses and others eventually performed CPR; paramedics arrived minutes later.
- Stewart’s health file indicated asthma and albuterol; the school had a written policy instructing staff to call 911 immediately under life‑and‑death circumstances and to distribute known health conditions to teachers quarterly. Harper testified he did not know Stewart had asthma and believed summoning the nurse was the correct first step.
- Plaintiff Mary Stewart (mother and estate administrator) sued the school district alleging willful and wanton conduct by Harper and other school agents (including failures in training/notification), seeking damages. The District moved for summary judgment asserting absolute immunity for discretionary policy decisions under 745 ILCS 10/2‑201; the trial court denied summary judgment, finding a factual dispute about whether Harper made a policy determination.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial limited to willful and wanton conduct; the jury returned a $2.5 million verdict for the Estate. The trial court denied the District’s directed‑verdict, JNOV, and new‑trial motions. The District appealed.
- The appellate court affirmed, holding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find willful and wanton conduct (focusing on Harper’s prolonged failure to call 911 and earlier notification/record failures), the jury instruction complained of was not prejudicially erroneous, and summary judgment on absolute immunity was properly denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for willful and wanton conduct | Harper’s delay (7–20 minutes) in calling 911, plus prior failures to notify/record asthma, showed utter indifference or conscious disregard | Harper’s immediate actions (running to student, turning him on his side, sending students to get nurse) showed care, not willful and wanton conduct; any delay was not unreasonable | Affirmed: reasonable minds could differ; jury could find the prolonged failure to call 911 and policy violations rose to willful and wanton conduct under the statutory standard |
| Jury instruction language using “prevent” medical care | “Prevent” and “fail to provide” were interchangeable ways to describe depriving Stewart of prompt care; supported by evidence | “Prevent” improperly suggests active obstruction; no evidence Harper actively prevented care | No reversible error or prejudice; instruction supported by evidence and broad meaning of “prevent” justified in context |
| Absolute immunity under section 2‑201 (policy‑decision immunity) at summary judgment | District argued Harper made a policy decision (e.g., choosing to summon nurse rather than call 911) and thus was absolutely immune | Estate argued Harper violated existing policy and did not make a discretionary policy choice; factual dispute existed | Affirmed denial of summary judgment: court correctly found a genuine factual issue whether Harper made a policy determination, so absolute immunity not established as a matter of law |
| Whether later inaction after initial care is irrelevant because it was “too late” to affect outcome | Estate: later inaction informs the willful‑and‑wanton inquiry and may affect causation; pre‑ and postcollapse conduct both relevant | District: only the immediate (first 2 minutes) conduct matters because of medical resuscitation window; subsequent inaction could not have affected survival | Affirmed: totality of circumstances (precollapse notice, 7–20 minute delay, and subsequent inaction) properly considered by jury for both culpability and causation; jury not required to adopt District’s narrow timing assumptions |
Key Cases Cited
- American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 192 Ill. 2d 274 (contrast where paramedics violated entry policy and 911 procedures)
- Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (statutory definition of willful and wanton conduct consistent with prior common law)
- Harris v. Thompson, 2012 IL 112525 (supreme court approval of using pre‑1998 common‑law analyses consistent with statutory definition)
- Doe v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 213 Ill. 2d 19 (willful and wanton requires deliberate intention to harm or utter indifference)
- Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P’ship, 181 Ill. 2d 335 (policy‑determination immunity requires balancing competing public interests)
- Harrison v. Hardin Cnty. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466 (principal’s administrative policy decision entitled to absolute immunity)
- Kirwan v. Lincolnshire‑Riverwoods Fire Prot. Dist., 349 Ill. App. 3d 150 (unjustified delay in administering emergency care can support willful‑and‑wanton finding)
- Burlingame v. Chicago Park Dist., 293 Ill. App. 3d 931 (guidance: omission supports willful and wanton only where imbalance between likely severe injury and small burden to prevent it)
- Tagliere v. W. Springs Park Dist., 408 Ill. App. 3d 235 (discussion of statutory definition’s scope and relation to common law)