in Re Adriene L. Sibley, 01-15-00196-CV

Background

Seminole Pipeline Company LLC holds three 1981 recorded 30-foot pipeline easements across property now claimed by descendants/heirs (the "Rossaws").
In January 2014 Seminole (through Enterprise/contractor) performed pipeline repair work that required use of land outside the 30-foot easement; Seminole alleges defendants interfered (alleged lock, demand for payment) and ceased operations to avoid greater costs.
Seminole sued Adriene Sibley and others in Brazoria County Court at Law No. 3 for breach of the easements and sought injunctive relief and damages; it obtained a temporary restraining order in February 2014.
Sibley removed (and attempted removal) the case to federal court and filed various defensive motions (plea to jurisdiction, motion to dismiss, motion to transfer venue, motions related to removal and remand); Sibley later filed a petition in the First Court of Appeals seeking prohibitory and mandamus relief against the county court judge.
Sibley contends the county court lacks jurisdiction because she is not a party to the original easement contract, the dispute is moot or unripe (thus would yield an advisory opinion), and the trial court has failed to promptly rule on her Rule 86/87 motion to transfer venue.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Does the county court have jurisdiction over Seminole's breach claim against Sibley?	Seminole: easements grant rights; Sibley (as purported successor/ heir) interfered with Seminole's easement rights and thus can be sued for breach and injunctive relief.	Sibley: she is merely an heir/successor who never consented to the 1981 easement contract; no contract existed between Seminole and Sibley, so county court lacks jurisdiction.	Not decided in this petition record — petitioner asks appellate court for prohibition; no appellate ruling included in the submitted petition.
2) Would adjudication constitute an impermissible advisory opinion (mootness/ripeness)?	Seminole: alleged interference caused cessation of operations and ongoing injury; relief is necessary and justiciable.	Sibley: Seminole had access and used easement until it voluntarily stopped operations; allegations show no present denial of access, so case is moot/unripe and any judgment would be advisory.	Not decided in this petition record — petitioner asks appellate court for prohibition; no appellate ruling included in the submitted petition.
3) Is the trial court required to promptly rule on Sibley’s Rule 86/87 motion to transfer venue?	Seminole: venue in Brazoria County is mandatory and proper.	Sibley: Rule 87’s timing is mandatory; trial court must promptly determine transfer motion and mandamus should compel a ruling.	Not decided in this petition record — petitioner asks appellate court for mandamus to compel a venue ruling; no appellate ruling included in the submitted petition.
4) Is extraordinary relief (prohibition/mandamus) appropriate to halt or compel county-court action?	Seminole: normal remedies (trial/appeal) suffice; proceedings should continue.	Sibley: county court is acting without lawful jurisdiction or is issuing advisory relief and failing to act on mandatory venue motion, so prohibition or mandamus is necessary.	Not decided in this petition record — petitioner seeks writs; no appellate disposition provided in the document.

Key Cases Cited

Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1991) (ministerial-duty standard and separation-of-powers/advisory-opinion principles)
Humble Exploration Co. v. Walker, 641 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1982) (writ of prohibition to prevent inferior court acting beyond jurisdiction)
In re Lewis, 223 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 2007) (appellate writs as limited-purpose remedies)
In re Roof, 130 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2004) (mandamus to compel ministerial act)
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998) (prohibition on advisory opinions by courts under separation-of-powers)
Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (ripeness and justiciability principles)