In Re: Estate of J. Don Brock, E2016-00637-SC-R11-CV

Background

Dr. J. Don Brock died in 2015 leaving multiple wills and a substantial estate; his 2013 Will (probated) disinherited five of his seven adopted children (the Contestants).
The Contestants filed a will contest attacking the 2013 Will (claims: improper execution/attestation, lack of testamentary capacity, fraud/undue influence) and later sought to expand the contest to earlier wills disclosed by proponents.
Proponents produced a signed October 11, 2012 Will that also disinherited the same Contestants and moved to dismiss the contest for lack of standing, relying chiefly on Cowan and Jennings.
The probate court (then Court of Appeals) dismissed for lack of standing, reasoning that precedent barred contestants disinherited by successive facially valid wills; the contestants appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held Cowan and Jennings are fact-specific: where an earlier will disinheriting a contestant has already been judicially declared valid (or its validity is uncontroverted/admitted), the contestant lacks standing; but that rule does not apply where no prior will has been judicially validated.
Because none of Dr. Brock’s prior wills had been judicially determined valid and the Contestants would take under intestacy or earlier wills if later wills were set aside, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether contestants disinherited by a later will lack standing to contest that will when an earlier will also disinherits them	Contestants: Cowan/Jennings are factually distinct and do not bar standing here; they would inherit under intestacy or under some prior wills if later wills are invalidated	Proponents: Cowan/Jennings support dismissal because a facially valid prior will disinheriting the same persons makes them strangers to the estate and thus without standing	Held: Cowan/Jennings are limited to facts where an earlier will’s validity has been judicially established or is uncontroverted; here no prior will has been so validated, so contestants have standing
Standard for standing in will contests	Contestants: Standing requires only that contestant would take if probated will were set aside or if intestacy applied	Proponents: Emphasize rule that strangers (those who would take nothing) lack standing; rely on precedent to show disinherited persons are strangers	Held: Tennessee requires a showing that contestant would share in estate under intestacy or a prior will; that showing exists here, so standing is satisfied
Scope of Cowan and Jennings	Contestants: Those cases shouldn’t be read as announcing a broad bright-line rule denying standing whenever prior facially valid wills disinherit contestant	Proponents: Argue Cowan/Jennings announce such a broad rule preventing contestants disinherited by prior wills from litigating	Held: The Court construes Cowan/Jennings narrowly—applicable only when the prior will’s validity has been established or admitted
Whether policy concerns (efficiency, probate finality) justify denying standing	Proponents: Denying standing prevents repeated contests and conserves resources	Contestants: Denying standing could insulate fraud and unfairly preclude adjudication of testamentary validity	Held: Efficiency concerns do not justify a rule that bars adjudication where the prior wills’ validity has not been established; courts must be able to resolve competing testamentary claims

Key Cases Cited

Cowan v. Walker, 96 S.W. 967 (Tenn. 1906) (held a contestant lacked standing where an earlier, unchallenged will disinheriting him was established as valid)
Jennings v. Bridgeford, 403 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1966) (affirmed that a collateral attack fails where a prior will’s validity was judicially established in earlier litigation)
Warmath v. Smith, 279 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1955) (articulates Tennessee rule that only those who would take if the will were set aside may contest)
In re Estate of Barnhill, 62 S.W.3d 139 (Tenn. 2001) (describes will contest as a proceeding to determine once and for all estate distribution)
Jolley v. Henderson, 154 S.W.3d 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (stands for the proposition that de minimis bequests do not confer standing)