In re Commitment of Chester
2017 IL App (1st) 160979
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- In 2007 the State filed a petition under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.) alleging Earl Chester was a sexually violent person based on a prior sexual-assault conviction and psychological evaluations diagnosing paraphilia NOS and other disorders.
- Probable cause was found and multiple evaluations were obtained; the case was continued for years and a jury trial ultimately was set and the jury sworn in March 2015.
- On March 10, 2015, Chester and the State submitted a written stipulation: Chester waived his right to a jury trial and agreed the evaluators would opine he was a sexually violent person, and the court accepted the stipulation and adjudicated him a sexually violent person.
- Chester filed a pro se motion to vacate the stipulation, claiming he changed his mind and that his mental condition affected his ability to understand; counsel argued withdrawal was in the interest of justice because Chester was tired and inexperienced with jury selection.
- The trial court denied the motion to vacate, finding Chester understood the stipulation and its consequences; after a dispositional hearing Chester was committed to the Illinois Department of Human Services and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Chester) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether stipulations are permissible under the Act | Stipulations are allowed in civil proceedings and enforceable unless unreasonable, fraudulent, or against public policy | The Act contains no mechanism for stipulations; by analogy to the Mental Health Code, stipulations in commitment cases are impermissible | Court held stipulations are permissible under the Act; nothing in the statute or precedent bars them |
| Whether court erred by accepting Chester's stipulation without a fitness inquiry | No statutory or due-process right to a fitness hearing under the Act; no indication Chester lacked capacity | Chester argued the court should have inquired into his mental capacity to understand the stipulation | Court found Chester forfeited the issue by not raising a fitness claim below and, on the merits, the record showed he understood the stipulation; no error |
| Whether the stipulation should be vacated for mental incapacity or coercion | Stipulation was knowingly entered and counsel reviewed it; no fraud or public-policy defect | Chester claimed changed mind, mental illness affected comprehension, and he was tired and inexperienced | Court denied vacation absent a clear showing the stipulation was untrue or procured by fraud; no basis to relieve Chester |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33 (2010) (statutory construction principles and de novo review on pure legal questions)
- In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300 (2002) (statutes must be read as a whole and words given meaning)
- In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548 (2000) (distinguishing persons under the Act from those under the Mental Health Code)
- People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455 (2005) (courts favor stipulations; stipulation substitutes for proof)
- In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965 (2009) (holding in Mental Health Code context that respondent could not effectively waive entire involuntary-admission hearing)
- In re Marriage of Tantiwongse, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1161 (2007) (stipulation may be rejected only if fraudulent, unreasonable, or contrary to public policy)
- Brink v. Industrial Comm’n, 368 Ill. 607 (1938) (relief from stipulation requires clear showing and timely application)
- In re Stephenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544 (1977) (mental illness is not a crime; distinction between illness and criminal conduct)