In re A.A. CA4/2
E076122
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jun 11, 2021Background
- Two daughters (I.A., age 3; A.A., age 2) were the subject of a dependency petition after multiple disclosures that father inappropriately touched their genital areas (including reenactments indicating digital contact).
- Disclosures were made repeatedly to mother, social workers, CAC medical staff, a forensic interviewer, and foster parents; foster parents and social workers observed behaviors and poor physical boundaries consistent with sexual trauma.
- Father denied the allegations, blamed older daughter Haley and others, and had prior allegations of sexual misconduct and a history of domestic violence.
- The juvenile court detained the children, found the section 300(d) sexual-abuse allegations true by clear and convincing evidence at a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing, and removed the children from parental custody.
- At disposition the court concluded the conduct constituted "severe sexual abuse" (e.g., manipulation/penetration by an animate object—father’s fingers), applied the reunification-bypass provision (Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.5(b)(6)), denied father reunification services, and found visitation detrimental and therefore denied it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Could the court properly deny reunification services under § 361.5(b)(6) when the court made a § 300(d) sexual-abuse finding (and dismissed an amended § 300(e) alleging severe sexual abuse)? | County: The combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing permitted the court to consider and make a severe-sexual-abuse finding; I.A.’s consistent reenactments describing digital manipulation meet the § 361.5(b)(6)(B) description, so bypass is appropriate. | Father: The court never made a jurisdictional finding of "severe" sexual abuse (it dismissed the § 300(e) allegation), so it could not apply the bypass at disposition; severe-abuse finding cannot be made only at disposition. | Court may reopen/address severe-abuse at the combined hearing; substantial evidence (consistent disclosures, reenactment of digital manipulation, behavioral indicators) supports a finding of severe sexual abuse and proper application of § 361.5(b)(6) to deny services. |
| 2) Was the denial of visitation an abuse of discretion? | County: Visitation is discretionary when reunification services are bypassed; given severity of allegations, children’s disclosures and trauma-consistent behavior, visitation would be detrimental. | Father: Court improperly "confirmed a detriment finding" without prior detriment finding and lacked evidence to support denying visits. | When services are bypassed visitation is discretionary under § 361.5(f); substantial evidence (children’s fear, continued disclosures, clinician/social-worker concerns, and father’s lack of responsibility) supported the court’s finding that visitation would be detrimental and denial was not an abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Allison J., 190 Cal.App.4th 1106 (2010) (describing reunification-bypass provisions and legislative purpose)
- Jennifer S. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.App.5th 1113 (2017) (standard of review: substantial evidence for bypass orders)
- In re J.N., 138 Cal.App.4th 450 (2006) (when services are denied under § 361.5(b)(6), visitation is discretionary and may be denied if detrimental)
- In re Stephanie M., 7 Cal.4th 295 (1994) (abuse-of-discretion standard for welfare-court determinations)
- In re C.C., 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 (2009) (visitation must not jeopardize child safety; mandatory during reunification absent exceptional circumstances)
- Estate of Young, 160 Cal.App.4th 62 (2008) (trial court has broad discretion to reopen and address issues during ongoing proceedings)