In re Carla C., 143 A.3d 677

Background

Mother petitioned in probate (later in Superior Court) to terminate father's parental rights to daughter Carla; father acknowledged paternity in 2009. Father has been incarcerated for crimes including a 2009 drive-by shooting; maximum release date 2018.
Mother initially brought Carla to several prison visits (2009–2011) but then unilaterally stopped visitation, obtained an order at the prison barring father from contacting her and Carla, and later stipulated to sole custody while still not facilitating court-ordered bimonthly prison visits.
Father attempted to maintain contact: sent cards/letters (many discarded by mother), filed motions to enforce visitation and obtained court orders for visits that did not occur, and otherwise sought contempt and visitation relief.
Probate petition alleged two grounds under Conn. Gen. Stat. §45a-717(g)(2): (B) denial of care by act(s) of parental commission/omission and (C) no ongoing parent-child relationship; trial court found both grounds proved and that termination served Carla’s best interests.
Appellate court reversed: (1) father’s criminal conduct that occurred before Carla’s birth cannot be the act of parental commission/omission under §45a-717(g)(2)(B); (2) mother’s interference in visitation precluded proving lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship under §45a-717(g)(2)(C).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prenatal criminal conduct can constitute an "act of parental commission or omission" under §45a‑717(g)(2)(B)	Mother argued father’s criminal activities (drive‑by shooting) and resulting incarceration deprived child of necessary care post‑birth.	Father argued parental‑commission/omission must occur after the child’s birth; prenatal conduct cannot support this ground.	Held: Prenatal conduct cannot be the basis for §45a‑717(g)(2)(B); court erred to rely on pre‑birth crime.
Whether a custodial parent may obtain termination under "no ongoing parent‑child relationship" (§45a‑717(g)(2)(C)) when that custodial parent thwarted the noncustodial parent’s efforts to maintain contact	Mother argued lack of positive parent‑child relationship and father’s long absence justified termination; further delay would harm child.	Father argued mother’s unilateral refusal to facilitate visitation (and prison contact orders she procured) caused the lack of relationship, so she cannot rely on that ground.	Held: Where the custodial parent’s conduct substantially caused the lack of relationship, she cannot establish the ‘‘no ongoing parent‑child relationship’’ ground.
Whether incarceration alone is sufficient to establish no ongoing parent‑child relationship	Mother relied on father’s prolonged incarceration and absence to show relationship ceased.	Father argued incarceration alone is insufficient; must consider efforts made within constraints and interference by custodial parent.	Held: Incarceration alone cannot justify termination; court must evaluate whether the incarcerated parent made reasonable efforts and whether custodial parent impeded those efforts.
Whether best‑interests analysis can cure statutory defects in proving termination grounds	Mother emphasized child’s stability and prospective harms if father’s rights continued.	Father argued statutory prerequisites must be satisfied before best‑interest analysis controls.	Held: Best‑interest analysis is relevant only after a statutory ground has been established; it cannot substitute for failure to meet statutory requirements.

Key Cases Cited

In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492 (Conn. 1992) (prenatal conduct cannot support parental‑commission/omission ground; state may not create the lack of parent‑child relationship and then terminate rights)
In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459 (Conn. 1991) (when custodial party limits visitation, evidence of relationship must be viewed in light of visitation constraints; stringent standard for proving no ongoing relationship)
In re Alexander C., 67 Conn. App. 417 (Conn. App. 2001) (incarcerated parent who made no efforts to maintain contact cannot later claim interference excuse)
In re Lukas K., 120 Conn. App. 465 (Conn. App. 2010) (termination of incarcerated parent upheld where parent failed to use available means to maintain relationship)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest requiring heightened procedural protections)
In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648 (Conn. 1979) (interpretation of "no ongoing parent‑child relationship" contemplates either never‑developed or definitively lost relationships)
In re Michael M., 29 Conn. App. 112 (Conn. App. 1992) (two‑pronged test: determine no relationship exists, then assess whether allowing time would harm the child)
In re Payton V., 158 Conn. App. 154 (Conn. App. 2015) (clarifies adjudicatory vs. dispositional phases and clear‑and‑convincing standard)
In re Justice V., 111 Conn. App. 500 (Conn. App. 2008) (explains clear‑and‑convincing evidence standard in parental‑rights cases)
In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485 (Conn. 2013) (incarceration is not per se a basis for termination; consider feasibility of visits and constraints)