In re D.L.
2018 IL App (1st) 171764
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Respondent D.L., a 16-year-old, was charged in juvenile court with multiple firearm offenses after police recovered a .380 handgun from his jacket following an encounter on March 28, 2017.
- Officers in plainclothes, in an unmarked car, responded to multiple 911 calls reporting shots fired on the 117th block of Loomis; dispatch provided no suspect description.
- While driving nearby, officers observed D.L. and another male walking quickly about one-to-two blocks from the reported location; Officer Scaduto observed D.L. for roughly five seconds.
- Officer Scaduto told D.L. to stop (testified as an "order"); D.L. ran down an alley, was pursued and detained within a minute.
- During a pat-down after detention, the officer found a stove-piped .380 semi-automatic handgun and then arrested D.L.; the circuit court granted D.L.’s motion to quash arrest and suppress the handgun.
- The State appealed; the appellate court affirmed suppression, finding the stop was not justified at its inception and the frisk therefore unconstitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (D.L.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether D.L. was "seized" only upon capture (so the stop could be judged at capture) | Seizure occurred when D.L. was apprehended after flight; at that time officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him under Terry. | The officer’s initial order to stop was a seizure from its inception; it lacked reasonable suspicion. | Court: The officer’s show of authority made the encounter a seizure at inception; reasonable suspicion was lacking at that point. |
| Whether the stop was justified at its inception under Terry v. Ohio | Totality (shots-fired calls, D.L. walking quickly away, only two people present, flight) supplied reasonable, articulable suspicion. | Five seconds of observing normal walking away from a shooting scene, with no description or other indicia, is insufficient for reasonable suspicion. | Court: The stop was not justified at its inception; observation of walking quickly near a shot location did not supply reasonable suspicion. |
| Whether D.L.’s unprovoked flight converted the encounter into a justified stop | Flight plus context (shots-fired calls and isolation of two people) provided suspicion when he ran, justifying the subsequent detention. | Flight alone—without other articulable facts—does not produce reasonable suspicion. | Court: Flight alone here did not create reasonable suspicion; no other factors tied D.L. to the shooting. |
| Whether the pat-down/frisk was lawful | Once seized, officer had reason to believe suspect might be armed and dangerous given shots-fired context and flight. | Frisk depends on a lawful stop; because the stop was unlawful, the frisk was unconstitutional. | Court: Frisk unlawful because the stop was not justified; suppression of the handgun affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes that brief investigatory stops require reasonable, articulable suspicion)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (holding that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion)
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability cannot, by itself, justify a Terry stop)
- California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (a show of authority does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure until the subject yields)
- Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (protective frisk during a valid stop is permissible when officer reasonably believes suspect is armed and dangerous)
- People v. Moore, 286 Ill. App. 3d 649 (1997) (officer actions not justified at inception where observed conduct could be lawful; flight alone insufficient for probable cause)
- People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103 (2001) (reasonableness of a stop judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer and requires specific, articulable facts)
- People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (2006) (factors indicative of seizure include number of officers, language/tone indicating compulsion, display of authority)
- People v. Davis, 352 Ill. App. 3d 576 (2004) (frisk constitutionality requires a proper stop, reason to believe suspect is armed, and limited scope)