In re Amey
2012 D.C. App. LEXIS 138
D.C.2012Background
- Superior Court judge ordered Maurice Ames? involuntary civil commitment for one year under the Ervin Act after a jury found mental illness and dangerousness.
- Appellant challenged Dr. Schwartz’s direct testimony referencing hospital records and other hearsay as bases for opinions on mental illness and dangerousness.
- Appellant argued (1) Melton-era requirement to show hearsay bases are substantially more probative than prejudicial under Rule 703 2000 amendment (not found here); and (2) Crawford confrontation concerns.
- Trial evidence included two community assaults; victims Anderson and Chen testified; no stun gun found at scene.
- Dr. Schwartz, hospital psychiatrist, based opinions on records, interviews, and communications with staff and family, including hearsay sources.
- Limiting instruction was given at trial end; appellant declined a mid-trial repeat; the court ultimately admitted hearsay bases to assist evaluation of opinions, not as substantive proof.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hearsay bases admissibility under Rule 703 | Ames argued hearsay bases must be weighed for probative value | Ames contends 2000 Rule 703 amendment requires such findings | Not error; DC common law preferred; no plain error shown |
| Confrontation Clause in involuntary commitment | Crawford requires exclusion of testimonial hearsay bases not subjected to cross-examination | Civil commitment not criminal; Crawford not controlling; due process suffices | Sixth Amendment not applicable; no plain error in permitting hearsay bases; due process sufficient |
| Effect of limiting instruction and test for prejudice | Hearsay bases could mislead jury absent stronger safeguards | Limiting instruction given; testimony corroborated by appellant’s own expert; no prejudice shown | No reversible error; instructions and corroboration mitigate risk |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Morris, 482 A.2d 369 (D.C.1984) (mootness and collateral consequences not addressed here but relevance to reviewability)
- In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C.Cir.1973) (not moot; repetition and collateral consequences keep reviewability)
- L.C.D. v. District of Columbia, 488 A.2d 918 (D.C.1985) (trust in hearsay bases; admissibility based on customary reliance by experts)
- Melton, 597 A.2d 892 (D.C.1991) (set framework for relying on hearsay with limiting instructions; need explicit reasonableness findings)
- Reed v. United States, 584 A.2d 585 (D.C.1990) (testimony may reference hearsay bases if probative value outweighs prejudice; Rule 403 balancing)
- Lyons v. Barrazotto, 667 A.2d 314 (D.C.1995) (hearsay bases admissible to show basis of opinion; balancing against prejudice allowed)
- Banks, 646 A.2d 972 (D.C.1994) (depositions relied on by expert admissible to show bases)
- Wilkes v. United States, 631 A.2d 880 (D.C.1993) (acknowledges hearsay basis generally relied on by experts)
- Samuels, 507 A.2d 150 (D.C.1986) (noting conceptual problem with using hearsay to prove dangerousness)
- Young v. United States, 863 A.2d 804 (D.C.2004) ( Crawford not applicable in non-criminal proceedings like probation)
- In re Stout, 159 Wash.2d 357 (2007) (Crawford-like concerns in noncriminal civil commitment)