2020 IL App (5th) 190168
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- 2011 delinquent real-estate taxes on mineral rights (parcel 08-702-100-04) were sold; Kathy Riley purchased the certificate and later assigned it to Stephen and Opal Castleman. The redemption period expired October 10, 2015.
- The Castlemans filed a pro se petition for a tax deed and the circuit court entered an order directing issuance of a tax deed on October 19, 2015.
- On October 28, 2015 Brown and her siblings quitclaimed their interests in the mineral rights to SI Resources, LLC. Brown previously was identified in treasurer records as the delinquent taxpayer’s relative.
- SI Resources and Brown unsuccessfully moved under section 2-1203 to vacate the October 19, 2015 order; that dismissal was not timely appealed. The Castlemans’ certificate of purchase was later assigned to William and Vicki Groome, who obtained and recorded a tax deed on February 29, 2016.
- A separate mandamus proceeding resulted in a corrective tax deed issued to the Castlemans on October 27, 2017. On October 23, 2017 petitioners filed a two-count pleading: (I) a Section 22-85 motion to void the recorded tax deed for failure to take out and record within one year; and (II) a Section 2-1401 petition to vacate the October 19, 2015 order alleging fraud and defective notice.
- The circuit court dismissed count I (failure to state a claim) and count II (lack of standing). The petitioners appealed; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a standalone Section 22-85 "motion to void" is a recognized procedural vehicle to collaterally attack a recorded tax deed | Section 22-85 permits voiding a deed for failure to timely take out and record; petitioners may bring a distinct 22-85 motion to void the recorded deed | Section 22-45 prescribes the exclusive procedures (appeal, §2-1203, or §2-1401) to contest a tax deed; 22-85 is silent on procedure and is not a separate collateral vehicle | The court held a standalone 22-85 motion is not a recognized procedural vehicle to collaterally attack a tax deed; count I dismissed. |
| Whether the petitioners’ 22-85 claim can be treated as a §2-1401 petition | Courts have sometimes allowed 22-85 issues to be raised in §2-1401; petitioners urge that route | §22-45 limits §2-1401 grounds and does not include a §22-85 timing claim; treating all 22-85 claims as §2-1401 relief conflicts with statutory limits and precedent | The court declined to convert petitioners’ 22-85 motion into a §2-1401 petition (petitioners did not present it as such) and did not adopt broader treatment; dismissal stands. |
| Whether petitioners (SI Resources and Brown) had standing to bring the §2-1401 petition to vacate the October 19, 2015 order | Brown (and SI Resources) asserted they held an interest and thus could seek relief under §22-45(3) and (4) | Defendants argued Brown quitclaimed her interest to SI Resources before the petition; SI Resources acquired its interest after the judgment, so neither had standing when the judgment was entered or when petition was filed | The court followed its prior holding: Brown lacked standing because she quitclaimed her interest in 2015; SI Resources lacked standing because it acquired interest after the judgment; count II dismissed for lack of standing. |
| Whether Brown retained a 70% future "suspense" interest under the quitclaim deed (supporting standing) | Brown argued the deed conveyed 30% of impounded/suspense proceeds, so she retained 70% of future interest | Defendants argued the deed conveyed all of Brown’s interest (including royalty/right interests) and 30% extra of impounded proceeds; the plain reading transfers full present and future interests to SI Resources | The court rejected Brown’s interpretation as implausible; it held the quitclaim conveyed Brown’s full interest (and 30% of existing impounded proceeds), so Brown retained no future interest and lacked standing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Oldendorf v. General Motors Corp., 322 Ill. App. 3d 825 (2001) (§2-615 motion tests legal sufficiency of complaint)
- In re Application of the County Treasurer, 333 Ill. App. 3d 355 (2002) (§22-85 compliance may be raised in timely §2-1203 motion)
- Sarkissian v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 201 Ill. 2d 95 (2002) (§2-1401 provides remedial collateral attack for void judgments)
- Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Constr., 96 Ill. 2d 159 (1983) (tax-sale proceedings are in rem; court acquires jurisdiction over the land)
- Wilkins v. Dellenback, 149 Ill. App. 3d 549 (1986) (filing date for §2-1401 is the clerk’s file-stamp date)
- People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555 (2003) (failure to raise an affirmative defense waives it)