In re: Charles Therion Clayton
829 F.3d 1254
11th Cir.2016Background
- Charles Clayton was sentenced in 2010 as a career offender under USSG §4B1.1, which increased his guideline range from about 120–150 months to 360 months–life based on a prior Florida conviction the district court found met §4B1.2(a)(2)’s “serious potential risk” language.
- Clayton seeks permission from the Eleventh Circuit to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. §2255 motion invoking Johnson v. United States (2015), which struck down ACCA’s identical “residual clause” as unconstitutionally vague.
- AEDPA requires prisoners who file a second or successive §2255 motion to obtain authorization from the court of appeals by making a prima facie showing under 28 U.S.C. §§2244(b)(3)(C) and 2255(h)(2).
- The Eleventh Circuit previously held in United States v. Matchett that Johnson’s vagueness holding does not apply to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause, a rule the concurrence opinions criticize as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
- The panel denied Clayton’s application because, under Eleventh Circuit precedent (Matchett), he failed to make the required prima facie showing that Johnson applies to his USSG-based sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Clayton may obtain authorization to file a second or successive §2255 motion based on Johnson | Clayton argues Johnson’s invalidation of the residual clause applies to identical language in USSG §4B1.2, so he can show a new, retroactive rule and obtain authorization | Government argues Johnson does not apply to advisory Sentencing Guidelines; under Eleventh Circuit precedent Clayton cannot make the required prima facie showing | Application denied: Clayton did not make the prima facie showing required to authorize a successive §2255 motion under §2244(b)(3) and §2255(h) |
| Whether Johnson’s vagueness holding applies to the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause | Clayton: identical language in USSG §4B1.2(a)(2) is as vague as ACCA’s clause and therefore invalid under Johnson | Eleventh Circuit (Matchett): vagueness and notice rationales do not apply to advisory guidelines because they do not fix punishments in the same way as statutes | This panel followed Matchett and did not reach the merits; concurring judges argue Matchett is wrongly decided and that Johnson should apply to guidelines |
| Whether the vagueness doctrine protects against arbitrary judicial enforcement in the guidelines context | Clayton: vagueness doctrine also guards against arbitrary enforcement and that concern applies equally to Guidelines; advisory status does not neutralize arbitrariness or notice problems | Government: advisory nature of Guidelines limits notice interest and removes the sort of reliance interest that vagueness doctrine protects | Concurring judges emphasize Johnson’s dual rationale (notice and arbitrary enforcement) and argue advisory status does not avoid due‑process problems; panel did not grant relief |
| Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s expedited, paper-only gatekeeping procedure for Johnson-based successive §2255 applications is appropriate | Clayton (and concurring judges’ critique): circuit’s practice of rapid, non‑adversarial review of sealed PSRs and irreviewable denials produces inconsistent, potentially final rulings that bar meritorious claims | Government/court practice: apply Matchett and AEDPA gatekeeping strictly and quickly to manage large volume | The order denied Clayton’s application; concurring opinions strongly criticize the court’s procedures and urge following Supreme Court guidance and remanding more claims for district-court consideration |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015) (Eleventh Circuit panel holding Johnson does not apply to advisory Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (Supreme Court holding ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (U.S. 2016) (Johnson announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive on collateral review)
- Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (U.S. 2013) (Guidelines serve as the starting point and anchor sentencing discretion; Ex Post Facto/fair‑notice considerations apply to Guidelines)
- Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (U.S. 2016) (improper guideline calculation is a significant procedural error because Guidelines anchor sentencing)
- Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (U.S. 2008) (defendant had no due‑process right to advance notice of an above‑Guidelines variance under advisory system)
- Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (U.S. 1996) (AEDPA’s limits on successive petitions do not suspend the writ; caution about divergent appellate interpretations)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (U.S. 1998) (new substantive rules can be applied retroactively on collateral review)