*1116In this consolidated writ proceeding, Jennifer S. (mother) and Kenneth S. (father) seek extraordinary relief from the juvenile court order denying them both reunification services with respect to their infant daughter, K.S. (born January 2017), and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. BACKGROUND
K.S., the minor who is the subject of these proceedings, was detained by the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) shortly after her birth in January 2017, due to a referral indicating that mother had tested positive for methamphetamines during a recent prenatal visit. According to the underlying dependency petition-as it was ultimately sustained by the juvenile court-K.S. (the couple's only child in common) was described by subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300 due to: mother's long history of substance abuse for which she failed to receive treatment; the termination of mother's parental rights with respect to four previous children based on her untreated polysubstance abuse; the parents' history of domestic violence; father's history of substance abuse, for which he failed to seek treatment until June 2017; and the termination of father's parental rights to three other children in 2008.
*753According to records supplied by the Agency, in 2010 mother gave birth to a daughter, C.S., who was detained after mother and baby tested positive for cocaine at birth. Mother was found to have an on-going substance abuse problem, a history of psychiatric hospitalizations, and a lack of stable housing. Reunification services were ordered for mother, including residential drug treatment, individual therapy, a psychological evaluation, and parenting classes. Unfortunately, those services were terminated as unsuccessful, and mother's parental rights were terminated with respect to C.S. in January 2012. Thereafter, in July 2012, mother's next child, K.G., was detained shortly after birth due to mother's unresolved problems with substance abuse, mental health issues, homelessness, criminality, and child welfare involvement. Mother was bypassed for reunification with respect to K.G., and her parental rights were ultimately terminated. In 2013, mother gave birth to twins-J.S. and R.S.-who were immediately detained due to positive toxicology screens for crack cocaine and marijuana (for mother and both babies) and mother's substance abuse history. Mother was bypassed for reunification with respect to the twins, and her parental rights were terminated in July 2014.
Similarly, father's three older children-K.S. (born June 2004) and twins P.S. and C.S. (born January 2006)-were detained in September 2006 due *1118to their mother's substance abuse and failure to provide for their care. The petitions filed with respect to these minors additionally alleged that father had criminal drug convictions, was incarcerated, and was unable to care for the minors. At a hearing in May 2007, the mother's reunification services were terminated, and father was ordered to engage in reunification efforts, including: refraining from the use of alcohol and illegal substances; random drug testing; successful completion of a program of counseling/psychiatric therapy as recommended after assessment; substance abuse assessment and related treatment; and visitation. However, in September 2007, father's reunification services were terminated after the juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that father had failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in the court-ordered services. Father's parental rights with respect to the three minors were then terminated at a February 2008 permanency planning hearing.
In the current case, both parents admitted to their long histories of substance abuse. According to mother, she began abusing alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine at age 12, with her drug of choice being crack cocaine. She also reported a history of prostitution, criminal behavior, and being " 'out on the street.' "
The parents also denied domestic violence in their relationship. However, at the time the petition was filed, there was an active restraining order against father, naming mother as the protected person.
After the filing of the petition in this matter, each parent made some efforts to engage in substance abuse treatment and related services. After a brief stay in a residential program, which mother reported leaving because it was not a good fit for her, mother had been engaged in outpatient substance abuse treatment starting in April 2017. During that same timeframe, she consistently tested negative for drugs and met with an anger management counselor. She also started working with family treatment court.
Father began participating in outpatient substance abuse treatment on May 24, 2017, less than a month before the contested dispositional hearing. During this same period, he also participated in a fatherhood initiative class and signed up for family treatment court. However, since the minor was removed in January, father had only drug tested twice for the Agency, in June, claiming difficulties with transportation due to his disability. At the contested hearing, *755the social worker testified that she believed father did have access to a car. Specifically, she had seen him drive to visits and had reviewed a March 2017 police report which indicated that father had a car registered in his name. Moreover, although father was drug testing with his doctor on a monthly basis in preparation for hip replacement surgery and six negative tests were reported, the social worker did not consider those tests to be random.
Finally, both parents consistently visited with K.S. and were reported to be appropriate and able to meet the minor's needs during visitation. K.S. was *1120generally doing well. However, the social worker testified, based on her experience, that the minor was exhibiting some physical symptoms that were consistent with in utero drug exposure. And, in testimony at the June 2017 contested hearing, mother finally, for the first time, acknowledged that it was possible that she tested positive for drugs during her pregnancy.
At the conclusion of the contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on June 14, 2017, the juvenile court found K.S. to be a minor described by subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300 and declared dependency, removing the minor from the parents' physical custody. Thereafter, while acknowledging the recent steps taken by the parents to address their issues, the court concluded that their efforts were not sufficient to overcome a bypass finding under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. It therefore ordered no reunification services for either parent, and set a permanency planning hearing for K.S.
Both parents subsequently filed notices of intent to file writ petitions, and the petitions themselves were filed in July 2017.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Bypass of Reunification Services Under Subdivision (b)(10) of Section 361.5
1. Statutory Framework and Standard of Review
As a general rule, when a child is removed from parental custody under the dependency laws, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to "the child and the child's mother and statutorily presumed father...." (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The purpose of reunification efforts is to "eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible." ( In re Baby Boy H. (1998)
*1121Baby Boy H. , supra , 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 478,
The statutory sections authorizing denial of reunification services are sometimes referred to as "bypass" provisions. ( Melissa R. v. Superior Court (2012)
The "reasonable effort[s]" necessary to avoid subdivision (b)(10) bypass are not synonymous with " 'cure.' " ( Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002)
We review an order denying reunification services under subdivision (b) of section 361.5 for substantial evidence. ( Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006)
2. Validity of Mother's Bypass Order
Mother contends that the juvenile court's order denying her reunification services in this case was not supported by substantial evidence because the record revealed that she was finally making reasonable efforts to treat her, admittedly, long-term problem with substance abuse. Specifically, mother claims that her recent efforts, including finding-without the social worker's assistance-a treatment program that was the right fit for her; providing 14 negative drug tests prior to the dispositional hearing; engaging with an anger management counselor; and positively *757and consistently visiting with K.S. showed a new maturity and dedication to sober-living that she did not possess during the previous dependencies of the minor's four half-siblings. As such, mother argues, they should be deemed reasonable efforts for purposes of defeating (b)(10) bypass.
While we agree with the juvenile court that mother's recent efforts are certainly laudable, we have no difficulty concluding that substantial evidence supports the court's bypass order with respect to mother. As the juvenile court stated, mother's efforts came extremely late, not only in terms of her many years of addiction, but also in terms of this particular minor. Specifically, mother continued to use drugs on at least one occasion despite knowing she was pregnant with K.S. and did not enter her outpatient treatment program until April 2017, three months after the minor's birth and detention. Moreover, mother refused to admit that she had used methamphetamines during her pregnancy with K.S. up until she gave testimony at the June 2017 contested hearing. Further, the juvenile court expressly found that mother's denial of domestic violence in her relationship with father was not credible and concluded, based upon her observations of mother on the witness stand, that mother remained "in denial of a lot of issues that she needs to work on and face." Under such circumstances, we can find no fault with the juvenile court's observation that "it takes a long time, really, to make reasonable efforts sometimes when you've had such a long history." We see no error.
3. Validity of Father's Bypass Order
We next consider father's challenges to the bypass decision made pursuant to subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 with respect to his reunification *1123services. Father argues in this court that the Agency failed to prove that he did not make reasonable efforts to treat his problems because it did not present sufficient evidence regarding the bases for the removal of his older children.
It is true that, where there is a lack of information with respect to the circumstances of the prior dependency action, bypass of reunification pursuant to subdivisions (b)(10) or (b)(11) of section 361.5 may not be appropriate. ( In re D.H. (2014)
Although, as father correctly points out, he was not incarcerated during these current proceedings, the record does not support father's related claim that incarceration was no longer an issue for him. Rather, although the social worker did not detail father's arrests between 2006 and 2010-stating only that he had an almost 30 year criminal history-the record does disclose that father was arrested on at least 14 separate occasions between 2010 and 2016, after the removal of his older children in 2006 and as recently as one month prior to K.S.'s birth. It is difficult to argue that this represents a reasonable effort to deal with his criminal recidivism.
*1124With respect to father's efforts to address his long-term substance abuse issue, the juvenile court found as a jurisdictional fact that "the presumed father has a history of substance abuse problems" for which he "failed to seek treatment until June of 2017," a finding no party has challenged before this court. As the juvenile court correctly noted in this case, the parents "have had years, years to address the problems that caused the first removals of their respective children." We thus have no trouble finding support in the record for the court's related conclusion that father's minimal efforts at engaging in substance abuse treatment mere weeks before the June 2017 contested hearing were not a reasonable effort to treat this problem for purposes of subdivision (b)(10) bypass. Finally, while it is true that there is no definitive evidence in this matter that father was currently abusing substances, there are certainly facts in the record from which the juvenile court could reasonably infer a continuing problem, including: father's ongoing criminal lifestyle, in particular an arrest in 2015 for possession of a controlled substance; father's persistent failure to comply with random drug testing since the minor's removal; the long-standing nature of his substance abuse problem; mother's drug use while living with father shortly before the minor's birth; mother's arrest for possession of a controlled substance in 2016; and the requirement of father's doctor that father drug test prior to his anticipated hip replacement surgery. Under all of these circumstances, we conclude that the juvenile court's decision to bypass reunification for father pursuant to subdivision (b)(10) was sufficiently supported by the evidence.
B. Best Interests of Minor Pursuant to Section 361.5, Subdivision (c)
Pursuant to section 361.5, once the juvenile court determines that a parent is described by subdivision (b)(10) of that statute, it shall not order reunification services for that parent "unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child." (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) " 'The concept of a child's best interest "is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a child's opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult." ' " ( In re William B. (2008)
In the present matter, the juvenile court expressly found that offering reunification services to the parents would not be in K.S.'s best interest. Mother challenges this finding in her writ petition, claiming that reunification would be in K.S.'s best interest because both parents had been establishing a bond with the minor through consistent and appropriate visitation and were engaging in services to address the Agency's concerns.
We note, however, several crucial distinctions between the mother's situation in G.L. and mother's circumstances here. First, the G.L. mother-in addition to positive recent interactions-had primary responsibility for the then-two-year-old minor for the first 5 months of his life. ( G.L. , supra , 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163,
Indeed-although we recognize and applaud mother's recent efforts in this case-given the extent of her substance abuse history, her clear resistance to prior court-ordered treatment for this and related issues, her relatively recent engagement in services, and the young age of the minor, we would be extremely hard pressed to find error on the part of the court below based on *1126its analysis of K.S.'s best interest. As the G.L. court noted in upholding the best interest determination of the juvenile court in that case, the fact "[t]hat there is evidence in the record supporting *760the opposite finding ... does not mean the court abused its discretion in finding it was in G.L.'s best interests to reunify with [his mother]." ( G.L. , supra , 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1166,
While, based on our various standards of review, we affirm the juvenile court's bypass determinations in this matter, we take this opportunity to express our continued frustration at the state of the evidentiary record regularly provided to us by many child welfare departments in bypass cases under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. It is true that, pursuant to these subdivisions, a prior termination of reunification services or parental rights is required, and thus court orders memorializing those outcomes are undoubtedly useful in a later dependency matter where bypass is requested. However, the existence of these readily ascertainable facts are rarely the focus of any bypass dispute. Rather, parents invariably argue that they have since made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the previous sibling removal. (See § 361.5, subd. (b)(10) & (11).) In order to meet its burden to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a lack of reasonable efforts in this regard, child welfare workers must focus on the facts underlying the previous dependency action and it resolution, as well as on any efforts made by the parent since the sibling removal . ( Cheryl P. , supra , 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 98,
We agree wholeheartedly with petitioners' position that "[t]he failure of a parent to reunify with a prior child should never cause the court to reflexively deny that parent a meaningful chance to do so in a later case." ( Renee J. , supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464,
III. DISPOSITION
The consolidated petitions are denied on their merits. ( § 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C), (4)(B).) Because the permanency planning hearing in this matter is set for October 12, 2017, this opinion is final as to this *761court immediately. (Rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
We concur:
RIVERA, ACTING P. J.
STREETER, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
Mother and father were reportedly married in December 2015 and were living together at the time K.S. was born. Father was declared the presumed father of K.S. in February 2017.
Mother's criminal history includes arrests for receiving stolen property, taking a vehicle without consent, and threatening a crime with intent to terrorize (2000); failure to obey a juvenile court order and loitering with the intent to commit prostitution (2001); possession of marijuana for sale (2003); battery on a person and obstructing/resisting a public officer (2008); assault with a deadly weapon (not a firearm) with great bodily injury likely (2008); domestic battery and vandalism (2008); transportation/sale of narcotics (2011); and possession of a controlled substance (2016).
Indeed, father's criminal history spanned almost 30 years, with multiple arrests for possession of narcotics for sale, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of crack cocaine. Recent arrests include petty theft (2010); possession of a controlled substance and violation of probation (2010); second degree robbery, possession of a controlled substance, and trespass (2012); possession of a controlled substance for sale, possession of paraphernalia, and carrying dirk/dagger (2012); burglary, assault with great bodily injury, receiving known stolen property, and committing an offense while on bail (2012); unlawful driving/taking of a vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, and probation violation (2013); second degree burglary, vandalism, and battery (2014); possession of a controlled substance (2015); domestic violence (2015); assault with great bodily injury, possession of a switch blade, and resisting/obstructing police officer/EMT (2016); reckless driving, forgery of registration, driving without a valid license, and receiving stolen property (2016); and petty theft (2016).
Although the restraining order was not set to expire until November 2017, the parents went to court and had it lifted in April 2017, while this matter was pending in the juvenile court.
Mother joins in this argument in her writ petition.
The Agency asserts that mother has forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the juvenile court. Mother's counsel, however, did argue generally that mother had changed and should be given a chance to parent the minor, and the juvenile court expressly found that reunification was not in K.S.'s best interest based on the "evidence presented for both mother and father." On this basis, we will reach the issue.