In re Brigham
A144572M
| Cal. Ct. App. | Oct 7, 2016Background
- Petitioner Leslie Brigham was convicted in 1987 of first‑degree murder as an aider and abettor for the killing of Hosea Barfield; enhancements for personal firearm use and great bodily injury were found not true. (People v. Brigham was the prior appeal.)
- Petitioner gave voluntary statements saying he and Norbert Bluitt were directed by a third party to kill a man nicknamed “Chuckie”; they confronted a person they believed to be Chuckie, Bluitt shot and killed Barfield, and Brigham said he tried to stop Bluitt. Ballistics and eyewitness testimony implicated an AR‑15 type rifle like the one Bluitt carried.
- At trial the jury was instructed on both direct aiding and abetting liability and the natural and probable consequences (NPC) doctrine; transferred intent instructions were also given.
- In 2014 the California Supreme Court decided People v. Chiu, holding an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first‑degree premeditated murder under the NPC doctrine—first‑degree liability requires direct aiding and abetting with the aider’s own willful, deliberate, premeditated intent.
- Brigham filed a habeas petition arguing Chiu rendered the jury’s first‑degree murder verdict legally unsupported because the jury could have relied on the now‑invalid NPC theory; the Court of Appeal exercised original jurisdiction and issued an order to show cause.
- The court found it impossible to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid direct aiding and abetting theory rather than the invalid NPC theory, and granted habeas relief: vacating the conviction and remanding to allow the People to retry or accept reduction to second‑degree murder.
Issues
| Issue | Brigham's Argument | Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chiu’s rule (NPC cannot support first‑degree premeditated murder convictions) applies and invalidates Brigham’s first‑degree conviction | Chiu applies retroactively; jury could have relied on NPC to convict; thus conviction cannot stand unless verdict is shown to rest on valid theory beyond a reasonable doubt | Chiu did not change substantive liability here or bar conviction because transferred intent or direct aiding and abetting could still support first‑degree murder; habeas relief unavailable unless conviction impossible as a matter of law | Chiu applies; court cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that jury relied only on valid theory; grant habeas, vacate, remand for retrial or reduction to second degree |
| Standard for harmlessness on collateral review when a valid and invalid theory were both instructed | Use Chapman beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard (as in Chiu and analogous cases) | Habeas should be limited to pure legal impossibility claims (Mutch/Earley test); apply narrower habeas review | Court follows precedent (Johnson, Lucero) applying Chapman standard on collateral review in such changed‑law contexts |
| Whether transferred intent or other instructions cured the error | Even with transferred intent instruction, jury could reasonably have believed Brigham lacked intent to assist in killing anyone but Chuckie, making NPC the route to convict | Transferred intent or direct aiding and abetting could have supported verdict; thus no relief | The presence of a transferred intent instruction did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury relied on it rather than the NPC theory |
| Appropriate remedy when conviction rests possibly on invalid theory | Vacate first‑degree conviction and allow People to retry on direct aiding and abetting or accept reduction to second degree | Opposes relief absent showing defendant could not be guilty as matter of law | Court grants habeas relief, vacates judgment, and remands to allow retrial or reduction to second degree if People do not retry timely |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (2014) (held NPC doctrine cannot support first‑degree premeditated murder convictions)
- People v. Brigham, 216 Cal.App.3d 1039 (1989) (prior appeal summarizing facts and conviction)
- In re Johnson, 246 Cal.App.4th 1396 (2016) (applied Chapman standard on habeas when Chiu error implicated verdict reliability)
- In re Lucero, 200 Cal.App.4th 38 (2011) (addressed retroactivity and harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt analysis after Chun)
- People v. Chun, 45 Cal.4th 1172 (2009) (reconsidered scope of felony‑murder rule; used in analogy for harmlessness analysis)
- People v. Guiton, 4 Cal.4th 1116 (1993) (instructs reversal when juries were allowed legally incorrect and correct theories unless verdict plainly rests on correct theory)
- Mutch v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 389 (1971) (habeas limited to cases where statute did not prohibit conduct; contrasted with changed‑law habeas principles)
- In re Earley, 14 Cal.3d 122 (1975) (similar rule to Mutch on limits of habeas for factual disputes)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for constitutional error)