In re: Anthony Johnson, 810 F.3d 1247

Anthony Johnson, pro se, seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging a sentence triggered by a statute the Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States.
A court of appeals must certify a second-or-successive § 2255 filing only if it meets § 2255(h)’s gatekeeping standards; the movant must make a prima facie showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
Johnson’s petition depends in part on whether Johnson (2015) is retroactive on collateral review; the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Welch to resolve that retroactivity question.
The Eleventh Circuit panel held Johnson’s application in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Welch rather than ruling within the 30-day period specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D).
The court concluded the statutory 30-day requirement is not mandatory for the judiciary, citing principles that deadlines directed at courts must show clear consequences for noncompliance and that courts retain equitable powers (e.g., to hold matters in abeyance).
The panel noted AEDPA’s gatekeeping should not be read to displace traditional equitable habeas authority absent a clear congressional command and emphasized potential constitutional problems if the timeframe were deemed jurisdictional.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2244(b)(3)(D)’s 30-day rule is mandatory	Johnson: Court should be allowed to wait for Supreme Court resolution of retroactivity (Welch) before ruling	Government: (Implicit) statute requires grant/deny within 30 days	Court: 30-day timeframe is not mandatory; court may hold application in abeyance
Whether the court may hold a second-or-successive § 2255 application in abeyance pending Supreme Court decision	Johnson: Abeyance preserves ability to obtain relief before statute of limitations runs	Government: (Implicit) prompt decision required to enforce AEDPA limits	Court: Abeyance is permissible; courts have inherent/equitable power to delay adjudication when appropriate
Whether AEDPA displaced traditional equitable habeas powers	Johnson: AEDPA’s gatekeeping shouldn’t preclude equitable management of cases	Government: AEDPA imposes strict procedural limits including the 30-day directive	Court: AEDPA does not clearly displace equitable authority; construing the 30-day limit as mandatory raises serious constitutional concerns
Whether prior Eleventh Circuit language in In re Henry requires strict 30-day application	Johnson: Henry was dicta on this point and not controlling	Government: (Implicit) Henry suggested strict deadline applies	Court: Henry’s remarks were dicta; not binding on the mandatory-timeline question

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Supreme Court decision striking down residual clause used to impose enhanced sentence)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (recognizing inherent appellate power to manage proceedings, including stays and abeyances)
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable principles govern habeas; courts resist statutory constructions that displace equitable authority)
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005) (limitations period for § 2255 runs from date new rule is recognized, not from date rule is made retroactive)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (consider AEDPA’s purposes and practical effects when interpreting habeas statutes)
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (habeas corpus is an equitable remedy; equitable principles apply)
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (procedural mechanisms for collateral review and interactions with Supreme Court review)
Fort Worth Nat. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1972) (statutory time is not mandatory absent explicit consequence for noncompliance)
In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009) (Eleventh Circuit previously exceeded 30-day period to allow considered adjudication)