In re Ashley R. CA2/4
B306895
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jul 30, 2021Background
- Mother (L.I.) and Father (R.R.) have two children (born 2015 and 2017). DCFS investigated after Mother obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) alleging a history of domestic violence by Father, including incidents in Nov. 2019 and Jan. 2020 when Father grabbed Mother’s neck while she was holding the children.
- Mother submitted a sworn TRO declaration describing repeated physical abuse (hands and charging cables) and stated the children had witnessed violence "all their lives." Mother later visited Father’s home after the TRO; Father and paternal grandmother reported Mother and the children had contact with Father despite the TRO.
- DCFS detained the children and filed a petition under Welf. & Inst. Code § 300(a) and § 300(b)(1), alleging ongoing domestic violence (counts a-1, b-1) and Father’s alcohol abuse (b-2); an allegation that Mother abused alcohol (b-3) was later dismissed.
- At adjudication the juvenile court sustained counts a-1, b-1 (domestic violence) and b-2 as to Father (striking allegations against Mother), found jurisdiction, removed the children from both parents, and ordered Mother to participate in domestic-violence support group, counseling (individual and conjoint if reconciling), and substance testing on suspicion.
- Mother appealed, arguing (1) insufficient evidence for jurisdiction under §§ 300(a) and 300(b)(1); (2) removal was improper because the court should have ordered voluntary supervision under § 301 (or § 360(b)); and (3) ordering services was improper because there was no showing she would refuse to participate voluntarily. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DCFS) | Defendant's Argument (Mother) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction under § 300(b)(1) based on ongoing domestic violence | Evidence (Mother’s TRO declaration and statements to CSWs, children’s spontaneous references) shows ongoing domestic violence in children’s presence creating substantial risk | Insufficient evidence of risk: no physical injury to children, only a neck-grab, no arrest, declaration unreliable (no K’iche’ interpreter) | Affirmed: substantial evidence supports jurisdiction under § 300(b)(1); child need not already be harmed and mother’s statements + child’s comments suffice |
| Removal vs. voluntary supervision (§ 301 / § 360(b)) | Removal appropriate given history of violence, TRO violations, and parents’ deception; § 301 supervision unavailable after petition filed; § 360(b) discretionary and not requested | Less drastic informal supervision should have been ordered to keep family together | Affirmed: § 301 was unavailable at disposition; mother forfeited § 360(b) argument by not asking trial court to exercise it; even if considered, court reasonably declined informal supervision |
| Ordering Mother to participate in services (§ 362) | Court may impose reasonable orders to remediate conditions leading to jurisdiction; services tailored to domestic violence and substance concerns | No basis to order compulsory services absent a finding mother would not voluntarily participate; invasion of privacy | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion ordering domestic-violence support group, counseling, and conditional substance testing; no requirement to find recalcitrance before ordering services |
Key Cases Cited
- In re J.K., 174 Cal.App.4th 1426 (substantial-evidence standard for jurisdiction/disposition review)
- In re Alexis E., 171 Cal.App.4th 438 (juvenile-court jurisdiction may be sustained on any one supported ground alleged in petition)
- In re T.V., 217 Cal.App.4th 126 (exposure to recurring domestic violence can support jurisdiction under § 300(b))
- In re Heather A., 52 Cal.App.4th 183 (ongoing domestic violence in child’s presence supports § 300(b)(1) jurisdiction)
- In re Daisy H., 192 Cal.App.4th 713 (physical parental violence supports § 300(b)(1) where likely to continue and places child at risk)
- In re N.M., 197 Cal.App.4th 159 (decision whether to use § 360(b) to avoid adjudication is discretionary for juvenile court)
