309 So.3d 192
Fla.2020Background
- The Florida Supreme Court, on its own motion, amended Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 (summary judgment) to adopt the federal summary judgment standard as articulated in Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita. The amendment is effective May 1, 2021.
- The Court observed that Florida Rule 1.510(c) and Federal Rule 56(a) are textually and purposively similar (both aim to secure just, speedy, inexpensive determinations), but Florida caselaw had diverged in three key ways.
- Three principal differences identified: (1) Florida historically treated summary judgment as distinct from directed verdict standards; (2) Florida required movants to disprove the nonmovant’s theory (Holl v. Talcott), while the federal approach allows movants to point to an absence of evidence (Celotex); (3) Florida often treated the existence of any competent evidence (even minimal) as defeating summary judgment, whereas the federal standard asks whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
- The Court concluded the federal standard better advances rule 1.010’s goals (just, speedy, inexpensive) and is more consistent and fair, while reaffirming that summary judgment is not a substitute for trial on genuine factual disputes.
- The Court opened a 60-day public comment period (comments due March 2, 2021) on the amendment and whether ancillary amendments or adoption of text from Federal Rule 56 are advisable.
- Justice Labarga dissented, arguing the change unduly diminishes the jury’s fact-finding role and lowers the caution historically applied before granting summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Proponents' Argument | Dissent (Labarga) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Florida should adopt the federal summary-judgment standard | Aligns rule text/purpose with Rule 56; improves efficiency; matches majority of states | Undermines jury role; risks courts weighing evidence and usurping jury function | Adopted federal standard; amendment effective May 1, 2021 |
| Whether movant must negate nonmovant’s theory (Holl approach) or may show absence of evidence (Celotex approach) | Movant may discharge burden by pointing to absence of evidence; burden varies with who bears persuasion at trial | Lowers bar and reduces caution before granting summary judgment | Adopted Celotex approach; movant need not conclusively disprove opponent’s theory |
| What counts as a genuine issue of material fact (any competent evidence vs reasonable-jury standard) | Use federal test: whether reasonable jury could return a verdict for nonmovant; exclude merely colorable or metaphysical doubts | Florida’s prior rule (any competent evidence) better preserves jury decisions on disputed facts | Adopted reasonable-jury standard (Anderson/Matsushita/Scott guidance) |
| Implementation and opportunity for comment | Invite public and committee input; allow consideration of ancillary textual changes or full adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 text | Urged caution but did not prevent amendment | Amendment issued with 60-day comment period; comments due March 2, 2021 |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant may show absence of evidence rather than negate opponent’s claim)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment inquiry asks whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (opposing party must do more than show metaphysical doubt; implausible factual claims insufficient)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (courts need not adopt factual versions that are blatantly contradicted by the record)
- Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966) (historic Florida precedent requiring movant to disprove nonmovant’s theory)
- Humphrys v. Jarrell, 104 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (caution urged in granting summary judgment due to its preclusive effect)