In Re Belanger Minors
357609
| Mich. Ct. App. | Feb 10, 2022Background:
- Nov 2019: domestic-violence incident between parents occurred in children’s presence; DHHS filed a petition in Apr 2020 alleging domestic violence and that SB reported witnessing respondent-father sexually abuse IB.
- Respondent pleaded responsible to the domestic-violence allegation but did not plead regarding sexual-abuse allegations; the court took jurisdiction and suspended parenting time.
- After adjudication, SB disclosed that respondent also physically and sexually abused him; DHHS declined to pursue some sexual-abuse allegations and allowed supervised parenting time; the children’s LGAL sought termination.
- Oct 5, 2020: the children’s original LGAL filed a termination petition alleging new physical and sexual abuse of SB and moved to suspend parenting time; DHHS opposed and argued the LGAL lacked standing; the court appointed a new LGAL.
- The trial court dismissed the LGAL’s petition as barred by collateral estoppel / res judicata because it deemed the petitions substantially similar, then ordered supervised parenting time and held the mother in contempt.
- The Court of Appeals reversed: it held the original LGAL had authority to file the petition and that neither collateral estoppel nor res judicata barred the second petition, vacating the dismissal and remanding for further proceedings.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| LGAL authority/standing to file termination petition | Original LGAL had statutory duty/powers to investigate and to file termination petitions on children’s behalf | DHHS/new LGAL argued original LGAL lacked standing / conflict of interest because he filed the petition | Court: original LGAL had statutory authority and standing to file; appointment of a replacement did not nullify that authority |
| Whether collateral estoppel bars the second petition | Second petition raises issues not actually and necessarily litigated in the first proceeding | Trial court and DHHS contended the petitions were substantially similar and thus precluded | Court: collateral estoppel did not apply—issues were not identical nor actually litigated; trial court misapplied doctrine |
| Whether res judicata bars the second petition | New facts and allegations (physical/sexual abuse of SB) developed after adjudication; res judicata should not bar fresh termination litigation | DHHS argued prior proceedings and decisions barred relitigation | Court: res judicata did not apply—prior adjudication addressed only limited domestic-violence plea; new facts/claims were not identical and could not have been fully litigated earlier |
| Evidentiary exclusions re parenting-time motion | Children argued trial court abused discretion by excluding evidence relevant to suspending parenting time | Trial court excluded certain evidence during parenting-time hearing | Court: because dismissal of petition was reversed and remanded, appellate court did not decide merits of evidentiary rulings and left them for remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Farris v. McKaig, 324 Mich. App. 349 (2018) (describing LGAL duties, authority to file pleadings and act for child’s best interests)
- In re Utrera, 281 Mich. App. 1 (2008) (recognizing LGALs may file termination petitions on behalf of children)
- In re Pardee, 190 Mich. App. 243 (1991) (res judicata should not rigidly bar subsequent termination proceedings when new facts or changed circumstances exist)
- Paige v. Sterling Heights, 476 Mich. 495 (2006) (elements of res judicata explained)
- Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 679 (2004) (elements and purpose of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion)
- Porter v. Royal Oak, 214 Mich. App. 478 (1995) (collateral estoppel requires issues actually and necessarily litigated)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parents lack double jeopardy protection in termination proceedings; informative distinction regarding adjudication)