*1
Paige
Sterling Heights
v
PAIGE v CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS
July 31,
application by
Docket No. 127912. Decided
2006. On
Court,
appeal,
Supreme
in lieu of
defendant
granting
leave
appeal,
argument
leave to
ordered oral
on whether to
grant
application
peremptory
Following
or take other
action.
argument,
Supreme
oral
Court vacated the decision of the
Compensation Appellate Commission and
Workers’
remanded the
proceedings.
matter to the commission for further
Paige
Disability
in
Adam
filed a' claim the Bureau of Workers’
Compensation, seeking
compensation
dependency
workers’
death
pursuant
418.375(2), following
benefits
to MCL
the death of his
father,
4, 2001,
Paige,
January
Randall
died on
G.
who
as a result
myocardial
coronary artery
of acute
infarction and
disease. Ran-
Paige,
firefighter
city Sterling Heights,
dall
for the
suffered a
12, 1991,
work,
myocardial infarction on October
did
while at
incident,
granted
open
return to work after the
and was
an
award
compensation
Paige
of workers’
benefits in 1993. Randall
suffered
myocardial
August
Paige,
a second
infarction on
2000. Adam
eight years
Paige
who was
old when Randall
suffered his first heart
Paige died,
attack and 17 when Randall
claimed that as a minor he
dependent
support
had been
on his father for
and that the 1991
by weakening
heart attack had contributed to his father’s death
Paige
his heart. Adam
claimed that the 1991 heart attack consti-
proximate
Hagerman
tuted “the
cause” of his father’s death under
GencorpAutomotive,
(1998),
in Randall
death
2001 and that Adam
was entitled
dependency
to death
benefits on the basis that he was listed as a
dependent
open
his
his
an
father when
father was awarded
award of benefits
1993 and also that that determination of
*2
controlling.
dependency
appealed
was
The defendant
to the Work-
(WCAC).
Compensation Appellate
ers’
Commission
The WCAC
rejected
Hagerman
controlling
concluded that
was
the defen-
(1934),
Speidel,
dant’s assertion that Runnion v
1. Workers’ Death Benefits Words and - The Phrases Proximate Cause. 418.375(2) phrase proximate The “the cause” as used in MCL refers proximate cause; employer to the sole in order for an to be liable statute, employee’s for death benefits under the the deceased injury immediate, work-related must have been the one most efficient, preceding and direct cause the death. — Compensation Dependency 2. Workers’ Death Benefits. 418.375(2) employee
The determination under MCL whether an who injury proximate suffered a work-related that was the cause of the employee’s dependents wholly partly death left that were dependent employee support pursuant on the for must be made by looking MCL 418.341 at the circumstances at the time of the injury, work-related not at the time of death. — 3. Workers’ — Compensation Dependency Presumptions Death Benefits Dependency. presumption dependency support upon The conclusive of whole for employee applies age a deceased to a child who was under the of 16 employee’s death; at the time of age where a child is over the employee’s death, of 16 at the time of the the issue whether the actually dependent, part, child was in whole or in at the time of the injury proximate work-related that was the cause of the death is a (MCL 418.375[2]). question 418.331[b], of fact Martin Pollok, Teresa and Rapaport, Farrell & Wal- dron, Pollok), PC. Steven J. (by Paige. Adam
Plunkett & PC. Cooney, (by Mary Massaron Ross Ronald A. Weglarz), city for the of Sterling Heights. Amicus Curiae:
Conklin, Benham, Ducey, Chuhran, Listman & P.C. Critchell), Martin L. (by for Michigan Self-Insurers’ Association. *4 C. J. this case involving the Worker’s Dis- TAYLOR, MCL 418.101 et seq.,
ability Compensation
(WDCA),
Act
Paige
Sterling
v
“the
phrase
proximate
is whether
the first
issue
418.375(2)
proximate
means the sole
cause” in MCL
immediate, efficient, and direct
cause, i.e., “the one most
does,
that it
damage.”
conclude
injury
cause of the
We
gov-
phrase
the identical
construing
as we did in
(GTLA),
seq.,
act
MCL 691.140 et
liability
ernmental tort
Detroit,
439, 462;
Paige myocardial suffered a second infarction on August 15, diagnosed 2000. He was as having coronary disease, artery a quadruple coronary underwent artery bypass August 4, 2001, on 2000. On January Paige died in his An sleep. autopsy report prepared by County Oakland Medical Examiner’s office noted that Paige suffered from occlusions of the left anterior descending coronary artery, right coronary artery, and coronary four bypass grafts. The deputy pa forensic thologist who conducted the autopsy opined Paige arteriosclerotic[2] (heart “died of cardiovascular disease attack).” The certificate of death that by was completed Paige’s treating cardiologist, Dr. Mark Goldberg, lists Paige’s immediate cause of myocar death as acute infarction, dial and further coronary artery lists disease as an underlying cause that “years” existed for before Paige’s death and led to the immediate cause of death. son,
Paige’s Adam Paige, who eight years old when Paige suffered his first heart attack and 17 when Paige died, filed a claim for workers’ compensation compensation benefits, however, This award of workers’ was made subject Paige’s to compensa election of like benefits in lieu of workers’ 418.161(l)(c). tion Paige benefits under MCL Because elected to receive duty disability pension Sterling Heights, benefits from and the amount of duty disability pension weekly compensa benefits exceeded his workers’ amount, tion benefit he compensation never in fact received workers’ benefits. hardening Arteriosclerosis is a of the arteries. Stedman’s Online (ac Dictionary, <http://www.stedmans.com/section.cfm/45> Medical 2006). April 14, cessed Sterling MCL pursuant benefits dependency death 418.375(2).3 of a deceased statute, the child Under this if he benefits dependency to death is entitled employee employee deceased on the dependent or she was cause proximate injury was work-related death his claim for making death. parent-employee’s he a minor benefits, claimed Adam dependency Further, support. father for on his dependent had been in 1991 heart attack he claimed that work-related weakening his death father’s had contributed his “the cause” therefore, proximate constituted and, heart *6 held that which under Hagerman, father’s death of his cause proximate mean the sole does not phrase that rather, only a cause but, requires death Hagerman, death. employee’s factor in the substantial claim for 728, opposed 736. Defendant at supra Adam had not benefits, arguing dependency death fact, was, in establishing that he introduced evidence Moreover, argued defendant father. on his dependent by Rob- overruled impliedly had been inson, proximate “the phrase held that which 418.375(2) provides: MCL proximate injury hy employee such was the If the received death, employee leaves or her and the deceased cause of his depen- specified, wholly partially dependents, or as hereinbefore support, death shall be sum him or her for benefit dent on indemnity sufficient, time of death which at the when added provisions paid payable of this act or becomes under
has been
compensation
employee,
for the
to make the total
to the deceased
services,
medical,
hospital
surgical,
injury
death exclusive of
services,
expenses
medicines,
furnished as
and rehabilitation
319, equal
full amount which
provided
to the
in sections 315
receive under the
dependents
been entitled to
would have
such
injury had resulted in
provisions
in case the
of section
payable in the same
shall be
immediate death. Such benefits
provisions
they
payable
of section
under the
manner as
would be
injury
death.
in immediate
321 had the
resulted
Magistrate Andrew Sloss resolved both issues First, Adam’s favor. he determined that the Hagerman definition proximate of “the and, cause” applied there- fore, the work-related heart attack that Randall Paige suffered in 1991 did not have to be the sole or most immediate cause of but, rather, his death only needed to be a substantial factor in the leading events to his death. He determined that the 1991 heart attack was a substantial Paige’s death, factor in stating that all three doctors who testified at the hearing on Adam’s claim “agreed that it was a combination of underlying coro- nary artery together disease with the cumulative dam- age to the heart that began with his work-related myocardial infarction in 1991” that caused Randall Paige’s death in 2001. magistrate The concluded determining that Adam was entitled to death depen- dency benefits long as as he qualified as a dependent. Noting that Adam’s status a dependent is to be determined as of the date of his father’s 1991 work- *7 injury, related 418.341,4 MCL Magistrate Sloss recog- nized that Magistrate Miller had listed Adam as Ran- dall Paige’s dependent in his 1993 order granting provides, pertinent part: MCL 418.341 dependents as to Questions who constitutes and the extent of dependency
their
shall
injuiy
be determined as of the date of the
to
employee,
right
and their
death benefit shall become
time, irrespective
fixed as of
any subsequent
such
change
of
except
specifically
conditions
provided
as otherwise
in sections
321, 331 and 335.
Sterling
Paige
v
that
He held
of benefits.
award
open
an
Randall
controlling,
was
dependency
determination
benefits.
dependency
for death
request
Adam’s
granted
to the
ruling
Sloss’s
Magistrate
appealed
Defendant
magistrate
that
argued
defendant
Again,
WCAC.
proxi-
of “the
the Robinson
definition
have applied
should
however,
defendant’s
WCAC,
rejected
The
cause.”
mate
controlling
was
concluding
argument,
418.375(2) while
MCL
addressed
it specifically
because
Robinson,
hand,
provision
involved
the other
on
Adam’s status
challenged
again
Defendant also
GTLA.
Mag-
challenge
directly
it did not
Although
dependent.
determina-
Miller’s
Magistrate
on
reliance
istrate Sloss’s
father at the
fact,
on his
was,
dependent
that Adam
tion
argued
injury, defendant
time of the 1991 work-related
address the
failing to
had erred
Magistrate
Sloss
as-
defendant
Specifically,
dependency.
of Adam’s
extent
in Runnion v
decision
this Court’s
that under
serted
(1934),
magistrate
Mich
257 NW
Speidel,
regarding
determination
make a factual
required
on his
wholly
partially dependent
or
Adam was
whether
and,
injury
time of the 1991 work-related
father at the
so,
do
and no evidence
did not
Magistrate Sloss
because
record, the
in the
existed
partial dependency
whole
could not be calcu-
amount
weekly compensation
correct
assertion
WCAC, however, rejected defendant’s
lated. The
factual determination
that Runnion
such a
required
Ameritech,
Murphy
and, instead,
relied on
dependency
(1997),
propo-
for the
591; 561 NW2d
App
presump-
conclusive
to the
Adam was entitled
sition that
418.331(b)
wholly
that he was
forth in MCL
tion set
of 16 at the
age
he had been under
dependent because
in 1991.
attack
heart
father’s work-related
time of his
the WCAC’s
appeal
leave to
applied
Defendant
proxi-
again raising
of Appeals,
in the Court
ruling
*8
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Resolution of the issues in this case involves the
interpretation
of provisions of the WDCA. Statutory
interpretation is a question of law that we review de
Yackell,
novo. Reed v
473 Mich 520, 528; NW2d
Reed,
As we stated in
supra
528-529:
Our
obligation
fundamental
interpreting
when
statutes is
“to
legislative
ascertain the
may
intent
reasonably
inferred from
expressed
the words
in the statute.” Koontz v
Services, Inc,
Ameritech
304, 312;
III. ANALYSIS If an employee who suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of employment dies before period within which the employee is entitled weekly work- Sterling death ends, employee’s benefits compensation ers’ and relieves disability to have ended considered weekly benefits further liability for employer 418.375(1). However, under MCL employee. injured *9 to the weekly payments 418.375(2), in lieu of such MCL death ben- pay to required employer the employee, are requirements if 418.3215 two to MCL pursuant efits (1) proximate “the injury was met: the work-related (2) the deceased death, and employee’s of the cause” wholly par- who were dependents leaves employee support.6 for employee the upon tially dependent A. THE PROXIMATECAUSE requirement the first in this case is Primarily at issue 418.375(2) “the injury be that the work-related of MCL Hager death. employee’s of the cause” proximate Asch,7 Dedes v man, Court relied on majority a of this 5 part: provides, in MCL 418.321 relevant employee, personal injury of an from the If death results subject paid, in 1 employer pay, to section or cause to be shall section, dependents of the provided to the in this of the methods employee’s wholly dependent upon earn- employee who were injury, weekly payment equal
ings support a at the time of the for weekly wage, subject average employee’s after-tax to 80% of the act, compensation under this rates of maximum and minimum period the date of death. weeks from for a of 500 418.301(1), pertinent part: provides, in also MCL which See injury arising personal out of and employee, An who receives subject employer employment an who in the course of compensation injury, paid as of the shall act at the time resulting from provided In the case of death in this act. paid compensation to the injury employee, shall be personal to the provided employee’s dependents in this act. as Robinson, (1994), part in in overruled 521 NW2d supra at 458-459. 476 Mich (c) 691.1407(2) GTLA, MCL
which involved the proposition Legislature’s that the use of the definite article of “the” instead the indefinite article “a” is inconsequential.8 Under its interpretation common- causation, law principles proximate the Hagerman the idea rejected by using phrase “the cause,” the proximate Legislature meant that the work- related had to be the injury proximate sole cause of the employee’s employer death order for the to be liable 418.375(2).9 for death Instead, benefits under MCL majority held that the employer was liable for death benefits there even if was more than one proximate cause of the employee’s death, long as the work- related injury was “substantial factor” the employ ee’s death.10 In a joined by dissent Justices WEAVER BRICKLEY,
I argued Legislature’s that the phrase use “the 418.375(2) proximate cause” MCL unambiguously *10 indicated its that intent the work-related injury must be the proximate sole employee’s cause of the death in order for employer the to be liable death benefits. My primary reasons for this conclusion were twofold. First, the “proximate term had longstanding cause” a Michigan’s definition in jurisprudence before the enact ment of Second, the majority’s WDCA. the analysis had rewritten improperly the statute to failing recognize Legislature’s the use of the word “the.”12
8 Hagerman, supra at 728-729.
9 Id. at 729-734.
10Id. at 734-738. 11Although directly my Hagerman dissent, I did not reference it in the importance Legislature of this is that the directed has that when it uses acquired peculiar terms in a appropriate meaning statute that have enactment, in the law before the statute’s the courts of this state are peculiar meaning. accord appropriate those terms such MCL 8.3a. 12Hagerman, supra (Taylor, <J.,dissenting). at 752-757 Sterling v Robinson, supra, in after Hagerman, years Two 691.1407(2) (c) GTLA, this the of MCL involved which the on which Dedes, supra, of part the overruled Court of interpretation had its based majority Hagerman 418.375(2) the phrase held that WDCA, and the MCL 691.1407(2)(c) of in MCL as used cause” “the proximate i.e., cause, “the proximate the sole refers to the GTLA preced- cause efficient, and direct immediate, one most majority’s Robinson heart of the The injury.”13 an ing in my Hager- dissent on rationale, part relied which is not cause” proximate “the phrase man that cause,” was proximate “a phrase with the synonymous Robinson, 460-462: at follows, supra that it actu- has an awareness Legislature shown [T]he It has done are different. ally phrases the two knows that least cause” proximate “a by utilizing phrase proximate “the phrase and has used five statutes16 Given such other statutes.17 in at least thirteen cause” the Dedes particularly indefensible pattern, it is as if it said proximate cause” free to read “the felt compounded, as not be The error will proximate “a cause.” analysis of the Dedes today corrects the flawed this Court majority.
Nevertheless, Legislature sometimes the fact that times “the and at other uses proximate “a cause” uses course, question not, answer proximate cause” does than to show cause” means other proximate “the what way. interpreted the same not be phrases should two Legislature’s choice meaning to the duty give is to Our other. over the one word analysis in the following found agree with We Automotive, 457 Mich Gencorp
dissent (1998): 753-754; 579 NW2d law, say nothing of our class- “Traditionally in our *11 ‘the’ and between rooms, recognized the difference have we 13 Robinson, supra at 458-459.
508 Mich 495 (used, 1. esp. ‘a.’ ‘The’ is defined as ‘definite article. before noun, effect, specifying particularizing or with a as opposed generalizing to the indefinite or force of the an). a or indefinite article ...’ Random House Webster’s College p Further, Dictionary, 1382. must follow these we Legislature distinctions ‘a’ and ‘the’ as between has phrases directed that ‘all words shall construed and according approved to the usage understood common 2.212(1). 8.3a; Moreover, language ....[’] MCL MSA there no ‘the’ indication that the words and ‘a’ in usage something common meant different at the time this statute ....” was enacted
Further, article, recognizing that “the” a definite noun, singular “cause” phrase is a it is clear that the “the Yet, proximate contemplates cause. meaning cause” one adjective given “proximate” must also be to the when juxtaposed “the” between and “cause” as it is here. We are helped long ago the fact that this Court defined “the efficient, proximate cause” “the immediate direct cause preceding injury.” Laubengayer, Stoll v Legislature The NW has nowhere abrogated this, and thus we conclude that in MCL 691.1407(2)(c) Legislature provided immunity tort employees governmental agencies employee’s unless the gross negligence conduct amounts is the one most immediate, efficient, injury and direct cause of the i.e., damage, proximate cause. 436.1801(3); 18.1175(801)(3), See MCL MSA MCL 600.2947(6)(a); 27A.2947(6)(a), 600.6304(8); MSA MCL 27A.6304(8), 691.1665(a); MSA 12.418(5)(a), MCL MSA 28.342A(o). 750.145o; and MCL MSA 257.633(2); 9.2333(2), 324.5527; See MCL MSA MCL 13A.5527, 324.5531(11); MSA 13A.553K11), MCL MSA 324.5534; 13A.5534, MCL MSA 418.375(2); MCL 17.237(375X2), 500.214(6); MSA MCL 24.1214(6), MSA 600.2912b(4)(e); MCL 27A.2912(2)(4)(e), MSA 600.2912b(7)(d); MCL 27A.2912(2)(7)(d), MSA 600.2912d(l)(d); 27A.2912(4)(l)(d), MCL MSA MCL *12 Sterling Opinion the Court 600.5839(1); 27A.2947(3), MSA 600.2947(3); MCL MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c), 691.1407(2)(c); 27A.5839(1), MSA MCL 750.90e; 28.285e. MSA MCL and 418.375(2) WDCA, that MCL the fact
Despite 691.1407(2) GTLA, of the MCL case, in and issue Robinson, phrase both use at issue in which the definition argues Adam that cause,” “the proximate not be from Robinson should cause” proximate “the 418.375(2). argument Adam’s primary to MCL applied GTLA, as a assertion is in of this support law, generally is the common derogation of in statute governmental in favor of strictly construed said to be statute, WDCA, remedial being a immunity,14 while the grant, liberally construed said to be generally stated Although we have deny, rather than benefits.15 of construction rules preferential utilized these case unnecessary in this application their past, proxi- “the phrase definition of the the proper because reference to solely by can be ascertained mate cause” peculiar “the” and the of the term meaning the common ac- cause” has “proximate phrase meaning construc- rules of preferential These in the law. quired rule that statutes should general nullify tion do not plain with their consistent reasonably interpreted Concrete Northern meaning. See unambiguous Cos-Midwest, Inc, Mich Inc v Sinacola Pipe, they importantly, More 320-321; 603 NW2d in MCL clear directive the Legislature’s override do not “the,” are to be words, such as that common 8.3a and that meaning their common according to construed appropriate peculiar acquired that have words 14Robinson, supra at 459.
15Hagerman, supra at 739.
meaning
cause,”
such as “proximate
are to be
peculiar
accorded such
and appropriate meaning.
Accordingly, we
overrule
and hold that
the phrase
proximate cause,”
“the
used MCL
418.375(2)
WDCA,
refers to the
proximate
sole
cause. In deciding to overrule Hagerman, we have not
only considered the fact that it was
decided
wrongly
but
also
injury
whether less
will result from overruling it
than
following
from
it.16In making this determination
we have considered whether Hagerman
“practi-
defies
*13
cal workability,” whether reliance interests would work
an undue hardship, and whether changes in the law and
longer justify
facts no
the Hagerman decision.17
Hagerman defies practical workability
because
person reading the statute surely would not know that
he or she cannot rely on what the statute plainly says.
is,
That
a reader and follower of the statute would,
of
rewrite,
because
Hagerman’s
not be behaving in
accord with the law. Such a regime is unworkable in a
rational polity. This all gets back to the unrebutted
truth that “it is to the words of the statute itself that a
citizen first
for guidance
looks
in directing his ac-
tions.”18 Furthermore, Hagerman
only
is not
inconsis-
tent with the plain language of the statute,
it is also
inconsistent with this Court’s decision in Robinson.
How are the
people
this state to know what “the
proximate cause” means when there is one case from
this Court
that states that
it
thing
means one
another case that states that it means something else?
When identical words in
law,
lying within a similar
statutory context, mean something altogether different,
City
Park,
675, 693;
Pohutski v
Allen
465 Mich
Regarding
interests,
reliance
just eight years ago, has not become “so
been decided
everyone’s
accepted,
fundamental, to
embedded,
so
so
produce
just
change
expectations
it would
that to
readjustments,
practical real-world dislocations.”20
but
only
prior
present where the
decision
reliance is
Such
attempt
large
persons
number
has caused
example,
For
conduct to a certain norm.
conform their
*14
pur-
of individuals or businesses
where an entire class
not in
another entire class does
insurance and
chase
may
by
Court, this
viewed
a
reliance on decision
“practical
could cause
of reliance that
as the sort
19
Joliet,
Jacobson v Parda
case in
in which we overruled
Such was the
involving
Union,
318;
(1998),
a case
457 Mich
577 NW2d
Fed Credit
Act,
seq.,
provision
Protection
MCL 15.361 et
a
Whistleblowers’
Magee v Daimler-
analysis
that utilized in
conflicted with
because its
(2005),
involving
108;
Chrysler Corp,
a case
Mich
red-world dislocations.” Cf. Pohutski v City Allen
Park,
(2002).
675;
465 Mich
Finally, we justify Hagerman no because longer law and facts a change as it was justified itself was never Hagerman had the but not power, that this Court in the law justified incep- make. from its authority, It was tion. controlling, no we
Thus, longer with It the case that of the statute. language return to the for death benefits employer for an to be hable order 418.375(2), employee’s the deceased work- under MCL “the one most immedi- injury related must have been ate, [the death].”22 and direct cause efficient, preceding to the for a therefore remand this case WCAC We Paige’s work-related determination whether Randall cause” of his death under injury proximate was “the this standard.
B. RESPONSE TO JUSTICE CAVANAGH
stridently criticizes
The dissent of Justice CAVANAGH
taken. His theme is
has
positions
them
argued
in that we have
our
are tedious
positions
22 Robinson, supra at 459.
true that we have argued previously, them but in the consistency normally defect; is, law is not seen if it *16 arguments against the dissent’s simple our rather the sis, which holds that one says who “the proximate cause” has said something different than one who says “a proximate cause,” are equally shopworn. In attempt ing to provide buoyancy argument for his that we are irresponsible, Justice CAVANAGH restates the simply incorrect claim that we have overturned cases at an Yet, unprecedented rate. as pointed we out with statis tics in v Sington Chrysler Corp, 144, 166-170; 467 Mich (2002), Detroit, 648 624 NW2d and Mack v 467 Mich 186, 211; 649 (2002), NW2d and as Victor E. Schwartz has also discussed in his article A critical look at the jurisprudence Court,23 the Michigan Supreme we have not done that. Unwilling to rebut either the statistics or the analysis, Schwartz Justice CAVANAGH continues making claim, hoping, surmises, one that readers will not know better. We think they will. regard
With
to Justice CAVANAGH’s claim that histo-
ry’s judgment of us
unkind,
will be
this also is not a new
claim.24We think the concern should be his. Our core
argument
is that texts should be approached using the
same
every
doctrines
time. This could be described as a
“truth in reading” approach. His is the
easily
less
defended notion that
you
sometimes
read
using
statutes
grammatical
textual and
rules that all users of the
language normally employ, but on
entirely
other
unpre-
dictable
you
occasions
do not. Accordingly, while Justice
CAVANAGH in some cases does use the textual rules that
2006).
(January,
BMich
J
24 See,
Goldston,
(2004)
e.g., People
523, 571;
v
cases cited herein reveals that this defense will not bear
scrutiny
way,
and that in fact he will find a
no matter
(see in particular Mayor
Lansing
how tendentious
v
of
Comm,
Public Service
470 Mich
Supplementing
these extratextual
tools Justice
CAVANAGH uses
reach a desired outcome is
utili-
his
legislative acquiescence,
zation of the notion of
which
he
an
deploys when
effort is made to overrule a past
occasions,
case where the law was not
On
followed.
such
case,
he
he
in
argues, as
does
that this Court should
retain the previous interpretation of a statute that
clearly
wrong simply
Legislature
because
has not
amended the
However,
statute to correct our error.30
this Court
explained
Donajkowski v Alpena Power
Co,
243, 261;
460 Mich
(1999),
NW2d
legislative
doctrine of
acquiescence
recognized
is not
this state for the sensible reason that
principles
“sound
statutory
construction require
Michigan
courts
Legislature’s
words,
determine the
intent from its
from its
(Emphasis
original.)31
silence.”
Not content
to merely ignore Donajkowski, he advances a new
argument
legislative
acquiescence, which is the
“
startling notion that once this
‘interprets
Court
statute,
then the statute becomes what this Court has
30 See,
Devillers,
e.g.,
613-614; Neal,
supra
supra
676-677;
at
Jones
Corrections,
(2003)
Dep’t
646, 665;
468 Mich
518
With
authorities
as no
authority
all,
at
we
to the
return
fact that Justice
ignore
holding
CAVANAGH chooses to
of
in
this Court
Donajkowski, just
ignored
as he has
this Court’s hold-
ings
his
rejecting
unprincipled approach
declaring
ambiguous.38
so,
statutes
In doing
Justice CAVANAGH
reveals
little fidelity
precedent
how
he has to
when he
not
precedent.
argument
does
like the
His
on stare
is,
as,
then
entirely
decisis
and should be seen
inconsis-
Cavanagh
frankly surprised
one in this nation. We are
that Justice
would,
light
difficulties,
of these
advance it in our state.
36
Market,
Boys
supra at 237-238.
37
1963,
3, §
Const
art
2.
38 by
Mayor Lansing, supra
A no means exhaustive list would include
164-167;
524, 535;
Corp,
v
Twichel MIC General Ins
469 Mich
676
(2004); People Spann,
(2003);
NW2d 616
v
This
has also
Justice CAVANAGH attacking
claim
we are
him
and
personally
being
insufficiently
of our
on
respectful
predecessors
only
Court. This is not
inaccurate but peculiar coming
from a justice who himself has this term accused the
majority writing
an
opinion
majority
advance the
interests,42
has, in
past,
members’
and
accused the
justices
in the
of making “unforgivable” fabri-
39 See,
Ass’n,
supra
592-593;
e.g.,
Devillers
Cameron v Auto Club Ins
at
(2006).
55, 64-67;
476 Mich
cations,43 the view of is “so- basing decisions on what behavior,”44 a cially having “complete acceptable respect” rights.45 lack of for civil All out the with his doing pointing problems we are deciding personal cases. That is not a methodology volley claim should seen as the latest attack. His Court years-long pre-1999 effort remnants supporters they bring and its to do what can to back the disciplined approach less of that Court. era,
In that Justice CAVANAGH was much more influen- colleagues tial because he had more who shared his His influence waned and it the influ- approach. has with ence of those who benefit from the of which legal regime an unquestioned regime he was leader —a where the inconsistent, highly unpredictable, decisions were virtually claim are possible they winner. He and very unhappy changes with the and have not accommo- dated well to the point current situation. The fact that we out Justice CAVANAGH has articulated no consistent legal principles methodology deciding cases is nei- a personal martyrdom. ther attack nor an occasion for However, for it an Justice inconvenient fact. CAVANAGH, by returning
We close
to this
case
what should
sight
not be lost
of here. That
is that
in Justice
*21
perfectly normal,
correct,
CAVANAGH’s world it is
indeed
absolutely
sometimes
identical
phrases
our
statutes,
cause,”
here “the proximate
have different
meanings in different
To express
statutes.
the notion is
expose
to
its flaw. To the extent
that Justice CAVANAGH
Co,
(2005)
Henry v Dow Chemical
63, 117;
473 Mich
701 NW2d 684
J., dissenting).
(Cavanagh,
Annapolis Hosp,
540, 601;
Shinholster v
471 Mich
C. DEPENDENCY If the work-related “the injury qualifies proximate as employee’s cause” of the death under the definition we above, have set forth the next under MCL inquiry 418.375(2) is left employee dependents whether and, so, they if “wholly partially whether were or on him her dependent support. . . .” The answers questions 418.341, to these are in MCL provided which provides, relevant part:
Questions dependents toas who constitutes and the extent dependency of their shall be determined as of the date of the injury any employee, right to the and their death benefit time, irrespective shall become fixed as such subse- quent change in except specifically conditions as otherwise provided in sections 331 and 335.
Accordingly, statute, under this the workers’ com- pensation magistrate must determine whether there persons were dependent employee, on deceased the extent dependency, by looking of such at the circum- stances at the time of the work-related injury at—not the time case, of death. the present Magistrate Miller listed Adam Paige dependent of Randall Paige when he issued his 1993 order granting Randall an award of open benefits. Defendant did not appeal Magistrate Therefore, Miller’s 1993 order. the issue whether Adam dependent on his father at the time of the work-related injury judicata,46 is res and defen- (1) judicata applies prior The doctrine of res where: there has been a (2) merits, actually decision on the issue was either resolved *22 Mich 476 495
522 Opinion of the Court But, it now. as defendant may challenge dant not correctly Magistrate Miller did determine argues, on his father at the dependency the extent of Adam’s i.e., Adam was injury, time of the work-related whether wholly dependent upon Paige. Randall partially made, being the rate of Without such determination may to which Adam be any weekly death benefits calculated. entitled cannot be rejected argument The defendant’s and held WCAC conclusively presumed wholly depen- that Adam is to be 418.331, provides, pertinent dent under MCL which part: conclusively following persons presumed
The shall be wholly dependent support upon a deceased em- ployee:
(b)
age
years
upon
parent
A child under the
...
16
the
living
with whom he or she is
at the time of the death of
parent....
questions
dependency,
that
In all other cases
part,
in whole or in
shall be determined in accordance with
fact,
may
injury.
as the fact
be at the time
Adam,
The
WCAC’s conclusion
who was under
age
of 16 at the time of the injury
age
but over the
death,
of 16 at
the time of the
entitled to the
presumption
dependency
conclusive
of whole
erro-
Runnion,
supra,
interpreted
predeces-
neous.
we
418.331(b),
sor of MCL
which was substantively simi-
lar,47
terms,
i.e.,
consistently
plain
with its
dependency
of whole
if the
presumption
applies only
parties,
first case or could have been resolved in the first case if the
(3)
exercising
diligence,
brought
forward,
had
reasonable
it
both
parties
privies. Baraga
actions were
the same
or their
between
Co v State
Comm,
264, 269;
(2002);
Kenney,
Tax
466 Mich
MCL 418.335 to order an to continue benefits until the dependent though period turns the normal 500-week benefit has even expired. Murphy, supra Obviously, nothing at 596-601. this had to do with 418.331(b). proper interpretation of MCL 476 Mich case, justified this the WCAC would not be
choosing Murphy to follow instead of Runnion. The obvious reason for this principle fundamental only the authority Court has one of overrule prior so, its decisions. Until this Court does all lower by courts tribunals are bound that prior decision they must follow it even if believe that it was wrongly decided or has become obsolete. Boyd v W G Shows, 515, 523; Wade NW2d short, may not, WCAC as it attempted has to do here, presume overrule this Court disregarding Runnion and seeking to its own impose construction of 418.331(b). MCL
Accordingly, should the WCAC determine on remand that Randall Paige’s work-related injury proxi- was the death, mate cause of his we direct it to further deter- mine the extent of Adam Paige’s dependency on Randall *24 Paige at the Paige time Randall suffered the work- related injury.
IV CONCLUSION We hold that the definition of the phrase “the proxi- Robinson, mate cause” set forth in supra, applies to 418.375(2) MCL WDCA. so holding, we over- rule Hagerman, supra. Accordingly, we vacate the deci- sion of the WCAC and remand this case to the WCAC for a determination of whether Randall Paige’s work- injury related proximate was “the cause” of his death under the Robinson Furthermore, definition. WCAC erred in determining that Adam Paige is entitled to a conclusive presumption whole dependency under 418.331(b). If, MCL remand, on the WCAC determines Paige’s Randall injury work-related was “the proxi- death, mate cause” of his direct we the WCAC to determine the extent of Adam Paige’s dependency upon Paige Steeling 525 by Opinions Cavanagh, JJ. Weaver and time Paige Randall at the Randall suffered Runnion, in injury work-related accordance with su- pra.50
Corrigan, Young, Markman, JJ., concurred with Taylor, C.J.
WEAVER, I majority’s J. concur (concurring). III(B), analysis, except part result and which is the majority’s response partial to Justice CAVANAGH’s dis- sent.
CAVANAGH,J. (concurring part dissenting part.) Today, majority of this Court vacates the Compensation Appellate decision the Workers’ Com mission remands this case for reconsideration in Detroit, 439; light of Robinson v 462 Mich 613 NW2d (2000). so, In doing overrules Hager Automotive, man v Gencorp 579 NW2d firmly I believe that Hagerman prop erly correctly interpreted decided and the phrase 418.375(2). it “proximate cause” as is used in MCL disposition Our of this case makes consideration defendant’s third unnecessary. issue 418.375(2) provides: MCL injury employee proximate If the such received was the death, employee her cause of his or and the deceased leaves dependents, wholly specified, partially depen- as hereinbefore support, dent on him or her for the death benefit shall he sum sufficient, indemnity when added to the which at the time of death paid payable provisions
has been
or becomes
under the
of this act
employee,
compensation
deceased
make the total
for the
*25
medical,
services,
injury
surgical, hospital
and death exclusive of
medicines,
services,
expenses
and rehabilitation
furnished as
319,
provided
equal
in sections 315 and
to the full amount which
dependents
such
would have been entitled to receive under the
provisions
injury
of section
in case the
had resulted
Despite my disagreement with the majority’s inter- 418.375(2) pretation of MCL and its election to overrule I Hagerman, agree with the that the presump- tion of whole if dependency applies the child was less than 16 years old at the time of the employee’s death. 418.331(b); MCL Runnion v Speidel, NW
I could take opportunity to further explain why correctly decided and should not be payable immediate death. Such benefits shall be in the same they payable provisions manner as would be under the of section injury 321 had the resulted in immediate death. *26 Sterling Heights Opinion Cavanagh, J. I could Specifically, Hagerman overruled. dissect just eight from explain why decision this Court issued that years ago examining very same issue is in over- implicated being improperly this case is now Further, similarly majority ruled. to how the crafts its case, in I I opinion suppose simply this could cut and paste portions Hagerman majority the relevant in opinion support my Hagerman view that remains does, I good Additionally, majority law. like the current length could from the in Robinson to quote dissents decided. But I why Hagerman properly show be- well-documented, that on my lieve views this issue are an majority’s Accordingly, ap- as are the views. such much, if proach any, juris- would not add value to our words, prudence. simply rehashing In other the same just eight differences of that this Court detailed opinion years ago and six does not benefit the bench and bar in way. And more meaningful importantly, regur- this gitation process truly would still not answer the ques- Why just tion at hand: is a decision of this Court issued eight years involving earlier and the same issue now being overruled?
Unfortunately, today’s majority adequately does not Instead, answer that it clear question. today’s from decision, as well as from Robinson and progeny, its the current does not like Hagerman. But mere disagreement validly opinion with a issued of this Court legitimate has never served as a for overruling basis precedent. Something always required. more has been Robinson, generic justifica- at 464-465. And the supra majority provides satisfy tions the do not the standard overruling precedent.2 it set forth Robinson for 2 Robinson, precedent Court observed before established (1) overruled, this Court must first decide the earlier case was whether (2) (3) wrongly decided, practical workability, the earlier case defies 476 MICH495 Opinion by Cavanagh, J.
Instead, majority devotes considerable effort explaining why it believes the decision was me, wrong personally attacking but little atten- carefully tion is paid explaining why Hagerman practical workability, defies reliance whether interests Hagerman weigh against it, on overruling and whether legal there has been some change factual that no longer makes Hagerman justifiable. Robinson, See su- at 464-466. pra telling This is both and troubling. *27 Robinson, Under before this Court can overrule established precedent, this Court must first decide whether the earlier wrong. decision was For the reasons dissent, stated earlier in I this believe that Hagerman was correctly Nonetheless, decided. major- the current note, I ity disagrees. however, must that apart from recycling dissent, Robinson and the Hagerman majority does not set forth why new reasons Hagerman was wrongly decided other than those that were expressly rejected in Hagerman. majority The certainly permitted reargue to the merits of the Hager- man dissent support its conclusion that Hagerman wrongly was decided. And there is little doubt that the majority is entitled to its But again, view. under the Robinson, doctrine of stare merely decisis believing that Hagerman wrongly decided is an insufficient ground to overrule that decision. Other considerations must factor into the calculus. And in light of these other considerations, majority has simply satisfy failed to the standard for overruling precedent. Therefore, re- gardless of whether this Court believes that Hagerman was correctly decided—like I wrongly do—or decided— hardship reliance interests would work an undue if the earlier case was (4) overruled, changes longer justify in the law or facts no the ear her Robinson, 464-465; supra City decision. see also Pohutski v Allen Park, 675, 694; Mich NW2d Sterling Opinion Cavanagh, J. decisis of stare does—the doctrine majority like the at this overruling Hagerman Court from prevents time. can overrule estab- this Court before example,
For
whether,
decide
this Court must also
precedent,
lished
case
decided, the earlier
wrongly
being
from
apart
Here,
has not
majority
workability.
practical
defies
defies practi-
that Hagerman
demonstrated
specifically
Instead,
Hager-
that
majority posits
workability.
cal
believes
majority
unworkable because
man is
of the
language
with the
is inconsistent
Hagerman
is un-
majority,
According
Hagerman
to
statute.
a follower of the statute
a reader and
workable because
the law
behaving in accordance with
would not be
418.375(2). But the
rewrote MCL
because
work-
majority’s
respect Hagerman’s
rationale with
majority’s
to the
belief
ability really goes back
Indeed,
wrongly decided.
Hagerman was
insurers,
injured
employees,
has not demonstrated
Appellate
Compensation
or the Workers’
magistrates,
readers and followers
primary
Commission —the
interpretation
Hagerman’s
statute —have found
case,
Indeed,
magistrate
in this
neither the
unworkable.
Appellate Commission
Compensation
nor the Workers’
*28
in
and conclud-
any difficulty
applying Hagerman
had
the earlier
testimony,
of medical
that
ing, on
basis
Further, the
caused the death.
proximately
heart attack
Hager-
the notion that
majority’s logic
ignores
also
law,
was,
fact,
in
and
rule
interpretation
man’s
did not amend the statute because
Legislature
that the
There-
proved to be unworkable.
Hagerman
it believed
regarding Hager-
rationale
fore,
majority’s
because
Hager-
that
workability
solely
relates
to its belief
man’s
decided,
has not satisfied
wrongly
man was
overruling pre-
forth
Robinson
the standard set
cedent.
Opinion Cavanagh, J. Robinson, Under this Court must also consider whether reliance misplaced interests would be cause an undue if hardship precedent established Here, overruled. majority’s rationale re- regarding liance simply unpersuasive interests is and does not satisfy the standard set forth in Robinson. The majority tells us that no reliance interests would be disturbed injured workers, because Paige, Randall and his counsel could not relied on Hagerman, feasibly have the con- trolling law at the time of this action. Such an assertion is preposterous because it suggests injured workers attorneys who practice the area of workers’ not, compensation not, do rely should on this interpretation Court’s Disability Worker’s Com- MCL 418.101 et seq. Moreover, Act, pensation logic such is inconsistent majority’s with the attempted rationale regarding Hagerman’s Here, workability. the majority attempts to claim that unworkable be- people right cause have a rely law; however, on the breath, its next the majority posits that no reliance interest would be unsettled because do people actually rely on the law.
Further, the majority also attempts to set forth a rather position curious lacking any legal foundation “mere compliance precedent” with will never amount to a Rather, reliance interest. the majority posits that reliance only interests are considered where a “large number of persons,” “an entire class of indi- viduals,” great or “a number of people” “attempt conform their conduct to a certain norm.” Ante 511-512. But the majority does not provide any stan- dard for what a “large number of persons,” “an entire class,” or “a great number of people.” Moreover, majority theorizes that “mere compliance prece- with dent” is insufficient to affect interests; rather, reliance only great where “a number of people affirma- *29 Steeling by Opinion Cavanagh, J. reliance interests will their behavior” tively alter Yet the original). (emphasis Ante at considered. it is on what any guidance provide does not majority from “affirma- “mere compliance” distinguishes that majority the Nor does behavior.” tively altering... this pertain when must this distinction explain why In- precedent. to overrule decide whether must Court standardless, arbitrary a offers stead, majority Because legal basis. principled lacks theory jurispru- threat to the a theory poses serious such by forth the test set Court, guts completely of this dence overruling precedent, majority in Robinson fundamentally flawed. abuse, theory such invites reliance that no still, claims Worse injured employees unsettled because would be interests on the and illnesses basis injuries their script do not insulting a claim is Court. But such of this opinions and it job, on the injured to be happen who to those regarding rationale majority’s demonstrates faulty from a starts Hagerman on placed reliance choose to become Granted, do not workers premise. this decisions of the basis of the or sick on injured choice; not a or is often Getting hurt sick Court. But when a worker injured or sick. simply get workers in the out of and arising or illness injury an suffers then and his counsel that worker employment, course how to deciding the rule of law when rely on rightfully And the rule of rights. the worker’s pursue protect died in this case time the worker at the applicable law decision of validly issued As a Hagerman. in this state. controlling law Court, was the only from this Court decision validly issued And a by overruled it is properly when rendered “untenable” status was Accordingly, Hagerman’s this Court. im- expressly did not Robinson because
precarious Mich 495 Opinion Cavanagh, J. plicitly Therefore, majority’s overrule Hagerman.3 *30 reliance regarding placed rationale the interests on satisfy the set does not standard it forth in Hagerman Robinson. before can
Finally, this Court overrule established this Court also decide precedent, changes must whether in the or facts no longer justify law the earlier decision. Here, the concludes: simply need not changes
[W]e
consider whether
in the law and
longer justify Hagerman
Hagerman
facts no
because
itself
justified
a change
was never
as it was
law that
the
this
power,
authority,
Court had the
the
but not
to make. It was
justified
inception.
from
513.]
its
\Ante
Clearly,
an
completely ignores
such
assertion
the stan-
dard for overruling
set
precedent
forth
Robinson.
And
importantly,
majority’s rationale in this state-
ment again reveals its
that it
belief
can
over-
properly
rule
it
Hagerman simply because
Hager-
believes
wrongly
man was
In other words,
decided.
the majority
does not feel the need
point
justifica-
to
special
change
tion or
to support its election to
Hager-
overrule
Perhaps
man.
that is
there
no change
because
has been
or
compensation
the law the workers’
landscape in
eight years
since
was decided. The
Hagerman
only
any event, Hagerman
allegedly
In
was
rendered “untenable” and
by design.
Hagerman
given
“inconsistent”
The author
dissent was
opportunity
arguably
pen
to examine an
similar issue and
Robinson.
so,
doing
Still, Hagerman
the author relied on his
dissent.
expressly
impliedly
planted,
was not
Yet
overruled.
the seed
opportunity,
Hager
instant defendant seized
this
author
granted
circumstances,
man dissent has now been
his wish. Under these
honestly
it cannot
be said
case
that this
falls within the class of cases
“ ‘
duty
precedent
where it is this Court’s
to reexamine
“where its
’ ”
reasoning...
fairly
question.”
Sington Chrysler
Corp,
called into
v
(2002)
144, 161;
(emphasis added;
467 Mich
Opinion by Cavanagh, J. Here, overruling Hagerman does advance fact, principles. just opposite these the is true. the Again, majority support reasons advances in of overruling Hagerman simply unpersuasive. are As earlier, noted current majority offers no new rea why Hagerman wrongly sons decided other than duly reasonably rejected those considered and in Hage .5So it overruling Hagerman rman cannot said that contributes development Rather, the law. overruling in Hagerman today the manner employed signals that any decision from this Court on depends only strong and is as the Court’s composition. When justices those who were in the minority once find majority, themselves in the today’s gives decision those justices free license vindicate their dissents and disregard doctrine stare decisis. nothing There is evenhanded or predictable approach. Nothing this an approach such fosters on reliance this deci- Court’s agree reasoning would Whether not we with Miranda’s resulting rule, addressing its were we the issue in the first instance, principles weigh against heavily of stare decisis “ overruling it now. While ‘stare decisis is not an inexorable ” command,’ particularly interpreting when we are the Constitu- tion, cases, “even in constitutional the doctrine carries such persuasive always required departure force that we have from ” precedent supported justification.’ ‘special to be [Id. some (citations omitted).] explained fully dissent, As more earlier in this in this “specialjustification” overruling no case offers other than wrongly Therefore, majority’s approach its belief it was decided. appears justice’s case inconsistent with the late chief views. *32 only “analysis” by majority The new set forth the current involves its disapproval “preferential of what it considers so-called rules of construc disagree expressed tion.” Ante at 509. IBut with the views this any event, majority’s the “preferential discussion. discussion of these establishing rules of construction” does not even come close to legitimate, independent Hagerman. reason to overrule Sterling Heights by Opinion Cavanagh, J. destroy actions the actual certainly And such sions. including Court. This integrity of this perceived Court — the rule of current, future members —and past, its of The mere dislike respect. are entitled to more law of decisions rendered justices on this Court some in their chairs does justices previously who sat under the law to disre- ground a sufficient constitute decisions. gard past and overrule those cannot prop- me clear. This dissent perfectly Let be I simply because erly grapes” be characterized as “sour and, decided im- Hagerman correctly believe true, I If that were should not be overruled. portantly, majority. as the guilty roughly same sin would as an appropriately can this dissent be labeled Nor prefer 418.375(2) I MCL to be of how would expression reading Hagerman refutes interpreted. Even casual charge.6 such a
Instead, highlight is intended to this dissent and the that this Court principle rather unremarkable justice, than individual larger laws of this state are also intended to justices, or This dissent is “philosophy.” decisis, the doctrine of to follow stare urge Further, this dissent principle a fundamental of our law. that the doctrine of decisis is intended to observe stare statutory interpre- strong in matters particularly tation, previously if Court Hagerman, like because can incorrectly, Legislature a statute interpreted and fix the remedy interpretation subsequently Moreover, statute, which it has not done this case. that adherence to intended as a reminder this dissent is statutory interpretation in matters of stare decisis interpreta- not corrected the Legislature has where lodged by Interestingly, unfounded accusations were similar rejected by Hagerman majority. prudently See dissent and Hagerman, supra at 734 n 12. *33 476 Mich by Opinion Cavanagh, J. respects tion of principles powers, is separation role,” “judicial with the and consistent avoids arbitrari- Finally, ness. this dissent is intended highlight to the principle the rule of law also includes this Court’s precedent. Sadly, these remain principles mystery Court, the current and the underlying involving debate principles these been on for going See, has some time. e.g., Robertson v DaimlerChrysler, 465 Mich (2002). NW2d
Nonetheless, majority the completely misses the point of this Rather dissent. than adequately explain- ing why stare decisis is being ignored in this case— point the raised this by majority dissent —the seeks to blur what is truly doing so, this case about. the majority confuses legal the issues and simultaneously attempts disagree. silence those who But once the peeled away, histrionics are pretense the of the ma- jority’s decision in particular this case is evident.
For example, majority speaks consistency predictability. again, But majority does not ad- equately explain why it disregards doctrine of stare decisis—a doctrine that is fundamentally based on con- sistency predictability. Accordingly, what the ma- jority professes to abe basis for its “philosophy” is at odds what majority with actually doing in this particular Moreover, case. the majority speaks con- usurpation stitutional and separation of powers. But again, the majority does not adequately it explain why disregards doctrine of stare decisis in a matter of statutory interpretation Legislature when the itself has eight years seen fit to correct Hagerman’s allegedly interpretation. Therefore, incorrect the ma- jority’s rhetoric concerning public policy is at odds with what the actually doing in particular Sterling Heights Opinion Cavanagh, J. and the Legislature making choice policy case— for people.7 decisis, up Black summed Justice
In matters of stare Boys the issue in his dissent on his own views Union, 770, Markets, Local 398 US Inc Clerks v Retail 1583; 26 Ed 2d 199 And 257-258; Ct L 90 S views unnecessary to Justice Black’s adopt it is while views, law, underlying prin- Michigan his *34 worthy consideration. Justice are at least of ciples, Black observed: case, certainty ordinary of and the
In the considerations similarly litigants provide will situated equal treatment of strong to precedent. incentive to adhere a statute, however, an interpreting is a
When this Court the It is weighed must be balance. additional factor primary to the the that this Court owes deference making of legislature laws. Of responsibility of the in the statute, course, a then interprets when Court first this it what this Court has said is. Such the statute becomes unavoidable, in interpretation proper, initial is and an any system applying courts the task of in which have general a The Court statutes in multitude of situations. however, interpretation, the task of not undertakes any ability special to fathom the the Court has because interpretation Congress, of but rather is intent because decision of case before it. When unavoidable in the the by case the law has been settled an earlier then “reinterpretation” gratu- is subsequent of the statute and more nor less than an amendment: it is itous neither judicial a effect from alteration of lan- no different in Congress placed that in the statute. guage itself Co, (1879) Douglass Pike 677, 687; See, e.g., 25 L Ed 968 US (“After construction, by judicial settled the construc a statute has been concerned, becomes, rights acquired it are as so contract under tion far as change itself, part a of is to of as the text decision much a the statute purposes on contracts as an the same in its effect all intents ). legislative means of a enactment.” of the law amendment Mich 495
Opinion by Cavanagh, J. Altering important provisions of a is a the statute legislative simply function. And the Constitution states unequivocally: “All legislative granted Powers herein in Congress shall be vested of the United ....” It States Congress, Court, responds this that to the pressures political pressures entirely groups, proper of in a society.... should, therefore, interject free This Court possible law-making itself as little into the and law- changing process. Having given meaning our on the view of statute, concluded, extraordinary our task is absent years changes When Court circumstances. its mind later, simply judges changed, my because the have judgment, upon legisla it takes of itself function (Black, J., [Id. dissenting) (emphasis ture. at 257-258 omitted).][8] added; citations 8 Remarkably, majority proclaims that Justice Black’s views are “no authority and, thus, at all” his views need not be even considered Accordingly, majority mightily ignore debate. Ante at 518. tries overruling precedent previously Justice Black’s view inter preted always separation powers. a statute to a of amounts violation Presumably majority separation this is because those in the believe that a powers argument uniquely majority’s theirs to make. But the attempts example, to discount Justice Black’s views are flawed. For may claims that Justice Black’s view consistent with the separation powers principles United States Constitution’s not our but *35 majority explain Yet the principle own. does not how the fundamental practically embodied in the United States Constitution differs from Michigan’s: separation powers “the of doctrine of ... is set forth Const 3, 1963, 2, provides powers government § ‘[t]he art which that of are legislative, judicial,’ divided into three branches: executive and and provides person exercising powers ‘[n]o further that of one branch shall powers properly belonging except expressly exercise to another branch ” provided Flushing City Council, in this constitution.’ Warda v Additionally, n majority the NW2d claims that may applicable Supreme
Justice Black’s view be in the United States given peculiar Court the nature of “that Court’s need to devote itself primarily adjudications.” However, to constitutional Ante 517 n 35. contrary majority’s understanding, Supreme to the the United States jurisdiction Court’s is not so limited: judicial Cases, Equity, The Power shall extend to all in Law and
arising
Constitution,
States,
under this
the Laws of the United
and
Sterling
by
Opinion Cavanagh, J.
made,
Authority;
made,
under their
shall be
Treaties
or which
—to
Ambassadors,
public Ministers and
affecting
other
all Cases
Jurisdiction;
admiralty
Consuls;
and maritime
all cases of
—to
—to
Party;
shall be a
the United States
Controversies to which
—to
States;
and
more
State
between two or
Controversies
—between
claiming
Grants of different
Lands under
Citizens of another State
thereof,
foreign
State,
States,
and
or the Citizens
and
between
Const,
III,
States,
§ 2.]
Subjects. [US
art
Citizens or
Scalia,
Interpretation:
and the Law
Federal Courts
A Matter
See also
of
(“A
(New
1997),
very
University Press,
pp
Jersey:
13-14
small
Princeton
any
interpretation
judges’
event.
proportion
is constitutional
of
work
(Even
Court,
than a fifth
Supreme
estimate that well less
the
I would
probably less
are constitutional issues—and
of the issues we confront
cases.) By
greatest
you
far the
if
exclude criminal-law
than a twentieth
meaning
judges
interpret
of federal
do is
the
part
I and all federal
of what
agency regulations.”).
and federal
statutes
may pertain
Further,
majority
to
that Justice Black’s view
the
claims
courts,
Court,
supreme
Supreme
because
but not state
the United States
daunting
Supreme
because that
Court’s workload is
States
the United
jurisdiction.
many
But
accepts appeals
under its
from
lower courts
Court
courts, including
reality
supreme
ignores
that state
such an assertion
the
Court,
accept appeals from
courts
Michigan Supreme
also
the lower
the
comically, majority
Additionally and, frankly,
jurisdiction.
their
under
simply because he voicedthem
attempts
Black’sviews
to discount Justice
rejected
But in the
his views.
and the
in that case
in a dissent
Court, majority
Hagerman dissent as its
very
uses the
case before this
wrongly
concluding
decided
authority
was
primary
for
therefore,
and,
must
overruled.
attempts
argue
is not
Finally, majority
that Justice Black’sview
to
Michigan
our Constitution
Constitution because
under the
defensible
Accordingly, major-
exercising legislative power.
forbids a court from
But
amend statutes.
ity protests
simplistically asserts that it cannot
make,
attempting
very
point
Black
Justice
this is
majority.
posits
Black
point
on the
Justice
apparently this
is lost
effectively
And
an amendment.
“reinterpretation”
statute is
of a settled
doing
statutes,”
so
Black asserts that
Justice
“we cannot ‘amend’
because
Again,
powers.
it is
principles
separation
Ante at 518.
of
would violate
Michigan’sjurisprudence,
necessary
adopt
Black’sview
Justice
believe, however, that a
advocating
I do
that we do so now.
I am not
powers
importance
separation
consistently preaches
Court that
very
thoughtful points
on this
issue
raised
should at least consider
justice.
Supreme Court
States
a United
*36
540
Opinion Cavanagh, J. Yet in light points by dissent, raised this at its core, basic the majority nevertheless tells the people this state that “philosophy” its and “preferences” should control the given outcome of a case. But the rule of law and the facts of the case should control outcome, “philosophy.” In matters of statutory I interpretation, have never wavered from the principle plain that a unambiguous statute is to applied be written. Under some circumstances, however, a statute may be unclear or ambiguous, likely which is to happen in cases reaching highest Court in this state. As such, when a statute unclear, then well-established, centuries-old rules of construction often come play into and may help Court resolve the controversy and determine the Legislature’s intent. I
Accordingly,
encourage readers to examine the
sampling of cases that
sets forth and judge
my fidelity for themselves. See ante at
nn
26-29. For
example, sometimes a statute
plain
and unambigu
ous; therefore,
the judge applies the statute as written.
Barbee,
v
People
283;
Mich
(2004);
I have is the best “philosophy” and that its justice it dispenses of this people and serves to this end best means lip majority merely pays But far too often state. entirely misapplies or “philosophy” to its stated service statutory involving issues in cases example, it. For disagree I and often majority interpretation, ambiguous. But because is particular statute whether interpretations based sound, reasonable there are two signal that this should statutory language, on it to majority purports as the may not be as clear statute Michigan, Inc Freight System, Yellow See, e.g., be. (2002), (2001), rev’d 537 US 21;
Mich
627 NW2d
(2003), on remand
Mich 862
remanded 468
vacated
476 Mich Opinion
Cavanagh,
J.
event,
App
This case is a The perfect example. majority chooses to criticize me rather than respond and adequately example, Corp, For v Twichel MIC Gen Ins (2004), by case, majority NW2d 616 majority cited the the this current disagreed and the dissenters over term whether the “owner” in a as used particular policy ambiguous. selectively consulting insurance After definitions, dictionary majority opined numerous “pos the Twichel that session, control, among primary and dominion are the features deleted). ownership.” (emphasis Relying “primary Id. at 534 on these features,” majority opined the plain current the term that “owner” was and, therefore, person that the concluded who died in that not case was hand, entitled to benefits. On the other dissenters the concluded that ownership may possession, dominion, more than entail and control. unremarkably, Rather may the dissenters that reasoned “owner” also “ person legal title, rightful mean the has ‘who or whether he is the ” (citation omitted) possessor J., or not.’ Id. at 537 dissent (Cavanagh, ing). Accordingly, majority’s Twichel, citation of and other similar cases, because, illuminating majority rightfully suggests, as the it clearly majority’s shows the differences between the current ambiguity, judicial dissent’s views on as well as standard rules of construction. Sterling Heights Opinion Cavanagh, J. why explain Hagerman must be overruled under ac- turn, cepted principles of stare decisis. this case has respect prece- become less about stare decisis and for dent and another giving op- more about portunity “philosophy” to extol the virtues of its while simultaneously disregarding the that principles suppos- edly its support “philosophy,” attacking as well as those disagree. really who This blurs what this case is about: respect precedent. stare decisis and for Further, I majority truly have no doubt fixing believes that it is it perceives wrong what to be However, I this case. believe that Hagerman was Nonetheless, decided. properly my disagreement on not point really the main thrust of this dissent. Father, this dissent is intended to observe that there larger law, are issues at stake in this case: rule of respect precedent, integrity Court, of this judicial Accordingly, larger restraint. institutional is- sues are implicated in this case. case,
This like all Court, cases that come before this should be law, about the rule of or ideology parti- sanship. The cases this Court decides are not some sort of game political football, complete “regime[s],” with “influence,” Further, “winner[s].” Ante 520.
Court must always be mindful that our decisions have real implications and affect people. real This Court must also be mindful that attacking sitting colleagues who happen disagree, attacking as well as past *39 justices cannot defend themselves —and charac- —who terizing inferior, them as “unpredictable,” and “incon- sistent,” does an extreme disservice to this Court and of citizens this state. Ante at 520. Such attacks are disrespectful. Such attacks are legal not robust debate by any definition. And such attacks and rhetoric wound this Court anas institution. Mich Opinion by Cavanagh, J.
Nonetheless,
often,
far too
the members of the cur-
majority prefer
spin.
rent
often,
to attack and
Far too
majority
the members of the current
use terms such as
“judicial
“usurpation,” “separation
“textualism,”
role,”
powers,”
“policypreferences”
conducting
of
when
damage control and to mask the rationale of some of its
opinions, not to mention the results of some of its
opinions.
occurs,
When this
of
members
this Court
disagreement.
must voice their
majority
often,
And far too
ignore
legal
will then elect to
merits of
disagreement
per-
and, instead, choose to criticize the
happens
disagree.
majority quite
son who
But the
right
history,
ultimately passjudgment
me,
will
fidelity
jurisprudence.10
on the current Court’s
long
majority
Indeed,
after those in the current
are
gone, their decisions will remain. And I am sure it is
hope
their
that when future members of this Court
body
justices
work,
consider their
of
those future
will
respect, wisdom,
exercise more
and restraint than the
today.
current
has shown
KELLY, J.,
CAVANAGH,
concurred
with
J.
10Likewise,
history
I
my
will leave it to
and others to evaluate
record
Thus,
as well.
I
majority’s compilation
see no need to “rebut” the
in
Sington, supra,
Michigan
or Victor E. Schwartz’s article in a recent
Bar
Journal,
jurisprudence
A critical
Michigan Supreme
look at the
2006).
Court,
(January,
note,
85 Mich B
however,
J 38
I must
that Mr.
advocate,
is a
Schwartz
renowned “tort-reform”
and filed an amicus brief
support
by majority
Henry
result reached
v Dow Chemical
Co,
473 Mich
to the editors description with Mr. Schwartz’s appeared subsequent journal. Court that have issues the bar See 2006). (March, 2006); (May, 85 Mich B J 10-12 B J 14