In rе DETENTION OF DAVID C. SAMUELSON (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. David C. Samuelson, Appellee).
No. 85469
Supreme Court of Illinois
January 21, 2000
Rehearing denied April 3, 2000
189 Ill. 2d 548
James B. Kinzer, of Watseka, for appellee.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of this state‘s recently enacted Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (
The case comes before us after the State initiated proceedings in March of 1998 to commit David Samuelson under the new lаw. Samuelson is an inmate in the Department of Corrections who was about to be released from prison following completion of his sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and exhibiting harmful material. Following various developments not relevant here, the court conducted a hearing to determine whether there was
Before the trial commenced, the circuit court dismissed the State‘s petition on Samuelson‘s motion, holding that the Act is unconstitutional. The circuit court‘s order constituted a final judgment and had the effect of invalidating the Act. The State therefore appealed directly to our court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). We stayed the circuit court‘s judgment pending the appeal. For the reasons that follow, we now reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (
“has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.”
725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998).
For the purposes of this statute, a “sexually violent offense” is defined to mean criminal sexual assault (
The provisions of the Act are triggered when a defendant who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, adjudicated delinquent on the basis of a sexually violent offense, or been found not guilty of a sexually violеnt offense by reason of insanity is nearing release or discharge from custody. If the defendant “may meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person,” the agency with authority to release or discharge him or her is required to notify the Attorney General and the relevant State‘s Attorney “as soon as possible beginning 3 months prior to the applicable date of” the defendant‘s anticipated release or discharge.
After the requisite notice is given, a petition alleging that the defendant is a sexually violent person may be filed by the Attorney General or, if the Attorney General elects not to proceed, by the relevant State‘s Attorney.
Upon the filing of the petition, the court is required to make a determination as to whether the defendant should be detained and to hold a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is a sexually violent person. If probable cause is not established, the petition must be dismissed. If probable сause is shown and if the defendant is not already in custody, the court must order the defendant taken into custody pending trial.
At trial, the State has the burden of proving the allegations in its petition beyond a reasonable doubt.
The initial commitment order is to be made following a hearing. The hearing is to be held as soon as practicable
After a defendant has been committed to institutional care, the Department of Human Services is to conduct an examination of his mental condition within six months of the initial commitment and again thereafter at least once every 12 months. The purpose of the periodic examinations is to determine whether the defendant has made sufficient progress to be conditionally released or discharged.
A defendant who has been committed to institutional care may petition the court to authorize conditional release once certain time requirements are met.
Once the defendant has filed his petition for conditional release, the court must appoint one or more examiners to examine the defendant and make a written report. After the report has been submitted, the court, sitting without a jury, must hear the petition and must grant it
“unless the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the person is still a sexually violent person and that it is still substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not confined in a secure facility.”
725 ILCS 207/60(d) (West 1998).
For a defendant to obtain discharge rather than conditional release, three different procedures arе avail-
The second mechanism for discharge is triggered whenever the defendant undergoes one of the periodic examinations required by the statute. At the time of each such examination, the defendant must be given written notice that he has the right to petition for discharge over the Secretary‘s objection. If the defendant does not affirmatively waive that right, the court must set a probable cause hearing to determine whether facts exist that warrant a hearing on whether the defendant is still a sexually violent person.
If the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is no longer a sexually violent person, it must set а hearing on the issue. Again, the hearing is to take place before the court, sitting without a jury, and the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is still a sexually violent person.
Finally, the defendant may petition for discharge at times other than the periodic examinations and may do
The case before us today is at a relatively early stage in this process. As previously indicated, the State filed a petition alleging that defendant is a sexually violent person, a hearing was held on that petition, the circuit court determined that there is probable cause to believe that defendant is a sexually violent person, and the court ordered defendant detained pending trial. Trial on the State‘s petition has not yet taken place.
There is no dispute that defendant is subject to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (
In assessing defendant‘s arguments, we begin with the well-established rule that all statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. Where, as here, the circuit court has found a statute to be unconstitutional, this court conducts de novo review of its determination. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999). The party challenging a statute bears the burden of clearly establishing that it is unconstitutional. Our court will uphold a statute whenever reasonably possible, and any doubts will be resolved in favor of the law‘s validity. People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1995).
There is no merit to defendant‘s contention that the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act contravenes the prohibition against double jeopardy and violates ex post facto princiрles. On these questions, the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), is dispositive. In Hendricks the court addressed the constitutional validity of a Kansas statute similar to the Illinois law at issue here. The court held that the law was civil rather than criminal in nature and that involuntary confinement pursuant to the law‘s provisions is not punitive. Accordingly, the court concluded that initiation of its commitment proceedings does not constitute a second prosecution for double jeopardy purposes. Because the law does not impose punishment, the court likewise concluded that it raises no ex post facto concerns. The court held that the ex post facto clause is not implicated
The points raised by the United States Supreme Court apply with equal force to Illinois’ version of the law. As with proceedings under the Kansas statute considered in Hendricks, proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act are civil rather than criminal in nature. The statute so states (
There is likewise no merit to defendant‘s contention that the Act violates article I, section 13, of our state‘s constitution, which deals with the right to trial by jury. As our summary of the legislation has indicated, a defendant who is the subject of a petition under the Act has an express right to request that a jury determine whether he is a sexually violent person.
Defendant‘s challenge to this scheme is premised on the principle that in criminal cases, the right to a jury trial encompasses the right to waive a trial by jury. If a criminal defendant wishes to forgo a jury, that desire cannot be overridden by the State. See People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 222 (1988). The flaw in defendant‘s analysis is that this is not a criminal case. As we have just discussed, proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act are civil rather than criminal in nature.
Defendant makes a separate and distinct challenge under article I, section 13, of the 1970 Constitution to those portions of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act governing petitions for conditional release or discharge filed after the initial commitment. The defect defendant claims with respect to those provisions is the converse of the one he raises with respect to initial commitment proceedings. Instead of failing to give a defendant the right to waive a jury trial when he does not want one, the provisions governing conditional release or discharge do not afford a defendant the option of requesting a jury trial when he does want one. Unlike initial commitment proceedings, the rules governing petitions for conditional release or discharge do not authorize jury trials at all. The petitions can only be heard by the court, sitting without a jury.
Contrary to defendant‘s contention, the fact that juries are not available on petitions for conditional release or discharge does not render the legislation infirm under article I, section 13. The right to a jury trial
We turn next to defendant‘s contention that the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act violates equal protectiоn under the state and federal constitutions. Our court applies the same analysis to equal protection claims brought under the Illinois Constitution of 1970 as it does to equal protection claims under the United States Constitution. People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 450 (1998). The right to equal protection of the laws requires the government to treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner. It
“‘does not preclude the State from enacting legislation that draws distinctions between different categories of people, but it does prohibit the government from according different treatment to persons who have been placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation.‘” Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d at 450, quoting Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996).
When we review legislation under equal protection analysis, the level of scrutiny applied depends on the type of legislative classification at issue. Classifications based on race or national origin or affecting fundamental rights are strictly scrutinized. McLean v. Department of Revenue, 184 Ill. 2d 341, 354 (1998). Intermediate
This court (People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 321 (1976)) and our appellate court (People v. McDougle, 303 Ill. App. 3d 509, 521 (1999); People v. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d 960, 967-68 (1999)) have held that the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (
Under the rational basis test, judicial review of legislative classifications is limited and generally deferential. The court simply inquires whether the method or means employed in the statute to achieve the stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationally related to that goal. If any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the classification, it must be upheld. In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 38 (1998).
Defendant‘s equal protection arguments are not well defined and have changed over time. Before our court, his principal contention appears to be that the law is invalid because it does not afford defendants the same rights available to defendants in criminal cases or to persons facing involuntary admission to a mental health facility pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (
That differences exist between the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act and the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code likewise presents no equal protection problems. In People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 321-22 (1976), our court considered a similar challenge involving the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. There, as here, the claim was made that the statute was invalid because there were substantial differences between commitment proceedings under the Act and proceedings under what was then known as the Mental Health Code. We rejected that argument by noting that persons subject to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act possess characteristics which set them apart from the greater class of persons who fall within the Mental Health Code, and such persons present different societal problems. These same considerations are equally applicable here. The provisions governing involuntary admission of adults to mental health facilities under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code apply generally to individuals suffering from mental illness. By contrast, far more specific criteria must be met to qualify as a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. The defendant must have been convicted of a sexually violent offense or been adjudicated a delinquent for a sexually violent offense or bеen found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and he must suffer from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence in the future.
Defendant‘s final argument is that the Sexually Violent Pеrsons Commitment Act is invalid because the procedures for post-commitment discharge do not satisfy the requirements of due process. This argument was adopted by the circuit court and appears to have been the primary basis for its decision. According to the circuit court, the post-commitment discharge proceedings set forth in the Act are constitutionally infirm because such proceedings are not automatic, they require defendants to make an initial showing that there is probable cause to believe that they are no longer sexually violent persons in cases where the petition has not been authorized by the Secretary оf the Department of Human Services, they reduce the State‘s burden of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and convincing, and they do not afford defendants the option of having the matter tried before a jury.
In cases of involuntary civil commitment, due process does not require the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The State may confine a mentally ill person if it shows by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Because due process does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the initial commitment, it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in subsequent discharge proceedings. The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act is therefore not subject to challenge on this basis.
With respect to the remaining deficiencies cited by
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that respondent1 failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (
Defendant David Samuelson pled guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse on March 1, 1990. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 15 and 7 years in the penitentiary. Defendant was subsequently scheduled to begin supervised release on March 5, 1998. One day before his release, however, the State instituted proceedings to further incarcerate him under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (
Defendant argues that the Act violates the Illinois Constitution‘s provision that a person shall not “be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense” (
There are a multitude of compelling reasons to conclude that confinement under the Act is criminal punishment rather than a mere civil remedy. The most obvious is that the Act is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. See
Yet another indication of the criminal character of the Act is that, in the vast majority of cases, it applies only to defendants who have been convicted of, and are already serving a sentence for, a criminal sexual offense.2
Further indication that the Act‘s procedures аre merely a proxy for imposing additional criminal punishment comes from the astonishing ease with which a convicted sex offender can be brought within the Act‘s provisions. Incarceration under the Act is premised upon a finding that a convicted sex offender suffers from a “mental disorder.”
Finally, the indefinite nature of the confinement period under the Act is a telling manifestation of the Act‘s criminal purposes. By allowing the State to secure a defendant‘s continued incarceration even after prosecuting and extracting from him the full service of a criminal sentence, the Act effectively amends every sentencing statute applicable to sexual crimes to give the State the option of seeking life imprisonment whenever it is displeased with the sentence imposed by the court in the defendant‘s original prosecution. The Illinois Constitution cannot countenance such a perverse transmutation of the criminal law. If the State desires to adopt a policy mandating a life sentence for certain serious sexual crimes, it must do so openly within the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code.
Because the Act is criminal rather than civil, it violates the Illinois Constitution‘s double jeopardy provision by imposing further punishment upon defendants who have already served their sentences. Furthermore, when the Act is applied to individuals such as dеfendant, who committed their crimes before it was passed, it also violates the Illinois Constitution‘s ex post facto clause. The majority rejects these arguments because the United States Supreme Court has rejected them as a matter of federal constitutional law. Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has no authority to curtail the protections afforded by our own state constitution. See People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (1996). The Act is unconstitutional as a matter of Illinois law. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.