In re Cross, 500 P.3d 958

Geoffrey Cross represented Drew Vickers in a 2014 criminal matter arising from an ATV accident; during representation Cross discussed with Vickers the possibility of suing Yamaha and Vickers decided not to pursue it.
In 2016 Mary Valenzuela sued Vickers; Michael Carroll (who had referred Vickers to Cross) represented Valenzuela and Kathleen Thompson represented Vickers in the civil case.
Carroll asked Cross for information; Cross provided a sworn declaration to Carroll/Valenzuela stating Vickers had declined a products-liability suit against Yamaha; Cross did not obtain Vickers’s informed consent and did not discuss disclosure with Vickers or Thompson.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) charged Cross with violating RPC 1.9(c)(2) and RPC 1.6(a); the hearing officer found violations but characterized Cross’s mental state as negligent and recommended a reprimand.
The Disciplinary Board reversed the mental-state finding to "knowing," struck one mitigating factor, and imposed a nine-month suspension; the Supreme Court affirmed the Board, holding that conscious disclosure is "knowing" even if the lawyer did not realize the RPCs barred it.
The Court relied on aggravating factors (two prior disciplinary offenses and long experience), upheld other mitigating findings (cooperation, remoteness of one prior offense), and found the nine-month suspension roughly proportionate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (ODC)	Defendant's Argument (Cross)	Held
Whether Cross’s declarations violated RPC 1.9(c)(2) and RPC 1.6(a)	Cross revealed information relating to representation to an adverse party, breaching both rules	Cross contends disclosure was harmless, public, or within an exception	Violation proven: disclosure was information relating to representation and not authorized by informed consent or exceptions
Whether Cross acted with "knowledge" or merely "negligence"	Cross knowingly disclosed protected information (conscious choice to reveal)	Cross lacked awareness that the RPCs barred the disclosure, so his conduct was negligent	"Knowing": conscious awareness of the conduct suffice; knowledge of RPC prohibition not required
Whether the disclosure caused actual or potential harm	Disclosure foreseeably risked harm to Vickers’s civil defense (third-party fault defense)	Cross minimized the effect, saying information was public or harmless	Court found potential harm was reasonably foreseeable, so potential injury existed
Whether a nine-month suspension is proportionate	Aggravating factors and knowledge with potential harm justify suspension	Cross argued prior cases support a lesser sanction (reprimand)	Suspension upheld as roughly proportionate given prior discipline and comparable precedents

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anschell, 141 Wn.2d 593 (2000) (Supreme Court has ultimate responsibility for lawyer discipline and reviews findings of fact for clear preponderance)
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Egger, 152 Wn.2d 393 (2004) (attorney's consciousness of circumstances can constitute "knowledge" without awareness that conduct violates RPCs)
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Stansfield, 164 Wn.2d 108 (2008) (no requirement to prove state of mind as to consequences; should-have-known standard can support knowledge)
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Holcomb, 162 Wn.2d 563 (2007) (attorney found to have acted with knowledge where he should have known a conflict existed)
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Noble, 100 Wn.2d 88 (1983) (deference given to Disciplinary Board’s sanction recommendations due to its experience)
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Poole, 156 Wn.2d 196 (2006) (distinguishing when knowledge exists but there is no potential for injury for sanction purposes)
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Gillingham, 126 Wn.2d 454 (1995) (sanctions must be "roughly proportionate" to misconduct)
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Schafer, 149 Wn.2d 148 (2003) (comparative decisions on disclosure of client confidences used for proportionality analysis)