In re Estate of Stewart
2016 IL App (2d) 151117
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Jeffrey Stewart, age 18 with known asthma, collapsed in his high-school English class in Feb 2008 and later died; autopsy listed cause of death as bronchial asthma.
- Teacher Stacy (Stacy) Harper ran to Stewart, instructed two students to fetch the nurse on foot, turned Stewart on his side, but did not call 911 (or have 911 called) for 7–20 minutes; school policy required calling 911 immediately for life‑or‑death events.
- School nurse Sandra Banbury and health coordinator Jill Weber arrived and performed/assisted CPR; paramedics arrived ~6 minutes after 911 was called; an inhaler was later found in Stewart’s pocket.
- Estate sued the District alleging willful and wanton conduct by Harper and other agents (training/notification failures); the trial court denied the District’s summary‑judgment claim of absolute immunity under section 2‑201 and the case proceeded to trial on willful/wanton liability.
- Jury returned a $2.5 million verdict for the Estate; trial court denied the District’s directed‑verdict, judgment n.o.v., and new‑trial motions; District appealed on sufficiency, an allegedly erroneous jury instruction, and denial of absolute immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence supported a willful‑and‑wanton finding | Harper delayed unreasonably (7–20 minutes) in calling 911 and there were precollapse failures (notification/training), showing utter indifference/conscious disregard | Harper’s initial actions (running to student, sending students for nurse, turning him on his side) showed care; any delay was not willful/wanton as a matter of law | Verdict allowed to stand: reasonable minds could differ; jury could find the policy violation, prolonged delay, and totality of circumstances satisfied willful and wanton conduct standard |
| Whether the jury instruction using the word “prevent” was erroneous/prejudicial | Instruction mirrored the Estate’s theory that District’s actions/inactions deprived Stewart of prompt care; evidence supported such phrasing | The word “prevent” implies active obstruction, which the evidence did not show; instruction was therefore improper | No reversible error or prejudice; instruction supported by evidence and any narrower meaning would have favored defendant |
| Whether the District was entitled to absolute immunity under section 2‑201 (policy decisions) at summary judgment | Estate: Harper did not make a policy determination but failed to follow policy; factual disputes existed about notification and actions | District: Harper made a discretionary policy choice (call nurse vs. call 911) and thus is absolutely immune | Summary judgment denial affirmed: court could not decide as a matter of law that Harper made a policy determination; issues of fact remained |
| Whether a new trial or judgment n.o.v. was required for insufficient evidence | Estate: evidence (policy violation, delay, precollapse errors, expert testimony) supported willful/wanton and causation questions for jurors | District: evidence was insufficient; Harper’s care precluded willful/wanton as matter of law; causation speculative | Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying new trial/j.n.o.v.; jury verdict not against manifest weight of the evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 213 Ill.2d 19 (Ill. 2004) (willful and wanton as aggravated negligence; failure to act can qualify)
- Harris v. Thompson, 2012 IL 112525 (Ill. 2012) (statutory willful‑and‑wanton definition consistent with common‑law analyses)
- Harrison v. Hardin County Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 197 Ill.2d 466 (Ill. 2001) (policy determinations by school officials may receive absolute immunity)
- American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 192 Ill.2d 274 (Ill. 2000) (failure to follow emergency procedures can support willful‑and‑wanton allegation)
- Kirwan v. Lincolnshire‑Riverwoods Fire Prot. Dist., 349 Ill. App.3d 150 (Ill. App. 2004) (unjustified delay in administering emergency treatment may constitute willful and wanton conduct)
- Burlingame v. Chicago Park Dist., 293 Ill. App.3d 931 (Ill. App. 1997) (guideline: omission rises to willful/wanton only where balance between risk and ease of prevention is especially one‑sided)