In Re Estate of Ina Ruth Brown
402 S.W.3d 193
| Tenn. | 2013Background
- Roy Brown Jr. and Ina Brown signed a mutual-will contract in 1999; their wills provided reciprocal life estates and will distributions to their children.
- In 2002, after conveying Brown Gap Road property to Roy Brown III, the couple signed a new mutual-will contract and executed new wills on June 13, 2002.
- Roy Brown Jr. died June 19, 2002; Ina Brown then executed a new will on June 28, 2002 leaving her estate to her son Estes, contrary to the 2002 contract.
- Ina Brown died February 1, 2003; Estes filed to probate Ina’s June 28, 2002 will in March 2003 without notifying Roy Brown Jr.’s children.
- Roy Brown Jr.’s children filed suit February 10, 2004 challenging Ina’s will on grounds of undue influence and breach of the mutual-will contract, asking for enforcement of the contract and probate of the prior will.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for the children; Court of Appeals affirmed; Supreme Court affirmed, holding the contract was enforceable and Ina’s 2002 will invalid.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject matter jurisdiction over contract-to-will challenge | Estes asserts trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate breach-of-contract claims in a will context. | Estes contends timeliness governs, not jurisdiction; contract claim should be dismissed as untimely. | Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate breach-of-contract claims. |
| Timeliness of the challenge to Ina's 2002 will | Complaint timely under two-year contest period after probate order. | Claims against the estate must be timely filed under statute of limitations; otherwise void. | Contest timely under § 32-4-108; timely filed notwithstanding initial probate timing. |
| Adequacy of consideration for the 2002 mutual-will contract | Consideration lacking because property had already been conveyed to Roy Brown III; no exchange. | Mutual promises constitute consideration; any small exchange suffices. | Contract was supported by adequate consideration; enforceable. |
| Validity of Ina's June 28, 2002 will under the contract | Will breach of the mutual-will contract should be enforced; estate should be limited accordingly. | No will breach to the extent necessary; contract invalidates probate of the 2002 will. | Ina's June 28, 2002 will invalid; breached contract to make mutual wills. |
| Procedural avenues for breach-of-contract-to-will claims | Claims may be asserted as estate claim, will contest, or specific performance action. | Rogers and related cases restrict remedies; contract breach must fit proper forum and timing. | Three avenues exist (estate claim, will contest, or specific performance); timely under two-year limit after probate order. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rogers v. Russell, 733 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn.App. 1986) (will contests not proper forum for contractual rights; not within jurisdiction)
- Junot v. Estate of Gilliam, 759 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn.1988) (court may determine breach-of-contract-to-will within broader proceeding)
- Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595 (Tenn.2004) (adequacy of consideration; mutual promises suffice)
- Word v. Metro Air Servs., Inc., 377 S.W.3d 671 (Tenn.2012) (defining subject-matter jurisdiction and its limits)
- Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632 (Tenn.1996) (foundation for jurisdiction and remedies principles)
- In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn.2012) (statutory and procedural considerations in probate matters)