In re Apple, Inc.
149 F. Supp. 3d 341
E.D.N.Y2016Background
- DEA seized Jun Feng’s iPhone 5s (running iOS 7) during a 2014 search of his residence; a warrant to search the device issued in July 2015.
- Agents could not access passcode-protected data; Apple said it could assist but only if compelled by a court order.
- Government sought an order under the All Writs Act (AWA), 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), compelling Apple to bypass the passcode; Apple opposed.
- Feng pleaded guilty before trial, but the government maintained the AWA application, citing ongoing investigation and potential use at sentencing or against coconspirators.
- The court conducted adversarial briefing and argument, collected information about multiple similar AWA orders nationwide, and considered statutory interpretation and the discretionary N.Y. Tel. Co. factors (closeness, burden, necessity).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Apple) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of the AWA: can courts compel a private manufacturer to assist bypassing device security? | AWA authorizes courts to issue any writ not prohibited by statute if "necessary or appropriate" to aid jurisdiction. | AWA is a gap-filler limited by "usages and principles of law"; courts may not confer authority Congress considered and declined to enact. | Court rejects government’s broad reading; AWA does not authorize compelling Apple to provide the requested assistance because Congress considered (and did not adopt) legislation addressing such burdens and privacy/security tradeoffs. |
| Relevance of CALEA and related statutes | CALEA and other statutes do not address "data at rest" here and therefore do not preclude AWA relief. | CALEA and the broader statutory scheme define and limit mandatory law‑enforcement assistance; omission implies legislative choice not to impose duties on companies like Apple. | Court finds CALEA and the legislative context support Apple’s position that the relief sought is not "agreeable to the usages and principles of law." |
| Discretionary N.Y. Tel. Co. factor: closeness of Apple to the crime/investigation | Apple’s software and control over device security make it functionally close and thus appropriately subject to compulsion. | Apple sold the device to Feng and has no ownership or involvement in his crimes; mere vendor/customer relationship and software license do not create sufficient proximity. | Court holds Apple is too remote from Feng’s criminal conduct and not analogous to the telephone company in N.Y. Tel. Co.; closeness factor disfavors compulsion. |
| Discretionary N.Y. Tel. Co. factors: burden and necessity | Burden is minimal and decreasing; government lacks safe alternative only in narrow circumstances, so compulsion is justified. | Compulsion would impose substantial, non‑financial burdens (customer trust, security, brand, cumulative operational costs); government has not proven no feasible alternative. | Court finds burdens (including cumulative and reputational) unreasonable and that government failed to prove necessity—there are conflicting government assertions about third‑party capabilities—so discretionary factors weigh against relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (AWA may compel third‑party assistance in limited circumstances; sets closeness, burden, necessity factors)
- Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34 (1985) (AWA cannot be used where statute provides the exclusive means for relief)
- United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (look to common law in assessing what writs are "agreeable to the usages and principles of law")
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (limits on delegating legislative powers)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (compelled physical procedures contrasted with testimonial Fifth Amendment protections)