In re Citizen Complaint by Stout v. Felix, 493 P.3d 1170

In October 2016 DSHS social worker Geene Felix signed dependency petitions that Thomas Stout alleged contained false statements; Stout alleged the crime of false swearing (a gross misdemeanor with a two-year statute of limitations).
On October 3, 2018 (one day before the two-year SOL expired) Stout appeared in Mason County District Court and filed an affidavit seeking to initiate a citizen complaint under CrRLJ 2.1(c); the court set a probable-cause hearing and notified the prosecutor and Felix.
At the December 2018 hearing the court observed the SOL had run and asked for briefing on whether Stout’s affidavit started the criminal action; the court concluded a criminal action is commenced only by filing a complaint and dismissed Stout’s citizen complaint as untimely.
The superior court affirmed; discretionary review in the Court of Appeals was denied; the Washington Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court held that under CrRLJ 2.1 criminal proceedings are initiated by filing a complaint (or citation treated as a complaint), and a citizen affidavit under CrRLJ 2.1(c) is only evidence presented to request the court’s authorization to sign and file a complaint; because no complaint was filed within the two-year SOL, dismissal was affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Stout)	Defendant's Argument (Felix)	Held
Whether a citizen’s affidavit under CrRLJ 2.1(c) initiates criminal proceedings (timeliness under SOL)	The affidavit filed Oct 3, 2018 is an exception to the complaint requirement and thus timely (it began proceedings before the 2-year SOL expired).	CrRLJ 2.1 requires a complaint (or a citation) to commence prosecution; an affidavit is optional evidence for a judge’s preliminary determination and does not itself initiate the case.	Held: An affidavit does not commence criminal proceedings; a complaint must be filed to initiate prosecution. Dismissal as untimely affirmed.
Whether CrRLJ 2.1(c) facially violates separation of powers (constitutionality of citizen complaint rule)	Stout and some amici defended availability of private citizen initiation; historical practice supports some private role.	Felix (and concurrence) argued CrRLJ 2.1(c) has judges exercising charging discretion reserved to executive prosecutors, violating separation of powers.	Majority: Avoided the constitutional question as unnecessary and disposed on SOL. Concurrence (Yu, J.) would hold the rule facially unconstitutional and would dismiss with prejudice.

State v. McEnroe, 174 Wn.2d 795 (statutory/rule interpretation reviewed de novo)
Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1 (plain meaning construed in context)
State v. Stump, 185 Wn.2d 454 (interpretation of rules in light of related provisions)
State v. Siers, 174 Wn.2d 269 (due process notice requirements in criminal proceedings)
State v. Rice, 174 Wn.2d 884 (discussing prosecutorial charging discretion and separation of powers)
State v. Hall, 95 Wn.2d 536 (principle of avoiding constitutional questions when unnecessary)
State ex rel. Romano v. Yakey, 43 Wash. 15 (historical practice of private prosecutions)
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (permitting lower courts to consider constitutional merits in limited contexts)