In re Campbell
874 F.3d 454
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Alva Campbell Jr., an Ohio death-row inmate, was convicted of multiple crimes and resentenced to death; his first § 2254 habeas petition (filed 2005) was dismissed and affirmed on appeal.
- Campbell filed a later challenge to Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol and sought remand to the district court to file a successive § 2254 petition asserting newly arisen facts about Ohio’s changing protocol and his deteriorating medical condition.
- The magistrate and district courts treated the new filing as a potentially "second or successive" petition and transferred it to the Sixth Circuit for initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
- The majority analyzed whether method-of-execution claims that concede the validity of the death sentence belong in habeas or must proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, focusing on recent Supreme Court precedent (Hill, Nelson, Glossip) and Sixth Circuit decisions (Adams line, Tibbetts).
- The majority held Campbell’s claims (protocol changes, worsened physical ailments) seek an injunction against a method of execution as applied to him, not invalidation of his death sentence, and thus are cognizable under § 1983 rather than habeas; his petition is "second or successive" and not eligible for authorization under § 2244(b).
- Judge Moore dissented, arguing Campbell alleged sufficiently specific and newly developed biological facts that could render his personal death sentence unconstitutional and therefore should be remanded for factfinding rather than dismissed as successive.
Issues
| Issue | Campbell's Argument | State/Warden's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the petition is "second or successive" under § 2244(b) | New facts (protocol changes, worsened health) make the claim newly ripe and not successive | The claims challenge method of execution as applied and do not attack the validity of the death sentence; thus they are successive habeas attempts | Petition is "second or successive" and must be pursued, if at all, under § 2244(b) (denied remand) |
| Proper forum for method-of-execution claims (habeas v. § 1983) | Because Ohio only authorizes lethal injection, demonstrating all methods are unconstitutional would void the sentence; habeas is therefore proper | Following Hill, Nelson, and Glossip, method-of-execution claims that concede a valid sentence must proceed under § 1983 unless they render the death sentence invalid | Claims challenging Ohio’s protocol as applied must proceed under § 1983; habeas jurisdiction is inappropriate absent a showing the sentence itself is invalid |
| Whether deteriorating physical health can constitute a Ford/Panetti-style claim (competency/incompetency analogue) | Severe, newly developed respiratory and other conditions could make execution of Campbell unconstitutional as applied, akin to Ford/Panetti insanity claims | Physical ailments do not impair the moral/mental capacity grounds that Ford protects; absent authority showing physical illness renders the sentence void, claim is not a habeas (Ford) claim | Physical-health–based claims do not equate to Ford incompetency claims; they are not per se cognizable in habeas; Campbell’s allegations do not demonstrate invalidity of sentence |
| Whether Campbell identified a constitutional alternative or new constitutional rule permitting successive habeas | Campbell argues factual development makes his claim ripe now; he implies Ohio has no available constitutional method for him | Under Glossip, a Baze-style challenge must identify a feasible, readily implemented less painful alternative; absence of a new retroactive rule or showing sentence invalidity means § 2244(b) relief is unavailable | Campbell did not rely on a new retroactive constitutional rule nor alleged facts that, if proved, would necessarily invalidate his sentence; authorization for successive habeas is not available |
Key Cases Cited
- Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (to obtain injunctive relief against an execution method, prisoner must show a substantial risk of severe pain and a feasible, readily implemented less painful alternative)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (Ford-type incompetency claims can be unripe until execution date and may avoid second-or-successive bar)
- Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) (method-of-execution claims that concede legality of the sentence are typically brought under § 1983)
- Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (suggests some method-of-execution challenges could amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence)
- Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015) (held that a Baze-style challenger must identify a constitutional alternative; closed the route for claims asserting no constitutional means of execution exists)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (civil actions that would imply invalidity of conviction/sentence are barred unless that conviction/sentence is set aside)
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (an intervening state-court judgment can affect whether a petition is "second or successive")
- McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ principles governing successive petitions)
- Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinions on death-penalty arbitrariness referenced in Eighth Amendment context)