In Re Ashton V.
M2016-00842-COA-R3-JV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Mar 22, 2017Background
- Child born in 2010 to unmarried parents; initial juvenile-court order (Jan 2015) named Mother primary residential parent and granted Father specific parenting time, later expanded.
- Father petitioned (Sept 2015) to change primary residential parent, alleging Mother’s hostile/co‑parenting behavior, interference with his parenting time and involvement in child’s medical/school affairs, exposure of the child to domestic violence and alleged drug use by Mother or her partner, and that the child exhibited stress-related symptoms (tic) and needed counseling.
- Two-day bench hearing: Father, paternal relatives, Mother’s other child’s father and his fiancée, and Mother’s husband/partner (Mr. Smith) testified; Mother denied many allegations and produced a private negative drug screen.
- Juvenile court directed a CASA investigation during the proceedings; a CASA report was submitted to the court but was never admitted into evidence at the hearing.
- Trial court found a material change of circumstances and that Father was comparatively more fit; it named Father primary residential parent, restricted Mother’s parenting time, ordered child support, and later denied Mother’s Rule 60.01 motion to correct the final order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mother) | Defendant's Argument (Father) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a material change in circumstances occurred to permit modification of primary residential parent | Father failed to prove a material change; many alleged problems predated the prior order and did not meaningfully affect the child | Mother’s refusal to facilitate Father’s role, interference with parenting time/medical involvement, exposure to domestic violence and alleged substance use, and child stress are material and post‑order | Court: Although reliance on CASA report was improper (not admitted), excluding it the evidence does not preponderate against finding a material change; affirmed |
| Whether modification is in the child’s best interest under statutory factors | Mother emphasized continuity, her role as primary caregiver, emotional bond, and child’s stability with her | Father can provide greater stability, is willing to encourage mother‑child relationship, and mother’s conduct (hostility, exposure to domestic violence, alleged substance use, work schedule) weighs against her | Court: Trial court adequately considered statutory factors; Father is comparatively more fit; modification is in child’s best interest; affirmed |
| Whether the juvenile court improperly relied on CASA report not admitted into evidence | N/A (Mother objects) | Court relied on CASA report in order | Court: Use of CASA report without admission was error, but harmless because other evidence supports findings |
| Whether denial of Mother’s Rule 60.01 motion was an abuse of discretion | Final order misstated court’s decision (contradicts an email ruling); relief under Rule 60.01 appropriate to correct clerical errors | Court’s final order accurately reflected its ruling; Mother failed to include the email in the appellate record | Court: Denial not an abuse of discretion; Mother waived record issue by not including email; Rule 60.01 relief not warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2013) (standard of review for factual findings in custody matters)
- Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2003) (two‑step analysis: material change threshold, then best‑interest factors)
- Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. 2002) (factors for determining material change in circumstances)
- Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2014) (deference to trial court credibility findings in custody cases)
- Finney v. Finney, 619 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (bench trial judgments must be based on evidence in the record or judicially noticed facts)
- Walton v. Young, 950 S.W.2d 956 (Tenn. 1997) (trial judge’s superior position to assess witness credibility)
- Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (what it means for the evidence to preponderate against a trial court’s factual findings)
- Wells v. Tennessee Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779 (Tenn. 1999) (standard for clear and convincing evidence to overturn credibility determinations)
- Continental Casualty Co. v. Smith, 720 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1986) (Rule 60.01 relief limited to clerical mistakes and oversight)
