Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co.

MEIGHAN, Jr., himself, Joe C. similarly situated,

and others

Plaintiff/Appellant,

U.S. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS

COMPANY, Defendant/Appellee.

Supreme Tennessee, Court of

at Knoxville.

April 1996.

Rehearing July Denied

634 Vowell, Andrews, K. A.

Donald James Knoxville, Snapp, Appellant. Thomas A. Knoxville, Farmer, Anthony J. for Amicus Curiae. Jr., Rayson, Burgin, B.

John John C. Adri- Anderson, Knoxville, Appellee. enne L. OPINION WHITE, Justice.

In upon this case we are called to examine application Rule Tennessee Rules involving inju- of Civil Procedure to actions property ries to real and to determine the trespass cause of dismissal of the of action and available causes dismissed reversed the trial court and in such actions. measure punitive damages claim and the class action certification, thereby removing the need I. single-county propriety address Meighan Plaintiff owner 11 review to granted Rule limitatiоn. We Railway County, Knox Tennessee. Southern certification, the class action consider right way across Company has railroad action, and the relief cause of nature Sprint is plaintiffs land. Defendant U.S. available. company into communications who entered al- agreement Railway license Southern of this case affected The resolution optic cable on lowing installation of fiber Sprint decision in Buhl our recent way right Tennes- (Tenn. 230 miles of railroad of in Co., 840 S.W.2d 904 Communications among see. Plaintiffs land was those tracts 1992). of held that the installation There we installed. upon Sprint’s which cable was taking a of the telephone cablе constituted Sprint did avail itself to the meaning of property within landowner’s procedures, get plain- did not condemnation Accordingly, the domain. the law of eminent consent, plaintiff did not com- tiffs and offer compensa was entitled to property owner pensation. Sprint tion. Buhl v. Communications clearly at 913. Since Buhl actions, Sprint’s plaintiff a result of As relief, plaintiff is establishes that entitled County in Knox Circuit filed suit Court appeal to the we attention this turn our alleging that the installation of the cable certification, appropriateness of class action “taking” plaintiffs land and a constituted of of and the of the cause nature trespass plaintiffs over land. Plaintiff available relief. sought statewide action certification. class relief, prayer plaintiff sought In his both II. Actions under Rule Class punitive damages. compensatory and Prerequisites A. to Class Actions granted court The trial class certification affected Knox owners complaint complaint and amended County. Sprint the tres- moved dismiss brought as class actions this action were punitive pass cause of action and the dam- Pro- Tennessee Rules Civil under Rule ages claim. The court the tres- dismissed alleged that the class consisted cedure. Both claim, pass but the claim for allowed entities, legal persons, which included all damages to stand. land in the state Tennessee who own Railway parties sought in- which Defendant Southern granted Both and were “across (SRC), has maintained a railroad extraordinary Company terlocutory appeals. and Un- the Defen- Appellate right-of-way, across which der Rule Rules of Tennessee and/or Procedure, optics single- Sprint constructed a fiber plaintiff challenged the dant has system.” fur- county By communication The class was class action limitation. virtue of subclasses, two plaintiff challenged dis- ther into three appeal, Rule 10 divided distinguished by the manner of De- were missal cause of action. which way acquisition right of the challenged, of Rule the railroad’s fendant virtue over and the third of which consisted of land the certification of the class action. Under way. The right no challenged ruling al- which railroad had Rule defendant alleged complaint all plaintiff’s punitive damages complaint and amended lowing claim filings1 prerequisites to class action set Appeals affirmed the stand. The Court of (2) questions are of law or fact common Civil there 23.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Rule class, to the provides that a class action Procedure (3) representative defenses of the the claims or party brought by representative of all on behalf parties typical the claims or defenses are only if: members of the class class, and (1)the joinder all class is so numerous (4) fairly representative parties will impracticable, members is the class. adequately protect the interest of forth in requested Rule 23.01 and Meighan alleged Plaintiff certifica- that each pursuant tion to subsection one or categories two three for class action certification 23.02, pursuant alternatively, applied Rule or to sub- to this opposed lawsuit. Defendant section three. grounds. certification on all In its order certification, granting the trial court held as prerequisites In addition to the to a class follows: 23.01, action set fоrth in Rule Rule 23.02 case, [I]n inverse condemnation such further limits the situations which a class one, jurisdiction as this venue means first, action can be maintained to three. The jurisdiction ... this Court has therefore no 23.02(1), set forth Rule allows class actions certify comprised class of land- prejudice order to avoid parties to the owners whose land lies outside Knox Coun- might which multiple result from suits about Tennessee; ty, and that while action is subject the same matter. separate Since county-wide certification prosecutions might “incompatible establish 23.02(3), under Rule ... the Court will standards of conduct” for the defendant deciding.... defer dispositive adjudications “impair im- pede” plaintiffs’ protection their inter- considering pleadings, After further ests, unitary adjudication of a class action court certified the action “as a class action 23.02(l)(a) preferable. is Tenn.R.Civ.P. & and that it shall order[ed] be so maintained (b). 23.02(3)-” pursuant to Rule The court limited the class to affected in landowners The allowing second reason for class action County. Knox adjudication, 23.02(2) ap set forth in Rule plies injunctive to cases in which or declara Implicit ruling finding in the court’s awas tory predominant is the sought. relief relief plaintiff that pre- had established all of the Thus, a class action be maintained when requisites maintaining un- class action party opposing the class “has acted or finding der Rule 23.01 well as as that a grounds generally refused to act on applica class action was under Rule 23.02(2). ble to the class.” Tenn.R.Civ.P. 23.02(3). equally apparent It trial is that the provision may apply While this in eases prompted court’s redefinition of the class was relief, monetary seeking that relief must be interpretation the court’s of venue and “secondary ancillary predominant jurisdiction requirements in eminent domain injunctive sought.” or declarative H. relief rulings actions. Both of these were chal- Actions, 4.12, Newberg, Newberg § on Class lenged appeal. on (2d 1985) (hereafter Newberg, at 294 ed. of Appeals The Court the class reversеd at-). -,§ supra, action certification no “because there are The third in situation which class actions remaining questions more of law or fact com- may be maintained are those in situations opinion, mon to the class.” In court’s that questions predominate law and fact the only remaining issues making over individual issues a class action are whether each fee interest owner is superior fair method for a resolution and, so, entitled to recover if 23.02(3). controversy. Tenn.R.Civ.P. questions what amount. These are differ- provision general, arguably This is the most ent for each are there- class member and actions, encompasses all is on class аnd based fore not common to the class.... judicial economy. principles Newberg, su- 4.24, pra, plaintiffs at 315. Because subsection Because resolution of each members, requires require three to all claim will inquiry notice class a detailed factual and opt provisions, plaintiffs because of its out as certifi- market value (1) (2) general- cation under ... inappropriate subsections this ease is Id., 4.20, ly preferred. action treatment. class complaint requisites. The Tenn.R.Civ.P. 23.01. this case through alleges, paragraphs pre- these make prerogative to correctly properly the trial court’s Appeals

As the Court of of аnd subse- noted, ac the initial determination of whether an the determination to class certification. quent modifications proceed action is tion should class authority to significant of The trial court retains discretion matter which is left the sound redefine, clarify the class. Only finding modify, or judge. upon a of an the trial that discretion the trial abuse of should impor- Furthermore, more perhaps judge’s appeal. Ster decision be modified genesis class tantly, of the we are mindful Corp., 855 F.2d ling v. Chemical Velsicol cre- Historically, were class actions actions. (6th Cir.1988). Appeals’ Court of “to afford of convenience ated as a matter conclusiоn, prompted by our decision the court justice parties before partial Buhl, its the trial court abused was that join they unable to all interested when were remaining no there are discretion “because join- then-compulsory parties pursuant to the class.” questions of law or fact common equity procedures.” court governing der rule disagree. We 32, 41, Lee, Hansberry v. 311 U.S. See (1940). 115, 117-18, 85 L.Ed. 22 S.Ct. in Buhl did reconcile one The decision recognized Supreme Court has United States -legal which was issues this case “efficiency actions advance not, however, class plaintiffs. common to all did principal litigation which is a economy of is- legal the common and factual resolve all Tele- purpose procedure.” General legal one ‍​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‍common sues. The removal of Falcon, 457 phone Company Southwest v. question grounds for decerti- sufficient 2364, 2371, 147, 159, 102 S.Ct. fying questions class if other common (1982). Thus, the Unit- L.Ed.2d 740 7A generally law or fact remain. See Supreme Court concluded: ed States Mary Wright, A. R. Miller Charles Arthur Procedure, Kane, Kay Federal Practice and develop- justifications that led to the (2d. 1986) (hereafter 1778, at 522-46 ed protec- the ment of the class action include Procedure, supra, Federal Practice the from inconsistent tion of defendant -at-). obligations, protection of the interests the absentees, provision a convenient the It is the exis well established disposing means of of simi- and economical fact, separate tence of issues law and lawsuits, the lar and the facilitation of damages, ne particularly regarding do not litigation among numer- spreading costs Ad gate action certification. See Rules class similar claims. litigants ous visory to 1966 Amend Committee Notes 23, 69 ments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 39 F.R.D. Ger Parole Commission v. United States (1966).2 separate While the factual issue 1202, 402-03, 388, S.Ct. aghty, 445 100 U.S. remains, legal individual common (1980). Thus, 1212, the while L.Ed.2d 479 63 issues, including the and factual the nature of par to advantages its the device has notable relief, predominate. We claim and the lawsuit, inter it advances the ties to a properly hold that the trial court exercised economy providing judicial and of ests of a certifying class action its discretion the access to courts. appellate im this and that the court lawsuit justifica- most notable of the These are the properly interfered with that discretion case class before tions for certification decertifying Buhl the class based potential- takings this defendant us. The decision. ly in hundreds of lawsuits could result judges. occupying courts dozens being inappropriate dozens of In addition regarding the decisions finding an of discretion on Inconsistent ease for abuse likely. punitive damages claims would be support judge, good trial reasons part of the differing continued, appellate initial, Separate decisions with certifica as well as the First, likely. Determination it is are no less results of this case as class action. tion persuasive. Bayberry Associates previously eral because of 2. We have held that Jones, language and in Rule 23 in our Rule 23 783 553 identical fed- Rules of Civil Procedure that of the Federal 638 4.26, remaining single supra, § common issues in a may trial court superior simply

forum is a far method of choose to among resolution. divide award may plaintiff members or allow each to re- Additionally, the certification serves by proving against cover his her claim provide access to courts to individual Boeing judgment. entire See Co. Van claimants whose small claims would not oth- Gemert, 472, 745, 444 U.S. 100 S.Ct. 62 justify seeking erwise their relief. it “Where (1980). particularly L.Ed.2d 676 This case is economically is not feasible to obtain relief aggregate damage ap- amendable within the traditional of a framework multi- proach. plicity of small damages, individual suits for aggrieved persons may be without effec- It is likewise irrelevant that the case tive redress they employ unless property damage. involves Though often Deposit Guaranty class-action device.” Na- “unique,” quality characterized as does 326, 339, Roper, tional Bank v. not foreclose involving cases dam 1166, (1980). S.Ct. 63 L.Ed.2d 427 ages procedures. Literally from Rule 23 argues merely While defendant that this al- dozens of class involving property actions plaintiffs lows counsel to have a more lucra- proceeded have in our state and case, historically, splitting tive fee awas e.g., federal courts. See Loretto Tele impetus primary behind the class action de- prompter Corp., Manhattan CATV 458 U.S. eondemnable, vice. It is not not it is (1982); 73 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. commendable.3 Eyak Village Corp., Native Exxon 25 F.3d (9th Cir.1994) (after federal court consoli Thus, we conclude when trial removal); Detroit, City dation and Hart v. properly court exercises its discretion and (1980). Mich.App. 296 N.W.2d 151 certifies lawsuit as a class action under 23.02(3), Rule fact signifi that one of the B. Venue in Class Actions legal prior cant common issues resolved Having Appeals’ reversed the Court of de- justify trial does decertification certification of this class we must if questions action the common law or fact plaintiffs address contention that the trial predominate. importantly, that remain More single county court’s limitation was in error. if properly the trial court has exercised its objects redefining Plaintiff the trial court’s certifying initially, discretion the class only to of the class include those owners of modificatiоns to that order remain the trial property County. affected in Knox Defen- prerogative. court’s phrases differently asserting, dant the issue Defendant contends that the remain- sole did, question as the trial court that is a it of ing issue in this case is of the amount individ- subject jurisdiction. matter by ual suffered each own- correctly Defendants that note the Circuit Consequently, er. suggests defendant that a subject jurisdiction Court has matter in an class inappropriate. action is we While rec- eminent domain action. Tenn.Code Ann. ognize compensatory that the issue dam- (1980 Repl.). Establishing 29-16-104 the require ages may some individual consider- action, proper filing court for the atiоn, disagree position we with defendant’s however, necessarily does not establish the will present that each owner be entitled to proper ap- or the exclusive location. While detailed evidence. venue, plicable statute addresses the issue of id.,

In a purport class courts are it not not not does and could to required separate damage modify equally applicable provisions to inqui conduct the Instead, specific provi- ries for statutory each class member. the Rule 23. Were the aggregate damage regarding interpreted court determine an sion venue defen- as would, definition, Newberg, urges, amount the as class a whole. dant class actions (1899) (case We it is 3. remind defendant "that the boast of the 102 Tenn. 52 S.W. law common that the lowest shall have its bene- allowing punitive damage jury when claim highest power....” fits as feel $7.50). well the its award was Shaw, Telegraph Telephone Cumberland Co. required to reside class were this and a number differ- member the cease exist in filed, the action was class causes action. the venue where ent exist. While the trial would cease to actions jurisdiction Subject and matter deny grant court discretion retains Subject separate concepts. are two venue class, class the certification and define authоrity jurisdiction matter concerns the as to include be so need not defined particular particular court to hear a contro requirements. the venue parties who meet Jones, versy. Landers Id. the nature It relates to sought. cause of action and relief Id. redefining court’s order trial generally by the defined constitution on court’s class in this case is based conferred statute and that all class members must mistaken belief Reynolds, organizes Cooper courts. the court reside in the same venue. While (10 Wall.) 308, (1870); 19 L.Ed. 931 limit the based on fac can class Inc., Excavating Turpin v. Bros. Conner tors, required to limit the the court is not (Tenn.1988). Here, 761 S.W.2d there the trial class based on residence. Since question for Knox no that the Circuit Court limiting the Knox court’s order class to County subject jurisdiction has matter over County property on a owners was based Ann. 29-16-104 this action. Tenn.Code law, we remand. On mistake of reverse and (1980 Further, question Repl.). there is no remand, the nu the court should consider jurisdiction personal court has over that the justifications allowing mainte merous parties.4 including nance a class action this case Venue, hand, on is a the other judicial economy, feasibility, financial concept privilege based on and conve verdicts, and should base consistent Turpin parties. to the nience Conner class on vеnue alone. future determinations Co., Inc., Excavating at Bros. generally prece It is not a condition III. Available of Action Causes power, dent the court’s but relates instead has Our decision Buhl established appropriateness location of plaintiff’s property, enti- defendant has taken regard action. there is much While debate tling issue plaintiff to relief. The second ing the con connectedness between the two case the available cepts, civil raised concerns procedure our rules of clear have ly distinguished Improper causes action. between two.

venue is matter which is waived unless complaint alleges Plaintiffs a “tak pleading. contested the first Tenn. ing” his over his land. land Subject jurisdiction, ‍​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‍R.Civ.P. 12.08. matter contends, Consequently, he he is entitled to hand, waived, other cannot because damages, including punitive tradi damages, it is the the to act. basis for court’s involving injury tionally cases to available Jones, 674, 675 See Landers v. 872 S.W.2d challenges plain property. real Defendant (Tenn.1994). by right proceed tiffs to other than the In con a class action venue is statutory prescribed con method for inverse repre by the of the named trolled residence demnation actions. 7A Proce Federal Practice and sentative. analysis begins with the statute itself. dure, 1757, Our of supra, rеsidence The Code Annotated section 29-16- Tennessee non-represented dispos- is not class members 123(a) unchanged it was has remained since un any contrary itive. rule would be Since of 1858. workable, enacted as Section 1347 the Code non-represented the residence of by “Action initiated owner” and may rather entitled disregarded be class members every provides: defeat venue. Id. If than allowed to denied, (Tenn.1992). juris- subject jurisdiction, by subject Unlike matter to 4. Personal contrast diction, by by ability bring may failure jurisdiction, it be waived consent or matter relates to the Kittrell, Jones, 674, object. parties Young v. 872 S.W.2d 675 v. Landers before court. appeal (Tenn.Aрp.), perm, to 833 S.W.2d 505 640

If, however, 450, such person company (1914); has 171 S.W. 82 v. Hopper Davidson actually possession land, 393, taken oc- County, such 206 Tenn. 333 S.W.2d 917 cupying for purposes (1960); it of internal v. County, Scott Roane 478 S.W.2d improvement, may (Tenn.1972); owner such land 886 East Tennessee petition jury inquest, in which case Gouge, 40, W.N.C.R. v. Tenn.App. Co. 30 203 had, proceedings may the same 170, denied, as near (Tenn.1947); Betty S.W.2d cert. be, may provided; as as hereinbefore or he Government, Metropolitan 1 may damages ordinary way, sue denied, (Tenn. (Tenn.App.), perm, appeal jury lay in which case the shall off 1992). the land cases, In our later we have made the by metes bounds and the dam- assess separate existence of two remedies abun ages, upon as appeal the trial of an from dantly County, clear. Scott v. Roane 478 of a jury inquest. return (“The at S.W.2d 887 statute ... should be (1980 29-16-123(a) allowing Tenn.Code Ann. read as two Repl.). distinct actions. The argues being Plaintiff allowing that first an inverse or reverse condemna owner to ordinary sue for “in the tion action and being the second a suit for way” supports an trespass, action for ordinary way.”); Johnson consequently, allows an County, award Roane 370 Tenn. S.W.2d damages. (1963) (“The Defendant contends that lan- provides statute an guage refers instead to the method of com- aggrieved owner two land or alternative ”). by property mencement of action оwner rights or remedies.... against taking authority. pronouncements In our most two recent recent, prior While decisions have re by argument we have faced the raised defen- solved both of these contentions. In Duck language dant —that refers to the Valley Gauge River Narrow Railroad Com manner of than commencement rather to the Cochrane, pany v. this Court described the cases, nature of the cause of action. In both by against action the landowner the railroad argument. we found no merit to the John- company appropriated for “land taken and 498; County, son Roane at S.W.2d ... in constructing road its across his farm” County, Scott v. at Roаne S.W.2d 887-88. ordinary “an of trespass.” Duck that, statute, While it true under the Valley Gauge River Narrow Railroad Com owner-initiated inverse condemnation actions Cochrane, (Tenn. pany v. 71 Tenn. by required petition commencement followed 1879). question spe for the Court was by publication, notice or it does not follow cifically whether charter ordinary way” only, that “sue in the means remedies were “exclusive all other reme argues, as defendant that suit also be dies.” Id. by commenced summons. Confronted with Relying on Section 1347 of the Code issue, a property that we have clarified that present identical Section 29-16- remedy owner who seeks the first under the 123(а), the Court found was statute, being a true inverse condemna- viable, alternative cause action. proceeding, may tion not institute the action latter clause this section leaves summons, procedure but must utilize the right no doubt as to the owner outlined for taker-initiated actions. Scott bring way, ordinary an action in the County, Roane at 887. Com- nothing can mean than else an action summons, however, is appro- mencement trespass upon anor the facts of the priate seeking remedy, for suits the second case to value recover the of the land and damages way. in at ordinary the Id. 887-88. damages. the at Id. 480. Previous decisions inconsistent long-standing uphold law of We the provisions and were based on charter not jurisdiction that property a owner whose the statute. Id. exercising by property is taken an in power River has of two alter Court’s decision Duck the eminent domain has consistently applied. property e.g., been See Southern native causes of action. owner petition Railway may jury inquest provided a Company Jennings, v. 130 Tenn. for of as

641 29-16-123(a) applied rules cases have these § Our older by Tenn.Code Ann. statute. involving (1980 alternative, property properly trespass actions Repl.). This des- law action, by an authorities. In three ignated takings as inverse condemnation аuthorized cutting involving wrongful in accordance with the the of trees must be instituted cases authorities, applicable by permission, to condemna- some provisions some with authority.5 without, taking the the consider expressly tion actions initiated we allowed at County, damages. 370 498. punitive Johnson v. Roane Cumberland ation Shaw, may Alternatively, sue 102 Telephone Telegraph the owner Co. v. & 313, 163, (1899); trespass If the damages for action. Cum Tenn. 52 S.W. 164 action, proceeds trespass Telegraph on a cause of v. Po Telephone owner & Co. berland 1040, by jury way.” ston, 696, “in the 1041 proceeding the is usual 30 94 Tenn. S.W. 29-16-123(a) (1980 Repl.) (1895); § Telephone Company Tenn.Code Ann. Memphis Bell (“in Hunt, 456, 159, jury lay which ease the off the land 160 shall v. Tenn. 1 S.W. 84 (1886). Shaw, by metes and bounds and assess the dam- we In Poston and reiterated could, ages, appeal from the upon jury the trial in its general rule that the -118(a) jury discretion, inquest”); damages upon id. at punitive return of a award (“[ejither eases, may appeal from party trespass finding that these —in and, finding jury, fraudulently, ... a trial cutting have of trees —was done anew, jury way”)- negli Hav- wantonly, gross before the usual or oppressively, concluded, ing Telegraph we of gence. Telephone so reverse the Court & Cumberland Poston, 1041; Appeals and trial court’s actions dismiss- Co. v. 30 ‍​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‍S.W. at Cumberland Shaw, ing trespass claim. v. Telephone Telegraрh Co. & at 164. S.W. Damages Trespass IV. recently punitive revisited the issue of We Cause Action Hodges damages trespass actions in v. S.C. case, having inquiry final in this Our Co., 896, & 833 S.W.2d Toof trespass affirmed the existence of the cause There, century we on three nineteenth relied appropriate of dam is measure cases. ages. Initially, we note that “the rules for jury trespass [is] In an action determining damages trespass [in actions] restrained, damages, in their assessment upon purposes for are based which such pecuniary loss to the amount of the mere [including give actions are maintainable t]o may plaintiff, but award sustained ..., compensation punish wrong [and t]o respect con- damages in of the malicious wrongful doers and deter conduct....” defendant, degree duct (1991). 118, § Trespass at Am.Jur.2d trespass which the has been insult with parties acknowledge plaintiffs While both attended_ damages op- should [T]hese right compensatory recover and deter punish the defendant erate plaintiffs taking property, defendant legally ... were [and] others disputes right to recover dam malice, fraud, gross negligence, in cases of ages. oppression. generally, an In actions at 900 Hodges v. 833 S.W.2d S.C. Toof & discretionary punitive damages is award of 140, Gilmore, 21 (quoting Tenn. Wilkins § at trier fact. Id. with the Fancher, Polk, (1840); Wilson & Co. awarded for tres Punitivе (1858); Byram 38 Tenn. wanton, pass oppressive, or accom (1859)). McGuire, 530, 532 40 Tenn. outrage aggravating panied with other Id., argues later authori at 112-13. Their Defendant circumstances. ty proposition forth outrageous has abandoned the set purpose punish conduct Id., Shelby County earlier cases. cites and to similar future conduct. these deter (Tenn.1975) Barden, 124, 127 (writ (notice inqui- petition); and -107 procedures are Tennessee -105 5. These outlined in (petition); ry damages). Code Sections 29-14-104 Annotated Government, Betty awarded, Metropolitan v. ages may in be the factfinder’s (Tenn.Ct.App.), perm, appeal to discretion. denied, (Tenn.1992). cases, Neither of these hоwever, involved an trespass owner-initiated explicit recognition punitive Our cause action. Barden was an inverse con damages in appropriate are available eases demnation action which involved the division trespass based on rather common-law than damages between a lessor and lessee statutory grounds is inverse condemnation Barden, Shelby property. County taken by legal practical required and consider 527 S.W.2d at 126. Our statement that the ations. The creation of inverse damages an “measure of to the landowner [in cause not impair condemnation of action does inverse in action] condеmnation is that used right the common law of action unless ex cases,” condemnation does not foreclose the Co., pressly Hodges v. stated. S.C. &Toof rare, availability punitive damages in Here, right 833 S.W.2d at 899. is ex appropriate trespass case for two reasons. reserved, pressly correspond ‍​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‍ as must be the First, the case did not involve the issue. remedy. ing an

was inverse condemnation not Moreover, availability Second, we believe that the trespass action.6 we are not autho damages punitive appropriate in by judicial away condem- rized to right decision take necessary fully compensate nation eases is cоnferred statute. Concomitant with the aggrieved trespass landowners in accordance with the legislative right to sue for is the unusual, provides explicit constitution. Our corresponding remedy in statute procedures power unique damages. which entities with punitive eases include eminent domain should follow. See Tenn. Equally inapposite position to defendant’s (1980 §§ Repl.). Code Ann. 29-16-105-122 Betty is the case. That case was also an compliance which proceed Those entities in proceeding, coupled inverse condemnation procedures protec- with those are afforded with under claims the Governmental Tort tions, including ability punitive tо avoid Liability thorough Act. Its instructions re- damages claims. who fail to avail Those damages garding purport did resolve themselves, appropriate should under cir- face, though acknowledge, the issue we it did cumstances, liable be landowner for dicta, ‘damages in “in for in actions damages full appropriate measure of ordinary way’ ... a owner’s mea- Accordingly, the cause of action. we reverse in sure the same as other prior dismissing request order involving injury property.” real case Bet- remand, punitive damages. On the issue will Government, ty Metropolitan princi- in with the be determined accordance ples opinion Hodges set forth in this and S.C. S.W.2d 896 Toof holding That dicta is the of this A property who case. owner sues dam V. Conclusion trespass taking ages against action case, inmay, appropriate recov We reverse dismissal class certifica- damages. punitive er Those trespass tion as well as the dismissal of the will cases be few. Punitive are punitive damages cause claim. egregious available circumstances which We remand to the trial court for further fraudulently, accomplished proceedings opinion. consistent with this wantonly, oppressively, gross negli appeal The costs of are taxed to defendant. Furthermore, gence. punitive damages are against many taking not available authorities. ANDERSON, C.J., DROWOTA, requisite rare which the

But those cases established, BIRCH, JJ., REID and concur. elements can dam- Barden, Notably, Shelby County 527 S.W.2d at 127-28. all cases cited were also either condemnation or inverse condemnation actions. except as the availabili- subsequent actions REHEARING DENYING ORDER and, in an ty of a class PER CURIAM. case, damages. punitive case, Sprint requested has re- In this reasons, has hearing. argues petition It that the Court over- for re- For all these acknowledg- prior without ruled hearing is denied. disagree. As respectfully our

ment. We out,

opinion carefully pointed longstanding that two

precedent supports proposition the in- are under

causes of action available Likewise, the

verse condemnation statute. acknowledge

decisions this Court

availability jury’s in the

eases discretion. challenges on Sprint the decision MURPHY, Appellee, In re Ira H. are limited to relief basis landowners eases,1 by four authorized statute. cites application to of which have none BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL 18, Leech, In 201 Tenn. case. Fritts RESPONSIBILITY, (1956), brought landowner suit S.W.2d Appellant. against department. highway state Tennessee, Supreme Court of immunity prohibited sovereign doctrine at Jackson. specifi seeking from redress not landowner cally allowed statute. See Tenn. Const. June 1996. I, Likewise, § 17. City art. Zirkle v. Kingston, 217 Tenn.

(1965) Monday County, v. Knox (1967), property

Tenn. 417 S.W.2d 536 against govern

owners were limited in suits

mental entities to that authorized statute derogation sovereign im of constitutional

munity. Each of eases stands for the these

elementary proposition that landowners with

adequate legal remedies cannot seek extraor

dinary equitable principle which ones.

Sprint is contends deduced from these cases

is incorrect.2

Finally, Sprint attacks two so-called factual

findings opinion. Sprint’s concern that against has facts” it is Court “found

unfounded. The Court resolved

propriety the lower court’s decisions

motions to It did not determine dismiss. ‍​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‍fact, nor direct that trial court’s

issues ejectment upon, View action on statute of limitations 1. The fourth case relied Pleasant Util al of (Tenn. ity Vradenburg, holding District 545 S.W.2d 733 grounds. concerned the The court’s 1977), inapposite totally it deals with the telephone companies' rights to take for internal proper statute of limitations and forum for proceed- improvements under eminent domain statutory condemnation action. dismissing proceeding ejectment ings. In barred, was time the court commented Equally unsupported Sprint’s claim that the to a statuto- landowner was limited dicta Doty Telephone Court overruled v. American remedy. ry discussed in Other cases cited and Telegraph 123 Tenn. 130 S.W. 1053 over-simplifica- opinion clarified that have (1910). Again, petitioner incorrectly states the tion. was, fact, holding a dismiss- of the case which

Case Details

Case Name: Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co.

Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date Published: Apr 29, 1996

Citation: 924 S.W.2d 632

Court Abbreviation: Tenn.