In re C.D.
2017 Ohio 5870
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Minor C.D. was adjudicated delinquent for disorderly conduct after an incident involving her mother; the juvenile court temporarily committed C.D. to Franklin County Children Services (FCCS).
- Approximately six weeks after the temporary court custody order, FCCS moved under R.C. 2151.36 for an order requiring Mother (N.D.) and Father (C.D.) to pay child support for C.D.; the magistrate granted support and set amounts and arrears.
- Both parents objected and moved to dismiss, arguing the motion was untimely, that the court lacked statutory authority to order support where a parent is the victim, and that they were not advised of or appointed counsel during the delinquency proceedings; they also challenged the amount of support.
- The juvenile court overruled objections to the grant of support but reduced each parent’s obligation by $100/month after applying R.C. 3119.22–.23 deviation authority and weighing listed factors, including that Mother was the victim.
- On appeal, parents raised four parallel assignments of error: timeliness/finality, denial of right to appointed counsel at commitment, statutory authority when parent is victim, and inadequate deviation (should be zero).
- The appellate court affirmed: R.C. 2151.36 authorizes the mandatory support order post-commitment; FCCS’s post-commitment motion was timely; failure to inform parents of right to counsel during delinquency proceedings was harmless because counsel represented them at the support hearing; the court properly considered R.C. 3119.23 factors and did not abuse discretion in granting a modest deviation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FCCS’s R.C. 2151.36 motion filed after commitment was untimely and violated finality/due process | Motion was untimely; Meyer requires finality, so post-commitment support motions are barred | R.C. 2151.36 mandates the court "shall issue" support when a child has been committed; statute contains no filing deadline and expenses accrue after commitment | Motion timely; statute’s plain language controls; six-week filing was permissible and no due-process violation shown |
| Whether parents were denied due process by not being advised of right to appointed counsel during delinquency proceeding | Parents lacked notice of right to counsel at adjudication/commitment; reversal required | Parents were appointed counsel before the support hearing and were able to fully contest the support motion | Failure to advise at adjudication was error but harmless here because counsel represented parents at the contested support hearing |
| Whether R.C. 2151.36 authorizes support orders where a parent is the victim of the delinquent child’s offense | Statute should not permit ordering a victim-parent to pay support for the child who harmed them | Statute applies to any child committed under chapter 2151; no statutory exception for victim-parents; policy changes belong to legislature | R.C. 2151.36 authorizes support regardless of the parent’s victim status; no judicially-created exception |
| Whether the juvenile court abused discretion by deviating only $100/month and not considering all R.C. 3119.23 factors (arguing deviation should be zero) | Court failed to adequately weigh factors (special needs, child’s condition, parents’ finances) and should have deviated to zero given Mother’s victim status | Court applied R.C. 3119.22–.23, considered factors including parents’ resources and catchall factor acknowledging victim status, and reasonably limited deviation to preserve reunification prospects | No abuse of discretion; court considered statutory factors (including victim status under 3119.23(P)) and permissibly limited the deviation given mandatory nature of R.C. 2151.36 and reunification goals |
Key Cases Cited
- Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142 (1989) (abuse-of-discretion standard for child support matters)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983) (definition of abuse of discretion)
- Meyer v. Meyer, 17 Ohio St.3d 222 (1985) (discussing finality in retroactive support requests)
- Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312 (1944) (plain meaning rule for statutory interpretation)
- Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Morgan, 104 Ohio St.3d 445 (2004) (give statutory words their ordinary meaning)
- In re Hinko, 84 Ohio App.3d 89 (1992) (reversing where parents were not advised of right to counsel and prevented from participation)
- In re Kretching, 108 Ohio App.3d 435 (1996) (acknowledging R.C. 2151.36 authority to order parent support even where parent is victim)
- Holcomb v. Holcomb, 44 Ohio St.3d 128 (1989) (appellate review limits; do not substitute judgment for trial court)